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Abstract 
 
The Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Malaria and TB and U.S 
President’s Emergency Fund for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) are global health 
initiatives (GHIs) that were established in the early 2000s with the 
mandates to increase global capacity to address HIV and AIDS rapidly. 
When the two GHIs were created, Namibia was one of the highest 
recipients of funding from both GHIs. A significant portion of their 
support to the country went to the Ministry of Health, which was the 
principal provider of treatment services in the country. Critics have 
argued, however, that the rise of financial support from the Global Fund 
and PEPFAR was associated with the creation of new administrative 
structures and procedures at the country level. This approach raises 
important questions about the degree to which Namibian health 
policymakers were able to exercise autonomy in the presence of GHI 
support.  
The aim of this thesis is to analyse the implications for 
institutional capacity and autonomy at the rise and fall of funding from 
the Global Fund and PEPFAR to the Ministry of Health concerning 
financial flows; human resources recruitment; and civil society 
engagement. With a focus on the changing relationship between the 
Ministry of Health and the two initiatives, the thesis examines the 
implications for country ownership and health systems capacity in the 
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context of decreasing financial support from the Global Fund and 
PEPFAR.  
The field studies for this research was undertaken in 2011- 2012, 
when the two GHIs had indicated their intentions to scale-down the 
financial support made available to Namibia. This thesis uses multiple 
sources of data to qualitatively analyse the influences of Global Fund and 
PEPFAR support to Namibia from when the two initiatives were first 
established in 2002 and 2004, respectively, to 2012. A principal source of 
data was 43 semi-structured interviews conducted in Namibia during a 
placement with the Directorate of Special Programs in the Ministry of 
Health in early 2012.  
For financial flows, both the Global Fund and PEPFAR channelled 
and managed their funding through funder-specific structures and 
procedures that were developed and operated in parallel to existing 
Ministry of Health operations. Both for financial flows and human 
resources, initial structures and processes created difficulties for the 
Ministry of Health’s long-term objectives for HIV and AIDS. For civil 
society engagement, the thesis examined the Ministry of Health’s 
relationship with the Global Fund. At the rise of funding, the Global 
Fund required the establishment of a new multi-sector coordination 
structure for HIV and AIDS. This new structure operated at the same 
time as the existing national coordination structure and was perceived as 
having undermined the Ministry of Health’s role as the primary steward 
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of Namibia's response. The Global Fund was also criticised for initially 
funding civil society organisations without making provisions for 
sustaining their capacity in the event of funding decline. 
The findings presented in this thesis indicate that at the rise of 
financing, the Ministry of Health’s engagement with the two HIV and 
AIDS GHIs initiatives was governed by the objectives of the two 
initiatives, rather than the long-term health systems goals of the 
Namibian Government. Their relationships with Namibia had an adverse 
impact on the Ministry of Health’s autonomy in making decisions on the 
national response to HIV and AIDS. The initial operations of the GHIs 
also had negative implications for Namibia's ability to sustain the health 
systems capacity they had helped to increase.  
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Lay Summary 
 
Building strong foundations for health systems interventions is 
essential for conditions, such as HIV and AIDS, which are treatable, but 
are not curable. This thesis aims to contribute to research on how 
international donors to HIV and AIDS engage with recipient country 
health systems.  It examines the implications for country ownership in 
Namibia’s relationship with the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis 
and Malaria and the U.S President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief 
(PEPFAR).  
In conjunction with the Namibian Government and other 
stakeholders, the assistance from the Global Fund and PEPFAR 
facilitated a rapid increase in HIV and AIDS prevention, treatment and 
care services in the country. When interview data for this thesis was 
collected in early 2012, respondents from the Ministry of Health indicated 
that financial support from the Global Fund and PEPFAR to Namibia 
was on the decline. This decrease in funding to Namibia from both 
initiatives was happening despite the country’s position as having one of 
the highest HIV and AIDS prevalence in the world.  
With the transition in funding as a cross-cutting theme, this thesis 
examines the administrative structures and practices that were adopted 
in relation the two initiatives at the rise of Global Fund and PEPFAR 
funding to Namibia. The thesis then examines the implications that these 
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structures and practices had for the Ministry of Health when financing 
from two GHIs was on the decline. The thesis has a thematic sub-focus on 
financial management and flows, human resources management, and 
civil society engagement. The research primarily draws on interview data 
that was collected from February to June 2012, during a placement with 
the Ministry of Health. In total, there were 43 semi-structured interviews 
with representatives from the Ministry of Health, Global Fund and 
PEPFAR. The thesis also draws on interviews with other stakeholders in 
the national HIV and AIDS response, such as members of other 
government agencies, civil society agencies, and international 
development agencies.  
The results of the research indicate that when the Global Fund and 
PEPFAR first started to provide funding to Namibia, the administrative 
structures that governed its relationship with the Ministry of Health 
were not aimed at encouraging country ownership. Through focusing on 
the rise and fall of Global Fund and PEPFAR support to Namibia, the 
research shows that several decisions that appeared to be sensible when 
the Ministry of Health first started to engage with the two initiatives 
proved to be problematic when the country was faced with a decline in 
financial support from the two initiatives. The initial operational 
decisions ended up having negative implications for the Ministry of 
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1.1 Why Examine Global Fund and PEPFAR in Namibia? 
 
This thesis is an examination of Namibia’s relationship with two 
global health initiatives (GHIs): The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund) and the U.S President’s 
Emergency Fund for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). The Global Fund and 
PEPFAR are part of a growth in issue-specific GHIs, which became 
prevalent in international development for health as from the late 1990s 
(McCoy et al., 2009; Ravishankar et al., 2009). In an analysis of 
development aid data from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD), Ravishankar et al. (2009) found that 
international assistance to health increased from US$5.6 billion in 1990 
to US$21.8 billion in 2007. Their analysis further revealed that health 
aid doubled in the 11 years between 1990 and 2001, but and then doubled 
again in the six years between 2001 and 2007 (Ravishankar et al., 2009). 
According to Ravishankar et al. (2009), a disproportionate increase in 
health aid that occurred post-2000 was mainly due to funding specifically 
targeted for HIV and AIDS (Ravishankar et al., 2009).  
The Global Fund and PEPFAR have been two of the most 
prominent global health initiatives (GHIs) for HIV and AIDS (Bilimoria, 
2012; McCoy et al., 2009; Riddell, 2007). The Global Fund was 
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established in 2002 and PEPFAR was created in 2004. By 2010, the 
Global Fund and PEPFAR were the sources of more than 20% of total 
international funding for HIV and AIDS (Truong, 2013; Voelker, 2010). 
This thesis reflects a policy and academic interest in understanding the 
impacts of the two GHIs on the health systems of countries that have 
received their support (Amaya et al., 2014; Biesma et al., 2009; 
Kapilashrami and McPake, 2013; WHO Maximising Positive Synergies 
Collaborative Group, 2009). 
The volume of funding from HIV and AIDS GHIs means that they 
have significant potential to dictate the health agendas of recipient 
countries (Caines et al., 2004; Hanefeld et al., 2007; Sridhar and Batniji, 
2008). Initiatives such as the Global Fund and PEPFAR may also have 
the potential to create the dilemma that recipients might not be able to 
sustain the levels of increased funding and operational capacity 
facilitated by the presence of GHIs (Caines et al., 2004). Understanding 
interactions between country health systems and GHIs can help national 
policy-makers determine how to minimise their negative impacts and 
sustain their positive effects (Walker, 2009; WHO Maximising Positive 
Synergies, 2009). 
Due to its high HIV and AIDS prevalence, the country Namibia 
was initially one of the highest per capita recipients of funding from both 
the Global Fund and PEPFAR (Hecht et al., 2010; Youde, 2010). At the 
time when interview data for this thesis was collected in 2012, it was 
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evident that the Global Fund and PEPFAR had changed their starting 
funding priorities. They had made a shift towards funding countries on 
their perceived ability to pay for their health interventions, rather than 
primarily on the basis of population health needs as had initially been the 
case (110th USA Congress, 2008; The Global Fund, 2013a, 2012a). Both 
GHIs had also moved away from their original message of a focus on the 
rapid scale-up of HIV and AIDS interventions and began to emphasise 
issues of country ownership and sustainable health interventions (110th 
USA Congress, 2008; Holmes et al., 2012; The Global Fund, 2013a, 
2012a). Their shifting priorities had a direct impact on Namibia. 
With a focus on Global Fund and PEPFAR funding to Namibia, 
this thesis examines the changing relationship between the two 
initiatives and the Ministry of Health. The thesis aims to answer the 
question: To what extent was Namibia able to exercise ownership in its 
engagement with the Global Fund and PEPFAR, given the rise and fall of 
GHI funding to the country? In this thesis, the recipient country's health 
system is the central unit of analysis. Given its pre-GHI role as the 
primary steward of the Namibian health sector, this thesis looks at the 
issue of ownership from the perspective of the Ministry of Health as the 
main unit of analysis. The underlying research sought to determine the 
extent to which Namibia was able to mitigate the potentially 
undermining impacts of the Global Fund and PEPFAR on country 
ownership and institutional autonomy.  
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For Namibia, the questions posed by this thesis are important 
because the country experienced a very rapid increase in funding from 
the Global Fund and PEPFAR during the 10-year period covered by this 
thesis. External funding as a percentage of total health sector spending 
increased in Namibia from 3.8% in 2001 to 21.7% in 2009 (Ministry of 
Health, 2010). More than 90% of the increase in external funds to the 
country’s health sector during this period has been attributed to 
contributions from the Global Fund and PEPFAR (Ministry of Health, 
2010). A principal source of data was 43 semi-structured interviews 
conducted in Namibia during a placement with the Directorate of Special 
Programs (DSP) in the Ministry of Health from February to June 2012. 
Observations gained from participation in Ministry of Health meetings 
and other discussions concerning the two GHIs supported the interview 
findings. Data unique to the Namibian health system and its relationship 
to the Global Fund and PEPFAR also came from documents such as 
newspaper articles, policy and strategy papers, as well as books and peer-
reviewed journal articles. 
By their initially defined health objectives, this chapter introduces 
the Global Fund and PEPFAR within global discussions on country 
ownership in the engagement between government recipients and 
external donors to the health sector. The examination of national 
ownership, in particular, draws on the Paris Agenda for Aid 
Effectiveness, which is an international commitment aimed at promoting 
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country ownership, and to which the Global Fund, PEPFAR, and the 
Namibian Government are all signatories (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), 2008). In the three primary results 
chapters (chapter five, six and seven), this thesis first evaluates the 
extent to which the two GHIs influenced Ministry of Health autonomy to 
make decisions on financial flows; human resources recruitment; and civil 
society engagement at the rise of their funding to the country. For these 
three functions, the thesis then examines the implications for country 
ownership and health systems capacity in the context of decreasing 
financial support from the Global Fund and PEPFAR.   
 
1.2  Defining GHIs 
 
This thesis mainly uses the term global health initiatives (GHIs), 
which evolved from other names such as Global Health Partnerships 
(GHPs), Global Health Programmes, Public-Private Health Partnerships, 
and Global Public-Private Partnerships, amongst others (Biesma et al., 
2009; Buse and Harmer, 2007; Walker, 2009; WHO Maximizing Positive 
Synergies Collaborative Group, 2009). Some of the other names for GHIs, 
particularly those using the term "partnership", have been found to be 
problematic. This discursive construction "disguises the unequal power 
relations between the various actors", and allows for a perception of 
adverse impacts of these ‘partnerships' as regrettable, but unavoidable 
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(Buse and Harmer, 2004, p. 51). The word “partnership” implies an equal 
sharing of rewards, risks and power in the relationship, which does not 
play out in the real world (Walker, 2009). The use of the term GHIs does 
not necessarily expose these power differentials, in fact, it may mask 
them, but at least it does not imply that they do not exist. 
There appears to be no consensus on whether GHIs have a 
negative or positive impact on the settings in which they implement their 
interventions. Whether the effects of GHIs are perceived as positive or 
negative appears to depend on a variety of factors. These factors include 
the type of GHI; the sort of response it supports; and social and political 
context of the country within which the GHI operates (Atun et al., 2011; 
Biesma et al., 2012; Buse and Harmer, 2007; Cailhol et al., 2013; WHO 
Maximizing Positive Synergies Collaborative Group, 2009). Table 1.1 
provides an overview of the perceived negative and positive impact of HIV 
and AIDS GHIs as reflected in the literature reviewed for this thesis.  
Table 1-1 Positive and Negative Impacts of GHIs 
Positive Impacts Negative Impacts 
• Succeed in getting health issues onto 
national and international agendas 
• Good at leveraging additional finances 
for target interventions 
• Increase access to health services to 
population groups who might otherwise 
not be able to afford them 
• Stimulate research and development on 
health issues 
• Strengthen national health policy 
process and content 
• Augment health service delivery and 
capacity 
• Distort country health priorities 
• Inefficiently implement parallel and 
duplicate delivery of services 
• Numerical focus on targeted 
interventions, which prevents a holistic 
approach to health systems 
strengthening 
• Produce supply-induced demand, which 
is not necessarily a reflection of country 
disease burden 
• Poach workers from public sector and 
with better pay packages 
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• Establish international norms and 
standards 
• Secure a reduction in prices for some 
medical commodities 
• Encourage countries to strengthen 
program monitoring and accountability 
• Boost wider stakeholder participation in 
health delivery and decision-making 
• Increase inequality in services access 
between services for target and non-
target diseases 
• Inadequate use of country governance 
and management structures and 
processes 
• They waste resources through failure to 
harmonise their activities with country 
systems and other donor activities 
• Do not always take into account the full 
cost of interventions 
• Disbursements are often less than 
commitments 
• Have a “one-size fits all” approach that 
does not always consider country 
diversity 
 
The issue of distortion of national health priorities is particularly 
prominent in discussions on adverse impacts of HIV and AIDS GHIs 
(Biesma et al., 2009). Buse and Harmer (2007) note that by nature GHPs 
are issue specific and quick results oriented in a way that rarely takes 
into account the whole system. Other bad habits highlighted by Buse and 
Harmer (2007) include the failure of GHIs/GHPs to harmonise their 
practices and procedures with one another and other donors, which leads 
to duplication and waste in various health systems functions. Staff 
associated with GHI interventions are often doubly held accountable, but 
often better compensated by GHIs than their public-sector counterparts.  
GHIs such as the Global Fund and PEPFAR have been found to 
distort country health priorities by distracting the government from 
addressing larger health system issues as result of their significant 
financial contributions to one health problem, namely HIV and AIDS. The 
output-based performance measures of the Global Fund and PEPFAR 
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have also been found often occur at the expense of wider health system 
improvements and country ownership as the recipient countries clamber 
to meet the measures of success defined by the GHIs (Buse and Harmer, 
2007; McCoy et al., 2009). The Global Fund and PEPFAR have been 
found to isolate functions such as planning, management, monitoring and 
evaluation systems from existing country processes (Amaya et al., 2014; 
Biesma et al., 2009; Collins and Beyrer, 2013; Kapilashrami and 
Hanefeld, 2014). By operating through parallel mechanisms of 
accountability, often unrelated to those of the recipient countries, GHIs 
can function with limited transparency in a way that hinders effective 
partnerships and country ownership.  
 
1.3 Origins and Priorities of the Global Fund and PEPFAR  
 
The Global Fund and PEPFAR have been defined as originating 
from the global attempts to assist recipients to achieve their development 
growth and poverty-reducing goals as reflected by the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) (Komatsu, 2007; Mills et al., 2010; Travis et 
al., 2004). The MDGS were established as eight global targets to 
substantially alleviate extreme poverty through addressing issues such as 
hunger, disease, and gender inequities by the year 2015 (The United 
Nations, 2000). These targets were made formal in September 2000, at 
the Fifty-fifth session of the United Nations Assembly (The United 
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Nations, 2014). The MDGs sought to decrease the overall global burden of 
infectious diseases in the poorest parts of the world. The guiding policy 
document, however, only specifically referred to HIV, AIDS, Tuberculosis 
(TB) and malaria (The United Nations, 2000). The global goals for HIV 
and AIDS were encapsulated by MDG6, which had two primary targets. 
Target 6A committed UN member nations to "have halted by 2015 and 
begun to reverse the spread of HIV and AIDS". Target 6B committed the 
UN community “to achieve, by 2010, universal access to treatment for 
HIV and AIDS for all those who need it” (The United Nations, 2000).  
According to Ramsay (2002), the idea to establish an international 
funding mechanism to address HIV/AIDS, TB and Malaria (the Global 
Fund), first gained traction in July 2000 at the Group of Eight (G8) 
Summit in Okinawa, Japan. After the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) had been adopted, the concept of the Global Fund was then 
unanimously endorsed at the UN General Assembly Special Session on 
HIV/AIDS in June 2001 (Ramsay, 2002). Subsequently, in July 2001, at 
their Summit in Genoa, Italy, the G8 leaders committed US$1.3 billion to 
funding the initial operations of the Global Fund (Ramsay, 2002).  
The Framework Document of the Global Fund constructs the GHI 
as seeking to contribute to poverty reduction as represented by the MDGs 
through facilitating financial resources to address HIV and AIDS, TB and 
Malaria (The Global Fund, 2001a). When the Global Fund first came into 
operation, it prioritised proposals aimed at scaling up interventions that 
 24 
already existed in the countries that applied for funding. As basic 
principles to guide the country process, the Global Fund had two main 
requirements (The Global Fund, 2001):  
1. The Global Fund will base its work on programs that reflect 
national ownership and respect country partnership-led 
formulation and implementation processes. 
2. The Global Fund will promote partnerships among all relevant 
players within the country, and across all sectors of society. It will 
build on existing coordination mechanisms, and develop new and 
innovative partnerships where none exist. 
Its founding documents state that “the Global Fund's purpose is to 
attract, manage and disburse resources to fight AIDS, TB and malaria. It 
does not implement programs directly, relying instead on a broad 
network of partnerships with other development organisations on the 
ground to supply local knowledge and technical assistance where 
required". It sought to address gaps in country efforts to fight HIV and 
AIDs, TB and Malaria. It was also meant to strengthen underlying health 
systems by financing programs that complement those of other donors. 
PEPFAR, on the other hand, was first introduced in President 
George W. Bush's State of the Union Address in February 2003 and 
signed into law that May. PEPFAR was initially defined by the U.S 
Government as a five-year, US$15 billion initiative to expand HIV 
prevention, care, and treatment services to 15 focus countries, mostly in 
sub-Saharan Africa. In 2008, the U.S Congress authorised another phase 
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of PEPFAR funding, also spread over five years (2009-2013). PEPFAR 
phase 2 set aside US$48 billion to combat global HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, 
and malaria; US$39 was meant exclusively for HIV/AIDS programs 
(110th USA Congress, 2008). Soon after the authorization of phase 2, the 
funding for the PEPFAR initiatives was subsumed by the U.S 
Government’s Global Health Initiative (GHI), which was introduced by 
President Barack Obama when he came into office in 2009 (Gostin, 2010). 
Through the GHI, President Obama pledged US$63 billion over six years 
(fiscal years 2009-2014) to global health support from the U.S 
Government. This amount consisted of US$51 billion for PEPFAR 
(HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria) and $12 billion for all other health issues 
(Gostin, 2010, p. 789).   
The goal of contributing to the MDGs was also implicit in the 
initial authorization of PEPFAR funding (108th USA Congress, 2003). In 
addition to the mention of MDG6, as part of the initial PEPFAR 
congressional approval, the U.S Government also specifically allocated 
funding to the Global Fund. This allocation constituted the U.S 
Government's G8 commitment to funding the Global Fund. The title of 
the congressional approval for PEPFAR Phase 1 (the United States 
Leadership Against Global HIV and AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria Act 
of 2003) also mirrors the full name of the Global Fund (108th USA 
Congress, 2003).  
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Table 1-2 Overview of Global Fund and PEPFAR 
 Global Fund PEPFAR 
Type Public-Private Partnership Bilateral donor 






Priority Flexible funding for priorities 
set by country stakeholders 
Achieving programmatic targets 
set by US Congress 
Management 
System 
Global Fund secretariat and 
Board, Country Coordinating 
Mechanisms, and Local Fund 
Agents 
US Global AIDS Coordinator, 
country teams coordinated 
through US embassy 
Major Funders Bilateral donors, private 
philanthropy donations, 
private sector 
US Government, with funding 
approved yearly by US Congress 
Funding 
Allocations 
Assessment of country 
proposal by Technical Review 
Panel and performance-
based assessment of country 
reports 




HIV, TB, and malaria 
services; health systems 
strengthening 
HIV and AIDS prevention, 
treatment, care and support; 
health systems strengthening; 




The year 2015 represented a threshold in discussions on 
international development objectives. The post-2015 Development 
Agenda was agreed in September 2015. The 17 Sustainable Development 
Goals, which are a follow-on to the original 8 MDGs have a specific and 
directed focus on sustainable development. The message that the 
Sustainable Goals convey is that it is important to recognise and examine 
the processes by which goals are achieved and not only focus on outcomes 
(United Nations, 2015). The new targets have a focus on sustainable 
development, which indicates that this was an element missing in the 
initial goals. The MDGS had a focus on providing as much money as 
possible to tackle problems of poverty. The new targets recognise that it 
is not just about providing lots of money for short-term goals. 
Sustainability came out as an important theme (United Nations, 2015). 
In relation to health, the Sustainable Development Goals reflect the 
recognition that it is important to also look at the systems and 
foundations that allow for a lasting impact on health interventions 
(Balabanova et al., 2010; Goldberg and Bryant, 2012; Hafner and 
Shiffman, 2013; McCoy, 2009; Ooms et al., 2008; Pearson et al., 2009; 
WHO Maximizing Positive Synergies Collaborative Group, 2009).  
Principal 
Recipients 
Governments, civil society NGOs, Governments 
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The Global Fund receives most of its funding through 
replenishment meetings held every two years. Before these meetings, the 
Global Fund Board of Directors sets targets for how much it wishes to 
raise to achieve its planned activities for the two years following the 
meeting (The Global Fund, 2001). In November 2010, the Global Fund 
held a replenishment meeting in New York City for which it set a target 
of US$20 billion. It only ended up receiving US$11.7 billion in pledges 
(Boseley, 2011; Voelker, 2010). As a direct result of the lower-than-
expected promises, in November 2011, the Global Fund cancelled Round 
11, which was the upcoming call for applications. Had this funding round 
continued as planned, it was supposed to provide new grant money for 
2011 through 2013 (Health Gap, 2011; Truong, 2013). 
Soon after the Global Fund Board made the decision to cancel 
Round 11 in Accra, Ghana, in November 2011, the Executive Director at 
the time, Michel Kazatchkine was quoted in the UK Daily newspaper, the 
Guardian, attributing the decision to the 2008 Financial Crisis (Boseley, 
2011): 
It is deeply worrisome that, inadvertently, the millions of people 
fighting with deadly diseases are in danger of paying the price for 
the global financial crisis. There are millions of people dependent 
on Global Fund resources to stay alive and healthy, and the Global 
Fund will redouble its efforts to increase the available funding to 
continue to scale-up HIV, TB and malaria interventions. 
 
Within the preceding quote, the Executive Director recognises that Global 
Fund support before the financial crisis led to people being dependent on 
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its financial resources to stay alive. On behalf of the Global Fund, he then 
promises that there will be increased efforts to continue scaling up 
funding to allow for the continued scale-up of interventions. The 
cancellation of Round 11, however, marked a transition in the Global 
Fund’s stated objectives and intentions for the funding it granted to 
recipient countries.  
As a replacement for the funding that countries had expected from 
Round 11, the Global Fund Board introduced the Transitional Funding 
Mechanism (TFM), which it defined as seeking to achieve the following 
(The Global Fund, 2012a): 
to make resources available so that current recipients of Global 
Fund financing can continue essential prevention, treatment and 
care services without disruption (p.2). 
 
When it was first announced, the Global Fund labelled the TFM as a 
temporary measure (The Global Fund, 2012a). However, a year after the 
cancellation of Round 11, in November 2011, the Global Fund Board 
adopted the rule that each year, 55% of all Global Fund resources must 
go to low-income countries (Aidspan, 2013). As a direct follow-up to the 
55% rule, the Global Fund then established its New Funding Model in 
2012. The Global Fund’s New Funding Model’s (NFM) basic framework 
divided up the available funding based on a country’s composite score of 
the burden health issues, and ability to pay, based on Gross National 
Income (GNI) per capita (The Global Fund, 2013). 
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At its meeting in November 2011, the Global Fund Board adopted 
a new strategy for the period 2012-2016. Whereas the original 
Framework emphasised the rapid scale-up of financial resources to 
address the three focal global fund health issues to produce quick health 
results; the New Strategy placed greater emphasis on sustaining the 
health results achieved with financial support from the Global Fund. 
Within the 2012-2016 Strategy, the Global Fund aspired to contribute 
substantially to international goals by saving 10 million lives and 
preventing 140-180 million new infections from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis 
and malaria between 2012 and 2016 (The Global Fund, 2013). 
According to the Global Fund, as reflected in Strategic Objective 1 
of the New Strategy, alignment with national strategies and systems is a 
fundamental principle of aid effectiveness, which contributes to enhanced 
country ownership. The 2012-2016 Global Fund Strategy admitted that 
there remained much more room for Global Fund practices to be better 
aligned with national strategies and systems (The Global Fund, 2013).  
In its New Strategy, the Global Fund defines itself as having been 
founded in a time of emergency to respond to the epidemics and build on 
the momentum created by the MDGs. It argues, however, that initial ten 
years were just a start and there was a lot of work still needed in order 
attain the MDGs. The primary purpose of Strategic Objective 5 in the 
New Strategy is to, therefore, sustain and expand the gains from the first 
ten years to achieve the MDGS and Global Fund's targets. "A failure to 
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secure the necessary resources would result in an opportunity lost and 
the risk of unravelling the progress made to date (The Global Fund, 
2013).” 
In the Guiding Strategy for PEPFAR phase 1, the purpose of the 
initiative was defined as focusing on "rapidly scaling up" prevention, 
treatment, and care activities, primarily for HIV and AIDS (Office of the 
U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator, 2009). PEPFAR was originally designed 
as an emergency initiative, operating with considerable funds, immediate 
roll-out, fast scale-up, and top-down technocratic administration. 
PEPFAR Phase 1 (2004-2008) never really had “country ownership” as 
one if its clear overriding objectives. The Strategy for the second phase of 
PEPFAR (2009-2013), however, sold itself as having a "focus on 
transitioning from an emergency response to promoting sustainable 
country programs."  The strategy emphasised that for them to 
sustainable, "programs must be country-owned and country-driven" and 
"must address HIV/AIDS within a broader health and development 
context" (110th USA Congress, 2008; Office of the U.S. Global AIDS 
Coordinator, 2009).  
In 2012, in an article primarily authored by staff from the OGAC 
(including Eric P. Goosby, the U.S Global AIDS Coordinator at the time), 
this is how PEPFAR administrators reflected on the impacts of the 2008 
Financial Crisis (Holmes et al., 2012):  
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…the worldwide economic crisis has raised uncertainty about 
whether the global HIV response will be able to make full use of 
the new scientific gains and continue to support existing 
interventions… The people who have been supported by global 
HIV/AIDS support need continuing support, with consistent access 
to health services, while their countries’ health systems maintain 
the capacity to accommodate other people who are newly in need of 
treatment (p.1554). 
 
Similar to the Global Fund Board, PEPFAR administrators recognised 
that the people that had been put on treatment with donor support 
needed to be kept on treatment. They also acknowledged that there would 
be a rise in new people who would need access to treatment. One of 
PEPFAR's policy responses to the Financial Crisis was the development 
of the Impact and Efficiency Acceleration Plan in early 2011. PEPFAR 
administrators characterised the plan as a "comprehensive strategy to 
implement [PEPFAR's] response to the global economic crisis effectively 
(Holmes et al., 2012, p. 1554). As part of the Efficiency Plan, PEPFAR 
signed partnership frameworks with more than twenty countries. 
According to Holmes et al. (2012), the partnership frameworks map out 
five-year strategic partnerships between PEPFAR and governments, 
Global Fund, and other in-country partners. The frameworks were meant 
to be aligned closely with existing or evolving national strategic plans for 
HIV and other health services.  
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1.4 Thesis Framing of Country Ownership and 
Autonomy 
  
Both the Global Fund and PEPFAR have faced criticisms for some 
of their impacts on country health systems, especially regarding 
procedures and systems for accountability. The two initiative have 
frequently been found to have donor-specific reporting requirements and 
operational procedures (Amaya et al., 2014; Biesma et al., 2009; 
Bilimoria, 2012; Cailhol et al., 2013; Collins and Beyrer, 2013; Oomman 
et al., 2008). The criticisms levelled against the Global Fund, and 
PEPFAR, particularly concerning country ownership and autonomy are 
reflective of ongoing debates on the function and value of external 
funding to the health sector. 
Health systems reside in nation-states, and country-level dynamics 
will ultimately determine prospects for a country-specific health agenda. 
However, global actors such as GHIs can influence national agendas, 
control considerable financing for country specific health systems and are 
sources of health policy ideas (Balabanova et al., 2010; Cohen et al., 2013; 
Druce and Dickinson, 2008a; Hafner and Shiffman, 2013; World Health 
Organization, 2007). Easterly (2008) has argued that providers of foreign 
aid have historically struggled with the question of how to deal with the 
governments in the recipient of assistance country: 
The central dilemma is that donors want to give money to states 
led by what the donors think is a good government, yet at the same 
time, they believe that the ‘‘country'' (always meaning the 
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government) should ‘‘own'' its homemade approach to development. 
There is an inescapable contradiction between the donors' 
imposition of conditions on what it takes to be a good government 
and the logical implication of ‘‘ownership'' that the ‘‘country'' will 
decide on its own what is a good government (Easterly, 2008, p.26). 
 
Thus one of the primary and prevailing concerns of critics the aid 
giving policy architecture relates to their tendency to constrain the 
autonomy of the governments of the countries that receive their funding 
(Whitfield and Fraser, 2009a):  
Western agencies have restricted the policymaking options of aid-
receiving governments by demanding that their money is spent on 
their priorities and particularly by insisting that, in return for 
much-needed finance, recipient governments change their 
economic and social policies. Critics argue that imposing policies, 
sequences of reform, and spending priorities has done more harm 
than good, overriding national sovereignty, damaging democracy, 
displacing local concerns and solutions (p.2). 
 
The tendency for western agencies to constrain the autonomy of 
sovereign governments in the implementation of plans to meet aid 
objectives is, however, often justified by seeking to make the transfer of 
assistance more effective (Oliveira Cruz and McPake, 2010). The Paris 
Agenda represents an example of the country ownership framing of the 
aid effectiveness agenda. It is widely touted as the best example of an 
attempt to promote country ownership for international aid for health 
(110th USA Congress, 2008; Booth, 2008; Buiter, 2007; Goldberg and 
Bryant, 2012; Government of the Republic of Namibia, 2008; Hafner and 
Shiffman, 2013; Shorten et al., 2012; The Global Fund, 2013a).  
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The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and the Accra 
Agenda for Action (2008) make up the Paris Agenda. The Paris 
Declaration is an international health agreement which was signed on 
the 2nd of March 2005. Its aim was to provide a “resolution to take far-
reaching measurable actions to reform the way aid is delivered and 
managed ahead of the five-year review of the MDGs, and beyond (P.1, 
section 1)” (OECD, 2008). The Declaration affirmed a commitment to 
accelerate progress in six main areas (P.1, Article 3) (OECD, 2008).  The 
Paris Declaration was signed by government representatives from low- 
and high-income countries and by the heads of multilateral and bilateral 
agencies. The Global Fund, PEPFAR, and the Namibian Government 
were all signatories to it (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), 2008).  
The Accra Agenda was signed approximately two-and-a-half years 
after the Paris Declaration, on 4 September 2008 in Accra, Ghana. Like 
the Paris Declaration, the Accra Agenda was ratified by health ministers 
from many countries (including Namibia); heads of bilateral and 
multilateral development, such as the WHO; by GHIs such as the Global 
Fund and PEPFAR; by civil society organisations, and by private 
foundations. The Accra Agenda is a direct follow-up to the Paris 
Declaration (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), 2008). Table 1.3 below shows the six main objectives of the Paris 
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Declaration alongside the three most important goals of the Accra 
Agenda. 
Table 1-3 Objectives of the Paris Agenda 
Paris Declaration on AID 
Effectiveness 
Accra Agenda 
1. Strengthen partner country 
national development 
strategies and associated 
frameworks 
2. Increase alignment of aid 
with partner countries’ 
priorities, systems and 
procedures for helping 
strengthen their capacities 
3. Enhance donor and partner 
country respective 
accountability to citizens 
and parliaments for their 
development strategies, 
policies and performance 
4. Eliminate duplication and 
rationalise donor activities 
to make them as cost-
effective as possible 
5. Reform and simplify donor 
procedures to encourage 
collaborative behaviour and 
progressive alignment with 
country priorities, systems, 
and procedures 
6. Define measures and 
standards of performance 
and accountability of 
partner country health 
systems in public financial 
management, and fiduciary 
safeguards assessments in 
line with existing good 
practices 
1. Improve country ownership 
so that developing country 
governments can take 
stronger leadership of 
development strategies and 
better engage their 
parliaments and citizens. 
This requires donors to 
invest in human resources 
and institutions, and better 
use existing country aid 
flow systems (article, 8). 
2. Build more effective and 
inclusive partnerships 
through better management 
and coordination 
mechanisms (Article, 9). 
3. Achieve development 
results and openly account 
for them through 
demonstrating that 
development actions 
translate into positive 





Achievement of the Paris Agenda objectives calls for country 
ownership of operational strategies with partners. It in particular calls 
for the alignment of donor practices with country systems and 
procedures. This quest for alignment is best represented by Objective 2 of 
the Paris Declaration, which aims to “Increase alignment of aid partner 
countries’ priorities, systems and procedures for helping strengthen their 
capacities” (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), 2008, sec. 1). Objective 2 recognises that countries have their 
own approaches to addressing health problems and would be more 
effective in addressing health concerns if donors contributed to 
strengthening rather than undermining existing plans.  
The Accra Agenda particularly emphasises the importance of 
accelerating progress in three main areas (P.15): 
1. Country ownership, so that developing country governments can 
take stronger leadership of development strategies and better 
engage their parliaments and citizens. This requires donors to 
invest in human resources and institutions, and better use 
existing country aid flow systems (article, 8). 
2. Build more effective and inclusive partnerships through better 
management and coordination mechanisms (Article, 9). 
3. Achieve development results and openly account for them through 
demonstrating that development actions translate into positive 
impacts in people’s lives (Article, 10). 
The Paris Agenda represents a recognition in the international 
development community that external funding for health issues does not 
adequately promote country ownership and institutional autonomy. 
Based on the articulation of country ownership in the Paris Agenda, 
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Whitfield and Fraser (2009) define ownership as the "degree of control 
recipient governments can secure over implemented policy (Whitfield and 
Fraser, 2009a, p.4). 
 Whitfield and Fraser (2009) argue that rather than getting aid 
givers to reform themselves, the international aid community (as 
represented by international policy agreements on aid effectiveness), 
places the onus on recipient governments to "take ownership" of aid 
activities: 
Contemporary donor promotion of ownership is partly a discursive 
response to criticisms of dominant funding practices, especially the 
use of conditionality. Donors deploy the term partly because it 
implies recognition of, and apparent accommodation with, their 
critics' position. By claiming that they will no longer impose 
policies on unwilling recipients, donors are searching for a renewed 
legitimacy of their activities (p.5)." 
 
As perceived by Whitfield and Fraser (2009) agreements such as the 
Paris Agenda are merely symbolic and superficial calls to country 
ownership that do not reflect an actual commitment by international 
funders to encourage country ownership. Banati and Moatti (2008) and 
Buiter (2007), similarly criticise the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda 
for being empty symbolic gestures because they do not provide clear 
guidelines on concepts such as sustainability and country ownership.  
Buiter (2007) expressly criticises the use of the word "country 
ownership" and dismisses it as a vague and ill-defined concept that has 
become a "pernicious example of politically correct international financial 
institution speak (p.647)". As perceived by Buiter (2007), it is easy 
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enough for GHIs to claim that they seek to encourage and align with the 
structures and priorities of country ownership if there are no clear 
indicators to hold them accountable if they fail to live up to the principles 
of country ownership.  
The criticisms around country ownership as defined through the 
Paris Agenda reflect the fact that aid from external funders such as GHIs 
does not only go to a country as a whole, but also to particular 
institutions within the country. Thus the concept of ownership needs to 
be practically broken down into the overall country context as well as its 
implications for the individual agency. Critics of the Paris Agenda, such 
as Buiter (2007), however, do not provide a clear alternative as to how the 
concept of country ownership can still be meaningful. Rather than just 
criticising country ownership as defined by others, De Valk (2009) seeks 
to offer a working definition of the concept, particularly for organisations 
within a recipient country that engage with external funders. 
According to De Valk (2009), the idea of ownership of a project or 
policy by an organisation can be loosely understood as a concept that 
seeks to capture the degree of responsibility that the organisation has 
and shows for the design, the planning and implementation of the project 
or policy and for sustaining the results. De Valk (2009) argues that 
ownership must be analysed not just through its intentions and priorities 
but primarily through its practice (De Valk, 2009). De Valk (2009) defines 
organisational ownership as meaning the ability of an organisation to 
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influence or control project processes and outcomes, in addition to being 
able to use the project output. Thus at an agency level, the concept of 
ownership then becomes interchangeable with the idea of the degree of 
autonomy that an organisation can exercise in the presence of external 
support. Analysing the extent of autonomy in making decisions on 
specific (elements of) projects then has potential to shed light on whether 
project implementation is sustained and in which manner (p.30).   
The extent of autonomy that recipients experience in their 
engagement with external donors has implications for how their 
operational capacity is affected both by the presence and departure of 
funders. Thus the extent to which GHI funding increased health systems 
capacity is one of the key issues that is examined by this thesis in its 
consideration of GHI influence on country ownership and Ministry of 
Health autonomy in Namibia. This concept of organisational ownership 
can then be defined as autonomy to separate it from the broader concept 
of country ownership. This thesis engages with the idea of country 
ownership as defined by Objective 2 of the Paris Declaration and the 
broken down through the Accra Agenda. With a focus on the notion of 
alignment as reflected in the agenda, the thesis examines the extent to 
which the practices of the Global Fund and PEPFAR in Namibia 
facilitated the autonomy of the Ministry of Health. 
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1.5 Namibia’s Political History  
 
The country known as Namibia today was not a political colony 
until German officially sought to govern it in 1890, and named the 
country German South West Africa (Cliffe, 1994; Kaela, 1996). After the 
First World War ended in 1919, Germany lost almost all of its colonial 
territories. Namibia was put under the patronage of the United Kingdom, 
then of South Africa, through the League of Nations in 1919. Under the 
mandate system, South West Africa was deemed as being unable to self-
govern and therefore needing political and economic support to eventually 
achieve independence (Dugard et al., 1974; Kaela, 1996). The British 
Government (through South Africa) was supposed to prepare the South 
West Africa for “self-determination” and “not profit from its 
administration rights” over the country (Dugard et al., 1974; Kaela, 
1996). However, following its independence from Britain in 1934, the 
South African government at the time annexed Namibia and refused to 
submit reports to the League of Nations (Dugard et al., 1974; Kaela, 
1996).  
When the United Nations (UN) replaced the League of Nations in 
1946, it also took over the former multilateral organisation's ambitions 
and responsibilities of transitioning former colonies to independence 
(Davis et al., 1966; Dugard et al., 1974). As part of this function, the UN 
General Assembly used its first ever session to take up the resolution to 
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place South West Africa under UN Trusteeship. The South African 
Government, however, refused to acknowledge the UN as the official 
successor of the League of Nations and refused to comply with the 
resolution (Kaela, 1996; Kozonguizi, 1966). This first decision marked the 
start of an international diplomatic struggle for Namibian independence 
that would last for more than 40 years. 
Namibia's path to independence was decided in 1976 through UN 
Resolution 385 (also known as the Namibia Peace Plan), which called for 
free and fair elections in the country under the supervision of the UN 
(Kaela, 1996; Kozonguizi, 1966). As part of the Namibia Peace Plan, the 
UN General Assembly also established the United Nations Transition 
Assistance Group (UNTAG) for Namibia (Cliffe, 1994; Hartmann, 2009). 
The UN directed UNTAG to administratively prepare the country for 
independence within one year (Hartmann, 2009). Namibia officially 
became an independent member of the UN on the 21st of March 1990.  
The political foundations of an independent Namibia are a 
reflection of the country's history with the UN. For example, through 
Resolution 283 in 1970, the UN set up a fund and appointed a 
Commissioner for Namibia in 1974 (Cliffe, 1994). One of the 
Commissioner's first tasks was to establish the Namibia Research 
Institute in Lusaka, Zambia. The role of the Institute was to develop 
economic, social and political policies for independent Namibia. The main 
components of the Constitution that the Republic of Namibia adopted at 
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independence in 1990 were drawn up in 1982 at the Lusaka Institute, in 
a document titled Principles Concerning the Constituent Assembly of an 
Independent Namibia (S/15287) (Cliffe, 1994).  
The Constitution defines Namibia as a democratic unitary system 
of government, governed by separate and independent legislative, 
executive and judiciary branches. The Constitution also declares 
fundamental human rights and protection of civil liberties for the 
Namibian people. The Namibian Constitution is one of the most 
progressive in the world due to its extensive protection of human rights 
(Hartmann, 2009). Since independence, the country has also frequently 
been ranked by various global indices as one of the best-governed 
countries in Africa (OECD et al., 2013). On the 21st of March 2015, 
Namibia celebrated its 25th year of independence, which marked the 
transfer of power to the third democratically elected president.   
 
1.6 HIV and AIDS in Namibia: Research Relevance  
 
This thesis engages with the concept of country ownership in the 
engagement between international donors to HIV and AIDS and recipient 
health systems. It seeks to understand the extent to which the Namibian 
Ministry of Health was able to exercise ownership of the Namibian health 
sector in the presence of Global Fund and PEPFAR funding. In seeking to 
understand the impact of the rise and fall of Global Fund and PEPFAR 
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funding to Namibia, this thesis evaluates the ways in which the practices 
of the two GHIs initially encourage country ownership and institutional 
autonomy. The thesis then examines the ways in which the Namibian 
policy environment was able to mitigate the potentially negative impacts 
of the two GHIs.  
The Namibian context is relevant and informative for several 
reasons. Since the country’s independence in 1990, communicable 
diseases, mainly HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria have accounted 
for the greatest share of illness burden in Namibia (MoHSS, 2010a; Zere 
et al., 2006). HIV and AIDS, in particular, has had a devastating effect on 
the population. The first reported incident of AIDS in Namibia was in 
1986 (El Obeid, 2001; Slotten, 1995). Between 1992 and 2000, overall 
rates of HIV infection rose from 4% to 22.3% (MoHSS, 2008a). Between 
1995 and 2000, approximately one out of every five deaths in Namibia 
were due to AIDS (El Obeid, 2001; MoHSS, 2005).  Table 1.4 shows the 
top 10 causes of death in Namibia in 2006, as reported by the country’s 
Ministry of Health. 
Table 1-4 Top 10 Causes of Death in Namibia 2006: (MoHSS, 2008a) 
Cause of Death Number of Deaths 
HIV/AIDS 3,735 
Gastroenteritis (Diarrhoea) 2,495 




Respiratory Disease 755 
Anaemia 485 





The highest HIV prevalence rates in Namibia have historically 
been among young people and women (European Economic Fund, 2008; 
McCourt and Awases, 2007; National Planning Commission, Office of the 
President, 2008). In 2000, about 25% of HIV infections were among 
people aged between 25 and 29 (MoHSS, 2010a). The HIV prevalence rate 
has also been historically higher among women when compared to men of 
the same age (MoHSS, 2008a). 
The Namibian government was already providing a limited 
amount of HIV treatment before it received funding from the Global Fund 
and PEPFAR (Farahani et al., 2014; Hecht et al., 2010; Schneider et al., 
2006). In 2002, the Namibian Government introduced free prevention of 
mother-to-child transmission (PMCT) at two hospitals. The Government 
followed on with free antiretroviral therapy (ART) in 2003 at three 
hospitals. Through its financial contributions and support from the 
Global Fund and PEPFAR, the Namibian Government undertook a rapid 
scale-up of HIV treatment (MoHSS and ICF Macro, 2010; PEPFAR 
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Namibia, 2012). By 2010, access to free HIV and AIDS treatment had 
been scaled up to all 34 district hospitals and 250 health facilities and 
clinics (MoHSS and ICF Macro, 2010). As a result, the ART coverage rate 
in Namibia rose from 3% in 2003 to 90% by 2010 (MoHSS, 2010b).  
The Namibian Government and others have credited some of the 
rapid increases in the provision of HIV and AIDS services to the financial 
contributions of Global Fund and PEPFAR (Presidential Commission of 
Inquiry: MoHSS, 2013; United States Department of State and the 
Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of Inspector General, 2010a). The 
increased level of participation by the Global Fund and PEPFAR in 
Namibia led to increased financial allocations to addressing HIV and 
AIDS in the country (Red Cross Society, 2010; WHO Africa Region, 2010; 
World Bank, 2009; Ministry of Health, 2010; Ministry of Health, 2008) 
(See Appendix 1). 
Funding from the Global Fund and PEPFAR also led to a general 
increase in the number of civil society and non-government agencies 
funded to implement health intervention. Between 2001/02 and 2006/07, 
the share of total health funds controlled by the Government fell from 
57% to 43%, while the share controlled by NGOs rose from 1.6% to 16% 
during the same period. In Namibia for fiscal years 2008/09, HIV and 
AIDS consumed 28.5% of total health expenditures; 45% of those funds 
came from public funds, while 51% came mainly from the Global Fund 
and PEPFAR (Ministry of Health, 2010). Funding from the Global Fund 
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and PEPFAR increased Namibia's overall health budget and shifted the 
proportions of the budget that were contributed and managed by the 
Namibian Government (MoHSS and Health Systems 20/20, 2008). 
Globally, a disproportionate amount of Global Fund and PEPFAR 
funding initially went to countries that are ranked as low income 
according to global economic indicators (Druce and Dickinson, 2008a; 
Hecht et al., 2010). Immediately after independence, Namibia received 
substantial financial assistance from international donors, primarily 
because of its classification as a low-income country (Cliffe, 1994). By 
1999, Namibia had moved from being a low-income country to a middle-
income country (El Obeid, 2001). The country's increased economic 
ranking led to the withdrawal of many donors. Funders withdrew under 
the argument that other nations had a greater financial need for their 
support (Ministry of Health, 2003; Ministry of Health, 2006; Ministry of 
Health, 2010; Office of the President of Namibia, 2009; WHO Africa 
Region, 2010).  
Funding from the Global Fund and PEPFAR increased donor 
support for health in Namibia. However, in the aftermath of the changes 
in the financing priorities of the Global Fund and PEPFAR, Namibia was 
one of the countries expected to increase domestic funding for HIV and 
AIDS. Namibia was one of the countries directly impacted by the new 
focus of the Global Fund and PEPFAR of also making funding decisions 
based on ability to pay, rather than primarily based on population health 
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need (Department Of State. The Office of Electronic Information, 2009; 
The Global Fund, 2013a). At the arrival of the two GHIs in the country, 
the Namibian health sector, however, suffered from various health 
systems deficits such as those relating to inadequate human resources 
capacity (Ministry of Health and Health Systems 20/20, 2008; Ministry of 
Health, 2010; USAID, 2010; WHO Africa Region, 2010; UNAIDS, 2008). 
Thus, despite the HIV and AIDS epidemic, there was a need to 
strengthen the Namibian Government’s overall health system.  
 
1.7  Structure of the Thesis 
 
Chapter one has introduced the concepts of country ownership and 
autonomy, within the context of the origins and changing objectives of the 
Global Fund and PEPFAER. This thesis examines the extent to which the 
structures and processes, which have defined the relationship between 
the Ministry of Health and the two GHIs over the years covered by the 
analysis, can be said to have positioned the Ministry to sustain the efforts 
that arose from the relationships. The thesis posits that the success of 
GHIs cannot only be measured based on their impacts at the height of 
funding but the potential for that impact to be sustainable once GHI 
funding has ceased.  
This thesis frames a wider discussion on country ownership within 
a larger discussion of the health system implications of GHIs at country-
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level. The health systems implications are the focus of chapter two, which 
uses the framing of country ownership and organisational autonomy 
presented in this chapter to examine the literature on the impacts of the 
Global Fund and PEPFAR at country-level.   
Chapter two will elaborate on how the thesis seeks to understand 
GHIs through their interactions with particular components of the health 
systems of recipient countries. The next chapter will also reflect on how 
the existing literature has sought to understand the extent to which the 
Global Fund and PEPFAR have facilitated or hindered country 
ownership. With a focus on the themes of financial flows; human 
resources management; and the engagement between governments and 
CSOs, chapter two also reflects on the health system implications of 
known GHI practices. The chapter concludes with an explanation of the 
research contribution of this thesis.  
Chapter three reflects on the research design that underlies the 
data gathering and analysis for this thesis. This chapter discusses the 
research methods, with a focus on the methodology of a qualitative case 
study. It also discusses some of the ethical and practical issues that arose 
from the research. The chapter concludes by reflecting on the implications 
of subjectivity in qualitative research.  
Chapter four lays out the Namibian context regarding the 
characteristics of the public health system. In particular, it highlights the 
ways in which Namibia has already defined its public health system 
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environment for addressing HIV and AIDS. It also provides a descriptive 
overview of the involvement of PEPFAR and the Global Fund in the 
Namibian health system. It provides background on Namibia's 
relationship with the Global Fund and PEPFAR regarding the agencies 
involved in the relationship, and the general known implications of their 
support at the time of data collection for the thesis. 
Chapter five evaluates financial flows in the Ministry of Health's 
engagement with the Global Fund and PEPFAR. In particular, Chapter 
five examines the initial practices for disbursements and financial 
management. The chapter then assesses the implications of these initial 
structures and processes for the Ministry of Health when it faced a 
decline in funding from the Global Fund and PEPFAR. 
Chapter six examines the procedures and structures for human 
resources management in the Ministry of Health's relationship with the 
two GHIs. It examines the administrative structures and procedures that 
were adopted by the Ministry of Health when it first started to get 
support from the Global Fund and PEPFAR. The chapter primarily 
reflects on the structures and processes for recruiting and managing staff 
to work on interventions funded by the two initiatives.  
Chapter seven examines the Ministry of Health’s relationship with 
the Global Fund in the context of the Namibian Government’s 
engagement with indigenous civil society organisations also seeking to 
address HIV and AIDS in the country. Similar to the first two thematic 
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chapters, chapter seven primarily describes and evaluates the ways in 
which the changing levels of Global Fund support to Namibia influenced 
the Ministry of Health’s ownership in the coordination and engagement of 
HIV and AIDS civil society organisations.  
Chapter eight is the main discussion. It examines the ways in 
which the findings chapters contribute to understanding the country-
specific health system interactions of the Global Fund and PEPFAR. 
Continuing the theme of the rise and decline of GHI funding, the chapter 
reflects on the health system lessons to be learned given the ways in 
which the Global Fund and PEPFAR influenced country ownership in 
Namibia. 
Chapter nine concludes the thesis by presenting an overall 
summary of the thesis findings and arguments. 
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2. HIV and AIDS GHI: Country Ownership and Health 
Systems  
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
As explained in Chapter One, the rise of the Global Fund and 
PEPFAR is associated with the year 2000 and the ambitions of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Through the MDGS, the 
international development community had identified HIV and AIDS as 
one of the key health issues to be tackled with substantial funding 
(Komatsu, 2007; Richard et al., 2011; The United Nations, 2014). Fitting 
within this larger narrative, both GHIs defined themselves as having the 
objectives to facilitate the rapid increase of resources to HIV and AIDS. 
The Global Fund and PEPFAR fundamentally altered the amount of 
financial resources available to address HIV and AIDS at a global level 
(Grundfest Schoepf, 2004; McCoy et al., 2009; Richard et al., 2011; 
Shiffman, 2009; WHO Maximizing Positive Synergies Collaborative 
Group, 2009).  
The vast amounts of funding provided by the two initiatives might 
have distorted the health system priorities of recipient countries (Amaya 
et al., 2014; Atun and Kazatchkine, 2009; Biesma et al., 2012; Cailhol et 
al., 2013; Mwisongo and Nabyonga-Orem, 2016). In some instances, the 
Global Fund and PEPFAR were criticised for overemphasising immediate 
measures of success at the expense of country ownership and wider 
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health system improvements (Banteyerga et al., 2006; Chima and 
Homedes, 2016; Collins and Beyrer, 2013; Hanefeld, 2010). This thesis is 
concerned with the impacts of the two GHIs on country ownership and 
autonomy, and their associated implications for health systems 
strengthening and its sustainability in the aftermath of GHI support. 
By their initially defined health objectives, chapter one introduces 
the Global Fund and PEPFAR within global discussions on country 
ownership in the engagement between government recipients and 
external donors to the health sector. The examination of national 
ownership, in particular, draws on the Paris Agenda for Aid 
Effectiveness, which is an international commitment aimed at promoting 
country ownership, and to which the Global Fund, PEPFAR, and the 
Namibian Government are all signatories (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), 2008).    
The purpose of this chapter is to reflect on prior literature which 
has sought to elucidate the country-specific impacts of the Global Fund 
and PEPFAR. It examines the extent to the existing research on the 
effects of HIV and AIDS GHI impacts on health systems has taken into 
account the issue of recipient country ownership and autonomy. The 
chapter first introduces the perceived main building blocks of health 
systems as defined by the World Health Organization (WHO) (World 
Health Organization, 2010, 2007). Using the WHO's articulation as a 
starting point, the chapter examines the ways in which other research 
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has positioned the potential health systems impacts of the Global Fund 
and PEPFAR. With a focus on the government's role in health systems, 
the chapter then examines the themes of financial flows; human 
resources management; and civil society engagement. It examines the 
extent to which GHIs have been found to have impacted country 
ownership and autonomy concerning these three themes. 
   The chapter then defines the research contributions of this thesis. It 
concludes with a reflection on the thesis' contributions regarding a 
qualitative study, which takes the priorities of the recipient as a starting 
point. The thesis also makes a research contribution by taking into 
account what might happen when the country faces a scale-down of 
financial support from GHIs. The literature reviewed mainly focuses on 
research that has sought to examine the country-level impacts of the 
Global Fund and PEPFAR.  
 
2.2 Health Systems and Country Ownership: Global 
Fund and PEPFAR 
 
The WHO defines health systems as "all actors and institutions in 
a country whose primary intent is to improve or maintain health in that 
country (World Health Organization, 2007)”.  The WHO Framework for 
health systems action defines health systems as being made up of six 
discrete building blocks or health system functions. These are 1) service 
delivery; 2) health workforce; 3) information; 4) medical products, 
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vaccines and technologies; 5) financing; and 6) leadership and governance 
(stewardship) (World Health Organization, 2007, p. v). 
Figure 2-1 World Health Organisation Health System Framework: (WHO, 2007, p.V) 
 
 
The WHO's framework argues that when each of these six building 
blocks is strengthened, then this will lead to increases in four areas: 
access, coverage, quality and safety for users within a health system. An 
improvement in these four areas is then supposedly meant lead to 
improved health outcomes; responsiveness of the health system to 
population needs; social and financial risk protection for both users and 
service providers; and improved efficiency (World Health Organization, 
2010, 2007). The WHO has constructed health systems and their sub-
components as easily identifiable and thus fixable when found to be 
inadequate (WHO Maximising Positive Synergies Collaborative Group, 
2009).  
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Studies on the health systems impacts of the Global Fund and 
PEPFAR, frequently use the World Health Organisation (WHO) 
definition of the essential building blocks of a health system (Atun and 
Kazatchkine, 2009; Bennett and Fairbank, 2003; Biesma et al., 2009; 
Chima and Homedes, 2016; Kelly and Birdsall, 2010; Rasschaert et al., 
2011; WHO Maximizing Positive Synergies Collaborative Group, 2009). 
Using the WHO definition of health systems, Bennett and Fairbank 
(2003) were some of the first researchers who sought to understand and 
predict the country-specific health systems impact of the Global Fund. 
They present an analytical approach, which aims to evaluate the Global 
Fund's broader effects on national health care systems (Bennett and 
Fairbank, 2003). They base their approach on the premise that the design 
and implementation processes of GHI interventions will have a direct 
impact on targeted diseases as well as broader health care system 
regarding equity, efficiency, access, quality, and sustainability (Bennett 
and Fairbank, 2003).  
Bennett and Fairbank (2003) propose that by reviewing the design, 
selection and implementation processes of the Global Fund, they can 
assess the effect on national level stewardship and policy, resource 
development, financing and service delivery functions. Their strategy for 
analysis then proposes that the country health system might mediate the 
potentially negative impacts of the Global Fund by monitoring and 
evaluating the GHI's effects on four main areas: policy environment, 
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public/private mix, human resources, and pharmaceutical and 
commodities (Bennett and Fairbank, 2003).  
For Bennett and Fairbank (2003) the issue of country ownership 
and organisational autonomy are included within the health system 
function of stewardship and policy. Their approach is, however, more 
focused on evaluating the impact of GHIs alone, rather than how they 
might intersect with existing country processes and procedures. It does 
not leave much room to assess how the governments of recipient countries 
might, in turn, be trying to manage their relationship with GHIs. They do 
recognise that the system-wide effects that of the Global Fund that will 
occur in-country will be affected by the country context in terms 
macroeconomic, political and development assistance context; and 
government and health system capacity; and service delivery structures 
(Bennett and Fairbank, 2003). 
 Biesma et al. (2009) reviewed country level evidence on the 
impacts of the Global Fund, PEPFAR and the World Bank Multi-country 
AIDS Program (MAP). They used Bennett and Fairbank's framework as a 
starting point to understanding the impact of the Global Fund and 
PEPFAR, by drawing on more than 30 country-specific and cross country 
reports based on fieldwork conducted between 2002 and 2007. All of the 
studies they evaluated were descriptive cross-sectional studies, with most 
using data collected at a national level. They present a framework, which 
frames the intersection between GHIs and country health systems 
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through a focus on health sector policy development and policy 
implementation.  
Biesma et al. (2009) define "policy development" as reflecting 
"global concerns around country ownership, harmonisation and 
alignment of GHIs with national priorities and policies, as expressed in 
the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (p.241)”. For policy 
implementation, Biesma et al. (2009) identified four cross-cutting health 
system themes: 1) Coordination and planning; 2) Stakeholder 
engagement; 3) Monitoring and Evaluation; and 4) Human resources. 
Under the four cross-cutting themes of implementation, their study first 
presents and interprets the adverse effects of GHIs, and then shows and 
explains the benefits and lessons learned by GHIs across the period of 
study.  
The main negative impacts of HIV and AIDS GHIs identified by 
Biesma et al. (2009) was the perceived distortion of recipient national 
priorities. They criticise GHIs for distracting national governments from 
strengthening health systems through the establishment of free-standing 
planning, management and monitoring and evaluation systems. Biesma 
et al. (2009) propose that country health systems can mitigate the 
potentially negative impacts of GHIs through the health policy process. 
Their framework suggests that alignment of GHIs with national priorities 
can be assessed for the whole health system at the policy development 
and policy implementation stages. 
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In 2009, the WHO commissioned a broad group of stakeholders, 
which it called the Maximising Positive Synergies Collaborative Group, to 
carry out a review and analysis of existing data on the interplay between 
GHIs (including Global Fund and PEPFAR) and country health systems 
(WHO Maximising Positive Synergies Collaborative Group, 2009). Also 
building on the WHO's definition of health systems as the well as the 
work done by Bennett and Fairbank (2003) and Biesma et al. (2009), the 
Maximising Positive Synergies Group evaluated the intersection of GHIs 
with country health systems by focusing on five main areas of 
engagement. These five areas are information systems, finance, 
governance, workforce, and supply management systems (WHO 
Maximizing Positive Synergies Collaborative Group, 2009) (see Figure 
2.2).  
 
Figure 2-2 WHO Maximising Positive Synergies Framework for GHI Interactions with 




The Maximising Positive Synergies Group constructs initiatives 
such as the Global Fund and PEPFAR as interacting with health 
systems, to influence health systems functions. Building on the WHO's 
health systems interactions among various stakeholders, the Group 
constructed GHIs and country health systems as having both an 
independent and combined impact on health services delivery and other 
resultant outcomes at identifiable points and sub-points within a health 
system (WHO Maximizing Positive Synergies Collaborative Group, 2009):  
When they arrive in a country, GHIs not only interact with the 
various actors, but they sometimes interact with them at different 
points in time as part of a particular sub-system function. GHIs 
insert themselves into country health systems and have the 
potential to have a significant impact on the operations of any of 
the sub-systems (p.2143).  
 
Relationships between initiatives such as the Global Fund and 
PEPFAR, and the governments that receive their support, however, have 
the potential to create tensions around issues related to dual 
accountability. These initiatives have accountability to meet their stated 
goals, which are often short-term in nature (Car et al., 2012; Collins et 
al., 2008; Harsh et al., 2010; Sidibe et al., 2006). They also have 
accountability to meet the demands and expectations of those that fund 
them. By only evaluating donor-recipient relationships under a 
supposedly objective health systems lens, the assumption is that funders 
have equal power to decide on the governance of recipient country health 
systems.  
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The Maximising Positive Synergies Collaborative Group was made 
up of more than 50 individuals from all over the world who represented 
academia, governments, civil society, and the private sector (WHO 
Maximising Positive Synergies, 2009). The convening of this group 
reflects the salient position of GHIs in the global health arena. As a 
political undertaking, the Maximising Positive Synergies exercise and its 
subsequent findings reflect the global recognition that GHIs are likely to 
have a significant impact on national health systems beyond their stated 
disease-specific objectives.  
The Maximising Positive Synergies, however, belies an assumption 
that GHIs are unproblematic as a model for achieving global health goals 
and it, therefore, takes a very uncritical view to their existence. GHIs are 
often unquestioningly endowed with legitimacy because they are seen as 
providing welfare-enhancing interventions and are automatically 
assumed to reflect the objectives and priorities of recipient countries 
(Buse and Harmer, 2004). The Group also places emphasis on 
determining whether the goals of GHIs are met and treats the country 
context as a secondary component of the analysis. The Group's criterion 
for a successful interaction between GHIs and country health systems is 
based on determining whether the GHIs have had no adverse impact on 
the health system as they attempt to reach their goals. This approach 
does not allow for a balanced inquiry of whether or not GHI interventions 
are in line with the priorities of a given country's health system.  
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Even as the study is titled "An assessment of interactions between 
global health initiatives and country health systems", it mainly focuses 
on determining whether GHIs can meet their stated objectives given the 
various country contexts. Based on the title, a more balanced approach to 
their analysis would have also been to assess whether country health 
systems are still able to meet their stated objectives in the presence of 
GHIs. The approach taken by the Maximising Positive Synergies Group is 
in many ways reflective of other research that has explored the 
interactions between GHIs and country health systems. This thesis takes 
a critical view in its analysis of GHIs impact on country health systems. 
For this thesis, the health system themes of financial flows, human 
resources and civil society engagement as associated with the Global 
Fund and PEPFAR are particularly relevant. The next three sections 
reflect on the how the two HIV and AIDS GHIs have influenced country 




Bennett and Fairbank (2003) predicted that the Global Fund's 
initially stated intentions to fund countries based on the proven 
performance of the grants would lead to the development of financial 
monitoring and transfer systems, which were parallel to those that 
recipients already had in place (Bennett and Fairbank, 2003). These 
predictions appear to have been realised for both the Global Fund and 
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PEPFAR (Brugha et al., 2010; Hanefeld et al., 2007; Mtonya et al., 2005; 
Oomman et al., 2008). Advisors and consultants specifically associated 
with funders are a frequent feature of donor support to global health 
initiatives and other international development projects (Easterly, 2008; 
Harsh et al., 2010; Riddell, 2007). Short-term grant management 
structure are established to improve the ability of beneficiaries to meet 
the reporting requirements of the Global Fund and PEPFAR. Money from 
the Global Fund and PEPFAR has then been used to pay staff to manage 
and oversee the new structures and processes (Biesma et al., 2012a; 
Drager et al., 2006; Oomman et al., 2008).  
In 2007, Oomman et al. (2008) examined the flow of financial 
resources from PEPFAR, Global Fund, the World Bank's Multi-Country 
AIDS Program (MAP) in Mozambique, Uganda and Zambia. Their 
analysis focused on donors' policies and practices and their resulting 
interactions with national governments and other stakeholders in 
supporting a national HIV and AIDS response. With the Paris 
Declaration as a starting point, Oomman et al. (2008) defined the goal of 
their research as seeking to make recommendations on how the 
movement of funds could be made more effective (Oomman et al., 2008). 
They evaluate how each GHI worked with governments; built local 
capacity; kept funding flexible; selected recipients; made money move; 
collected and shared data.  
 64 
In Mozambique, Uganda and Zambia, the national governments 
were the primary providers of HIV and AIDS service before the arrival of 
funding from the two GHIs. PEPFAR did not channel most of the funding 
through government systems. Government organisations had capacity 
constraints concerning their ability to quickly meet pre-defined PEPFAR 
health targets. Thus, in all three countries, Oomman et al. (2008) 
conclude that PEPFAR funding was allocated mainly based on 
requirements set by the U.S Congress for the treatment, prevention, care 
of patients and vulnerable orphans (Oomman et al., 2008). 
In comparison to the Global Fund, PEPFAR structures and 
procedures for financial flows requirements have been found to be both 
more inflexible and more uniform across different countries (Fan et al., 
2013; Hanefeld, 2010; Oomman et al., 2008). The need to meet U.S 
Government legislatively-mandated targets on prevention, treatment and 
care drove the initial operations of PEPFAR (108th USA Congress, 2003). 
This emphasis on specific targets was found to lead PEPFAR to prioritise 
speed and efficiency over factors like improving the sustainability 
capacity of recipients. When PEPFAR money first arrived in many 
countries, it was primarily channelled by non-government, even when 
governments were the primary providers of HIV and AIDS services. 
PEPFAR administrators viewed recipients as lacking the capacity to 
quickly translate funding into its pre-defined health targets within the 
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five-year period of the GHI's two funding authorisations (Hanefeld, 2010; 
Oomman et al., 2008).  
Even when governments are the primary funders and providers of 
existing health services, their involvement in the oversight of PEPFAR 
programs was initially found to be limited. U.S Government staff, both 
in-country and at headquarters in the USA, were often the ones that 
coordinated the activities of various PEPFAR recipients (Oomman et al., 
2008). In Uganda, CDC was known to monitor the activities of recipients 
actively and require them to frequently justify their actions (Oomman et 
al., 2008). In Uganda, Mozambique and Zambia, there were criticisms 
that PEPFAR did not make the government a real partner. Research in 
these three countries showed that financial and performance data were 
not routinely made available to public officials at crucial times such as 
during the development of their country's annual budgets (Oomman et 
al., 2008). 
In contrast to PEPFAR, Oomman et al. (2008) credited the Global 
Fund for choosing recipients in a highly flexible way both within and 
between countries. As a result, they argue, funding from the Global Fund 
went to recipients whose capacity might not have been viewed as 
adequate by PEPFAR (Oomman et al. 2008). In the three study countries, 
Global Fund support mainly went to government agencies. In Uganda 
and Mozambique, all funding from the Global Fund went through public 
sector recipients that were already addressing HIV and AIDS. Oomman 
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et al. (2008) perceived the Global Fund as being more aligned with 
country ownership because it primarily funded agencies that were the 
primary health implementers through national public legislations. 
The perceived tendency for PEPFAR to bypass government 
systems, even when government facilities were the main providers of 
health services, is also reflected in findings from South Africa and Zambia 
(Hanefeld, 2010). In the two countries, Hanefeld (2010) found that 
PEPFAR allocated a large proportion funding to agencies with North 
American connections. In comparison to PEPFAR, Hanefeld (2010) found 
that Global Fund supported activities were perceived as more closely 
aligned with the objectives of recipient national Governments. Reflecting 
on the two initiatives and their differing intentions towards promoting 
country ownership in South Africa and Zambia, Hanefeld (2010, p. 97) 
noted the following:  
Research findings indicated PEPFAR mainly operates through a 
structure separate from the state, including its support for public 
sector treatment programmes, which raises questions of country 
ownership of activities and programmes. Whereas Global Fund 
funding for treatment has largely been for the assistance of the 
government treatment programmes (Hanefeld, 2010, p. 97). 
 
In South Africa and Zambia, respondents interviewed for the 
research noted that not only was PEPFAR funding channelled to non-
government agencies, but government officials had limited input in 
planning for how the funding was used once it arrived in the countries 
(Hanefeld, 2010, p. 97). As Hanefeld (2010) noted for PEPFAR, it is easy 
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to conflate the amount of donor funding countries receive because the 
money goes towards staff whose primary goal is to monitor donor funding 
(Hanefeld, 2010, p. 98). Hanefeld (2010) also questions whether the 
PEPFAR initiatives can be considered to have built the capacity of a 
recipient country when its funding was primarily used to temporary fund 
agencies and individuals with a link to the U.S Government. 
The Global Fund has been positioned as distinct due to its stated 
intentions to not establish in-country offices (Hanefeld, 2010; Riddell, 
2007). Regarding financial flows and management, research has 
frequently found that the Global Fund has not been as flexible as its 
guidelines would first indicate. From the onset of its operations, the 
Global Fund often mandated the specific processes for which it required 
its funding to be channelled and managed (Biesma et al., 2012; Carlson et 
al., 2004; Mtonya et al., 2005). A standard feature of the initial operations 
of Global Fund grants has been a country-specific Program Management 
Unit (PMU).  
Oliveira Cruz and McPake (2011) found that both the Global Fund 
and PEPFAR opted to create parallel systems of financial management in 
Uganda. Their structures and processes for management did not 
contribute to the health Sector Wide Approach (SWAp), a mechanism 
which would have earmarked their funds for the health (Oliveira Cruz 
and McPake, 2011). Under the SWAp strategy, the Ugandan Government 
had set a limit for how much of the pooled money could go towards each 
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ministry (Carlson et al., 2004). Oliveira Cruz and McPake (2011) found 
that the Global Fund in Uganda used a PMU within the Ministry of 
Health (MoH), which had its own monitoring tools and a parallel system 
for managing its grant (Oliveira Cruz and McPake, 2011). 
Biesma et al. (2012) found that Lesotho was another country that 
was required to establish a PMU as a pre-condition to receiving its first 
Global Fund grant. In Lesotho, the Ministry of Finance was the Primary 
Recipient (PR) of the Global Fund grant, but the Ministry of Health was 
the principal implementer of the GHI-supported interventions (Biesma et 
al. 2012). Biesma et al. (2012) argue that the establishment of a 
coordination unit unique to the Global Fund created connections and new 
ways of working with the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Health, 
and across to other government and non-governmental organisations. The 
PMU was viewed as operating in a non-constrained way when compared 





In the early 2000s, before the establishment of the Global Fund 
and PEPFAR, inadequate human resources capacity was perceived as 
hindering the rapid scale-up of HIV and AIDS in many countries 
(Banteyerga et al., 2006; Biesma et al., 2012; Hanefeld and Musheke, 
2009; Oomman et al., 2008). A significant portion of Global Fund and 
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PEPFAR financial resources therefore initially went towards the 
recruitment and training of health workers to provide HIV and AIDS 
services. Consequently, both GHIs extended the human resources 
capacity in the countries that initially received grants (Biesma et al., 
2012; Dodd and Lane, 2010; Hanefeld and Musheke, 2009; Oomman et 
al., 2008; WHO Maximising Positive Synergies Collaborative Group, 
2009).  
In their review of studies on the intersections of GHIs and specific 
country systems, Biesma et al. (2009) found that a shortage of trained 
health workers was a dominant barrier to health system performance in 
several countries before the arrival of Global Fund and PEPFAR 
resources. These health worker inadequacies were in turn viewed as 
initially hindering GHI efforts to scale up HIV and AIDS services. The 
studies, however, regularly revealed that the Global Fund and PEPFAR 
often developed human resources capacity specifically for only the 
interventions that they funded (Biesma et al., 2009). Biesma et al. (2009) 
found that many of the initial studies that sought to understand the 
human resources impacts of GHIs focused on issues such as worker 
motivation, workload and incentives, as well as training, which are all 
related to direct-service delivery.  
GHIs have been criticised for creating parallel human resources 
structures, which then lead to the pilfering of human resources from the 
structures that already have a limited capacity. Thus previous research 
 70 
focused on the symptoms of different working conditions rather than the 
causes of the working conditions. There is limited discussion of the ways 
in which the GHIs went about creating different working conditions for 
health workers on a policy level. It is, therefore, hard to evaluate the 
policy impacts or at least reflect on the various policy responses that 
recipient governments might be faced with if they sought to increase 
health sector capacity using financial support from HIV and AIDS GHIs. 
In their study of the flows of the Global Fund, PEPFAR and World 
Bank MAP finances in Mozambique, Uganda and Zambia, Oomman et al. 
(2008) also assessed the country-level impacts of GHIs on human 
resources. They found that the impacts on human resources of the Global 
Fund varied, while PEPFAR human resources practices were much more 
uniform across the three countries (Oomman et al., 2008). PEPFAR 
funding mainly went towards funding the hiring of a substantial number 
of nongovernmental health workers, many of whom earned much more 
than civil servants (Oomman et al., 2008). In Mozambique, Zambia and 
Uganda, PEPFAR hiring practices and salary supplements were criticised 
for pulling staff away from their public sector positions by attracting 
them with better pay and work incentives (Oomman et al., 2008).  
Global Fund and PEPFAR approaches to human resources that 
exclusively focus on HIV and AIDS can undermine health sectors that 
were already inadequately staffed. In their analysis of the interactions 
between the Global Fund, PEPFAR and World Bank MAP in Nigeria, 
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Chima and Homedes (2016) found that all three GHIs barely invested in 
the domestic production of new health workers. In some instances, 
government health policy makers redistributed health workers from 
facilities without donor‐funded projects to ones with GHIs projects. This 
approach ensured that they were meeting the project targets established 
by funders (Chima and Homedes, 2015). Chima and Homedes (2016) 
therefore also criticised the HIV and AIDS GHIs for contributing to 
internal national brain drain by luring health workers from the public 
sector to non–governmental organisations.  
In their literature review of the human resources practices of the 
Global Fund and two other GHIs, Vujicic et al. (2012) sought to 
understand the types of human resources activities that were eligible for 
financing; and the human resources activities that received funding. They 
found that there was little information available on how payment rates 
are determined, how the potential negative consequences are mitigated, 
and how payments are to be sustained at the end of the grant period 
(Vujicic et al., 2012). Based on their analysis Vujicic et al. (2012) argue 
that there was an opportunity for improved coordination between the 
three GHIs at the country level in human resources activities.  
For instance, Vujicic et al. (2012) et al. found that regarding 
training content, the Global Fund grants tended to focus on training that 
was specific to the three priority diseases. They argued that one likely 
 72 
reason behind the heavy emphasis on in-service training is because the 
Global Fund proposal evaluation criteria placed emphasis on applicants 
to show results within the time frame of the grant and thus potentially 
created a bias toward short-term, non-recurrent expenditure items for 
human resources (Vujicic et al., 2012). 
 Recipient countries have, however, also been criticised for not 
adequately taking advantage of the substantial funding provided by GHIs 
as an opportunity to strengthen their existing human resources capacity 
for their whole health sectors (Banteyerga et al., 2006; Drager et al., 
2006). In Ethiopia, Banteyerga et al. (2006) found that money from the 
Global Fund went towards funding higher than normal salaries for 
individuals employed specifically to carry out HIV and AIDS 
interventions for non-government agencies. In some instances, Global 
Fund money was also used to top up some of the salaries of the regular 
employees assigned to work on Global Fund activities within government 
facilities (Banteyerga et al., 2006).  
Banteyerga et al. (2006) found that, in Ethiopia, some of the 
tensions in regards to human resources challenges created by its 
relationship with the Global Fund were due to the country's general lack 
of a broad human resources strategy. In the baseline study, key issues 
included staff turnover and attrition, which appeared to be increasing 
with the growing shift of personnel from the public to the private sector 
due to the pull of Global Fund money. The follow-up study pointed to 
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worsening working conditions for staff in the public sector (Banteyerga et 
al. 2006). 
In a five-year study funded by the European Commission, Cailhol 
et al. (2013) examined processes and policy contents of the human 
resources practices of Global Fund and PEPFAR in Angola, Burundi, 
Lesotho, Mozambique and South Africa from 2007 to 2011. Cailhol et al. 
(2013) sought to analyse the influence of external aid on countries' health 
policy and systems using the WHO's six building blocks of the health 
system. Through qualitative interviews of those involved in donor-funded 
programs at the national level, Cailhol et al. (2013) focused on evaluating 
policy changes on human resources over the period of study. In all 
countries, successful ARV roll-out was observed, despite generally 
perceived shortages of human resources for health. This result was 
viewed as coming about mostly because of a short-term emergency 
response by GHI-funded Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and to 
governments increasing the available human resources for health to focus 
on HIV and AIDS tasks (Cailhol et al., 2013). 
Cailhol et al. (2013) note, however, that the five countries slowly 
implemented mid to long-term HRH strategies, sometimes in 
collaboration with GHIs (Cailhol et al., 2013). Short term policies were 
plans implemented by local stakeholders without a formal regulatory 
framework, mostly via internal arrangement. Long-term policies were 
defined as those that backed-up by an official authority and a regulatory 
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In the Framework Document that initially defined its operations 
and governance structures, the Global Fund required that all country 
proposals for funding had to be developed and submitted through an in-
country coordinating mechanism that solicited the input of relevant 
stakeholders impacted by and involved in addressing HIV and AIDS, TB 
and malaria within the applicant country. In Global Fund documents, 
this coordinating body is called the Country Coordination Mechanism 
(CCM) (The Global Fund, 2011b). The Global Fund defines CCM's as 
being "central to the Fund's commitment to local ownership and 
participatory decision-making" (The Global Fund, 2011a, p. 1). 
This thesis only examines the influence of the Global Fund on the 
relationship between the Namibian Ministry of Health and civil society 
organisations in Namibia because the Global Fund initially and explicitly 
defined itself as seeking to promote country ownership through its 
funding application and disbursements processes (The Global Fund, 
2011a). Through the establishment of the CCM in a variety of countries, 
the Global Fund gets credit for making the health systems of its recipient 
countries more pluralistic (Atun and Kazatchkine, 2009; Banati, 2008; 
 75 
Doyle and Patel, 2008; Kapilashrami and McPake, 2013; Spicer et al., 
2010).  
Atun and Kazatchkine (2009) credit the Global Fund for having 
enabled strengthening of local health leadership to improve governance of 
HIV programs (Atun and Kazatchkine, 2009). The Global Fund is 
therefore seen as having enabled civil society and other non-
governmental organisations to play a critical role in the design, 
implementation, and oversight of HIV programs. They also perceive the 
Global Fund’s emphasis on inclusiveness and diversity in planning, 
implementation, and grant management as having broadly enhanced 
country coordination capacity. Thus by strengthening local leadership 
capacity and governance, they give the Global Fund credit for helping to 
build efficient and equitable health systems to deliver universal coverage 
of HIV services (Atun and Kazatchkine, 2009). 
In South Africa and Zambia, Hanefeld (2010) found that in 
comparison to PEPFAR, the Global Fund was perceived as having better-
reflected country health system priorities through its requirements of a 
CCM:  
There was a sense from interviewees in both countries that the 
GFATM [Global Fund] was more responsive to country needs than 
PEPFAR. Their perception was mainly based on the proposal 
development and mechanisms for implementation, which mean 
that Global Fund funding was based on national priorities rather 
than targets set globally (Hanefeld, 2010, p. 99). 
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The inclusion of CSOs in Global Fund mandated structures and processes 
have, however, sometimes been viewed as not reflecting a meaningful 
engagement in country responses to HIV and AIDS (Amaya et al., 2014; 
Banteyerga et al., 2006; Biesma et al., 2009; Kelly and Birdsall, 2010; 
Mtonya et al., 2005; Spicer et al., 2010). The Global Fund policy states 
that applicants are only required to establish a CCM if there is no 
existing alternate national coordinating mechanism. Most countries have, 
however, needed to create a CCM to access funding.  In some instances, 
the establishment of a CCM has been found to lead to the duplication of 
existing multi-sector coordination structures for HIV and AIDS (Doyle 
and Patel, 2008; Kapilashrami and O’Brien, 2012; Mtonya et al., 2005).   
The Global Fund has also been found to increase the complexity 
faced by governments as they attempt to coordinate the various efforts of 
the new or increased participants (Biesma et al., 2012; Brugha et al., 
2010; Hanefeld et al., 2007; Harmer et al., 2013). The Global Fund helped 
to increase the number of actors involved in addressing HIV and AIDS. 
The GHI did not initially, however, spend much on strengthening the 
existing technical capacity and coordinating mechanisms of recipient 
countries (Biesma et al., 2009; Brugha et al., 2010; Caines et al., 2004). 
The Global Fund's requirement of a CCM comes with an explicit 
definition of what the term country ownership means. 
 In an evaluation commissioned by the Global Fund early on its 
existence, Brugha et al., (2005) evaluated the establishment and the 
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operations of CCMs for Round 1 funding for four countries: Mozambique, 
Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. Their study found that all four countries 
appeared to have established a CCM in 2002 as an expedient way to 
access Global Fund money. On the one hand, Brugha et al., (2005) 
revealed that respondents thought that the CCM gave countries greater 
autonomy on deciding how to use the funding for the Global Fund when 
compared to other international donors. Respondents from Tanzania, 
Uganda and Zambia also remarked that the CCM often felt like a 
government coordinating mechanism, rather than a country coordinating 
mechanism due to the dominance of government representation, which 
made it hard for civil society to talk openly.  
Brugha et al. (2004) found that respondents from Zambia, Uganda, 
Tanzania, and Mozambique had conflicted views on the role of the CCM. 
On the one hand, respondents revealed that the CCM gave countries 
greater "autonomy" on deciding how to use the funding for the Global 
Fund when compared to other international donors. There were, however, 
several problems with how the CCM ended up functioning both in the 
application for and implementation of Global Fund grants. Before the 
arrival of Global Fund resources, all four of the countries (Zambia, 
Uganda, Tanzania, Mozambique) had National AIDS Councils (NACs) 
that were underpinned by national legislation and had clear lines of 
accountability to either the President or the Prime Minister (Brugha et 
al. 2004; p.99). The establishment of the CCMs represented a duplication 
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in existing structures and led to tensions with NACs over respective roles 
and the control of funds. 
In Zambia, CCM members apparently noted that they were not 
quite sure what to do once the application had been submitted (Brugha et 
al., 2005). A civil society CCM member was quoted after the signing of an 
agreement saying that members had not come together after the signing, 
as the role of the CCM was not clear after signing. They quoted a 
respondent who said "What will we be talking about when we meet? We 
don't control resources (Brugha et al., 2005, p. 98). The respondent was 
referring to the fact that even CSOs were engaged in the preparation of a 
Global Fund grant, it was ultimately the Government of Zambia that 
decided how to allocate most of the country's health resources. In India, 
Kapilashrami and McPake (2013) highlighted several barriers to effective 
participation in the CCM. They found that CCM meetings were often held 
at the launch of a new round either to finalise a country proposal or to 
submit the country progress report. As a result, the CCM's ‘oversight' role 
was reported as negligible. 	
In Malawi, Mtonya et al. (2005) found that members of the CCM 
and government employees were often confused about what the functions 
of the CCM were supposed to be. When the Global Fund started operating 
in the country, the Ministry of Health was the primary steward of the 
health sector. The Global Fund's requirement for Malawi to establish a 
CCM duplicated the functions of the National AIDS Council (NAC) 
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Board. Its creation apparently produced confusion for existing health 
stakeholders as they were unsure of what the responsibilities of the CCM 
are supposed to be, as compared to those of the NAC Board (Mtonya et 
al., 2005). 
In Ethiopia, Banteyerga et al. (2006) found that when Global Fund 
resources first arrived in the country, the government had just started to 
implement a decentralised strategy for planning and for implementing 
health activities. By requiring the establishment of a CCM, the Global 
Fund-related planning processes did not adequately reflect the health 
sector's move toward decentralisation. For instance, the tight Global 
Fund deadlines did not allow room for the CCM and other central-level 
decision makers to quickly consult with and learn the priorities that the 
regions and other stakeholders would have wanted to contribute to the 
proposals (Banteyerga et al., 2006). 
Based on empirical evidence from country studies forming part of 
the Global HIV/AIDS Initiatives Network (GHIN), Spicer et al. (2010) 
explored the effects on subnational and national coordination structures 
of the Global Fund, PEPFAR, and World Bank MAP. Their paper 
synthesised empirical qualitative data from seven country studies in 
Europe, Africa, Asia and Latin America: Georgia, Ukraine, Mozambique, 
Zambia, China, Kyrgyzstan, and Peru (Spicer et al., 2010). These studies 
explored the development and functioning of national and subnational 
HIV coordination structures and the extent to which coordination efforts 
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around HIV and AIDS were aligned with and contributing to 
strengthened country health systems.  
Spicer et al. (2010) used the studies reviewed to define the 
functioning of national coordination mechanisms including Global CCMs. 
Their analytical framework seeks to capture three outcomes: a) GHIs and 
other financiers of country HIV/AIDS programmes; b) aspects of the 
functioning of national and subnational coordination structures; c) and 
the effects of coordination structure functioning on programme 
coordination (Spicer et al., 2010) (Figure 2.3). 
Figure 2-3 Spicer et al. 2010 Framework for Examining GHI-supported CSOs 
 
Spicer et al. (2010) revealed that the positive effects of GHIs included the 
creation of opportunities for multi-sectorial participation, greater political 
commitment and increased transparency among most partners. They 
found, however, that the quality of involvement by CSOs was often 
limited, and some GHIs bypassed pre-existing coordination mechanisms, 
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especially at the subnational level, and thus potentially weakened their 
effectiveness.  
The multi-country study of coordination by Spicer et al. (2010), 
however, suggests that most CCMs continued not to perform the broad 
range of functions outlined in the Global Fund guidelines such as 
oversight and monitoring and evaluation: they primarily existed to agree 
and sign Global Fund proposals and met infrequently. Spicer et al. (2010) 
also found that in some cases, multiple coordination structures began to 
exist at the national and subnational levels, which either exclusively 
focused, or had a major focus on HIV and AIDS. 
With a focus on the advocacy role of CSOs as supported by the 
Global Fund in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine, Harmer et al. (2013) 
examined of civil society advocacy efforts to reform HIV and AIDS and 
drugs-related policies and their implementation in the three countries. 
They argue that Global Fund support resulted in making CSOs more 
professional, which increased confidence from government and increased 
CSO influence on policies relating to HIV and AIDS and illicit drugs 
(Harmer et al., 2013). The findings by Harmer et al. (2013), however, also 
suggested that many CSOs became financially dependent on Global Fund 
grants. They quote several CSO staff sub-grantees in Ukraine who felt 
that financial dependence on short-term Global Fund HIV/AIDS grants 
undermined their ability to criticise the Government – which was the 
main recipient – for fear of losing further funding. 
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With a particular focus on Global Fund practices concerning NGOs 
(including CSOs) in Peru, Amaya et al. (2014) found that non-state 
agencies emerged as important actors due to their high representation in 
domestic HIV and AIDS coordination bodies. Funding from the Global 
Fund led to the emergence and participation of many new CSOs together 
with older ones. It had potential to contribute to them reaching 
vulnerable groups, strengthening the political position of these groups 
and increasing their training and overall capacity.  
Amaya et al. (2014) found that the pattern of direct funding of 
CSOs as sub-recipients affected the steering role of the Peruvian Ministry 
of Health. Respondents from other sectors argued that the role of CSOs 
primarily as project executors, as facilitated by the Global Fund, hindered 
the CSOs' ability to advocate for their constituents and make the 
government accountable to agreements. Global Fund support made 
NGOs' committed to producing results – often in conjunction with 
national governments. Amaya et al. (2014) identified the CSOs' ability to 
assure government accountability as a key element to guaranteeing the 
continuity of Global Fund activities.  
 
2.3 Ownership and Health Systems Implications of HIV 
and AIDS GHIs 
 
Evidence demonstrates that scale-up of HIV services has produced 
stronger health systems and, conversely, that strengthened health 
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systems were critical to the success of the HIV scale-up (Palen et al., 
2012). Increased access to and effectiveness of HIV treatment and care 
programs, attention to long-term sustainability, and recognition of the 
importance of national governance, and country ownership of HIV 
programs have resulted in an increased focus on structures that 
compromise the broader health system (Palen et al., 2012). In comparison 
to PEPFAR, Global Fund supported activities have been perceived as 
being more closely aligned with country ownership (Hanefeld and 
Musheke, 2009; Oomman et al., 2008).  
In some instances, funding from the Global Fund and PEPFAR 
arrived within countries that were already providing some amount of HIV 
and AIDS services to their citizens (Farahani et al., 2014; Grundfest 
Schoepf, 2004; Schneider et al., 2006). These existing services imply that 
governments of these countries had some of the necessary health systems 
infrastructure in place to provide the health services that would then be 
buttressed by GHI funding. The health infrastructure of some recipient 
countries did not necessarily have the capacity to quickly translate the 
significant amount of financing that was made available through 
PEPFAR and Global Fund grants into health outcomes (Farahani et al., 
2014; Hanefeld and Musheke, 2009; Schneider et al., 2006). 
Some respondents interviewed for the study by Oliveira Cruz and 
McPake (2011) in Uganda explained that the rationale that drove GHIs 
like PEPFAR and the Global Fund to set up these parallel mechanisms 
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were related to the weak capacity of governments. If they had decided to 
work through the existing government structures, this would have 
delayed the implementation schedule of their activities (Oliveira Cruz 
and McPake, 2011). HIV and AIDS have the potential to increase the 
demand for health services, and at the same time as it has the potential 
to reduce the capacity of existing health service. As a result, access to 
antiretroviral treatment (ART) and other HIV-related services in the 
health sector are likely to place both positive and adverse effects on the 
supply of and demand for health services (Yu et al., 2008). It is difficult 
for health systems to provide HIV and AIDS services in isolation from 
other health services. A vertical approach works for a while, and then it 
hits the ceiling of insufficient health workers and dysfunctional health 
systems, particularly in countries with high HIV prevalence (Pearson 
2004). 
Drawing on evidence from Malawi and Ethiopia, Rasschaert et al. 
(2011) analyse the effects of the scale-up HIV and AIDS treatment 
interventions on human resources policies, service delivery and general 
health outcomes, and explore how synergies can be maximised. In both 
countries, the need for an HIV response triggered an overhaul of human 
resources policies. As a result, the health workforce at the health facility 
and community level was reinforced. In addition to a significant increase 
in the coverage of HIV and AIDS services, they observed a rise in user 
rates of non-HIV health services and an improvement in overall health 
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outcomes (Rasschaert et al., 2011). Thus interventions aimed at the 
expansion of HIV and AIDS services can have positive spill-over effects 
on the health system (Rasschaert et al., 2011). 
In a case study of Ghana, Atun et al. (2011) aimed to explore how 
the Global Fund-supported HIV program interacts with the health 
system there and to map the extent and nature of integration of the 
national disease program across six key health systems functions (Atun 
et al., 2011). Qualitative interviews of national stakeholders were 
conducted to understand the perceptions of the strengths and weaknesses 
of the relationship between Global Fund-supported activities and the 
health system and to identify positive synergies and unintended 
consequences of integration. They conclude that investments in 
infrastructure, human resources, and commodities have enabled HIV 
interventions to increase exponentially. But Ghana’s relationship with 
the Global Fund introduced governance and monitoring and evaluation 
functions, which were parallel structures to national systems, and led to 
inefficiencies (Atun et al., 2011). 
Thus the aspects of health services provision and management that 
might serve as constraints to meeting general health system goals are 
some of the same ones that would impede progress for GHI interventions. 
Given the significant contributions of the GHIs, there are many questions 
around whether the HIV/AIDS money is strengthening or weakening 
health systems (Oomman et al. 2008). Based on their findings in Zambia, 
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Uganda and Mozambique, Oomman et al. (2008) argue that the 
establishment of parallel structures by HIV and AIDS GHIs is untenable 
and unrealistic. The AIDS-specific systems supported by funders also 
used many of the resources employed by the broader country health 
system. They used the same infrastructure and health facility workers, 
who must complete separate reports for donor health information 
systems, and their drugs were stored at the government facilities and 
delivered on the same trucks to many of the same health centres 
(Oomman et al. 2008). 
The kinds of health worker skills required to address HIV and 
AIDS are not unique when compared to the skills needed to address a 
broad range of other health issues. For instance, within the hospital 
setting, the same skills needed to ensure efficient administration of and 
adherence to HIV and AIDS treatment are the same types of skills 
required to deliver other types of health programs (Callaghan et al., 2010; 
Marseille et al., 2002; Semo et al., 2014). Investing in the human 
resources infrastructure needed to deliver HIV and AIDS related services, 
therefore, has the potential to lead to a health system's improved ability 
to more efficiently provide other services (Banati and Moatti, 2008; 
Callaghan et al., 2010; Hanefeld and Musheke, 2009; McCourt and 
Awases, 2007). 
According to Hanefeld (2014), within the first five years of the 
Global Fund's operation, it became apparent that the scale up of disease-
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specific programmes was affected and potentially limited by weak health 
systems in recipient countries. Hanefeld (2014) argues that despite its 
potentially harmful system-level effects, the Global Fund created 
momentum regarding HIV and AIDS issues within focal countries, and 
highlighted the need for activities to strengthen systems, which otherwise 
may not have come to the fore (Hanefeld, 2014).  
With a focus on Nigeria and the health system practices of the 
Global Fund and PEPFAR in the country, Chima and Homedes (2015) 
raised concerns that a particular focus on HIV and AIDS could be 
weakening health systems by diverting attention and scarce resources in 
the health sector. In Nigeria, implementing agencies were accused of 
caring less about ensuring equitable distribution of health services than 
about ensuring that they got good project numbers quickly, even at the 
expense of equity. Chima and Homedes (2015) found that facilities that 
were doing better at providing services tend to be selected for more 
support because such ‘viable institutions' are more likely to scale up 
services with minimal support quickly.  
Travis et al. (2004) argue that objectives based on achieving clearly 
specified targets within the short time frame can create a sense of 
urgency and provide a critical focus for addressing health issues:  
The primary advantage of taking an intervention-specific approach 
to strengthening health systems is that it can help to maintain 
focus by targeting a "manageable chunk" of the system rather than 
taking on the whole. Targeting particular health-system 
constraints to the achievement of health goals may also deliver 
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quicker returns than longer-term, broader, system-based 
interventions (Travis et al., 2004, p. 902). 
 
Long-term sustainability of health system capacity can be undermined by 
the benefits of short-time goals. Travis et al. (2004), therefore argue that 
a focus on larger health systems strengthening would address underlying 
causes of deficiencies in a system:  
The advantages claimed of a system-wide approach are that such a 
strategy increases the range of options and tackles root causes, and 
the benefits accrue to several, not single, priorities, i.e., efficiencies 
are possible. The disadvantages are that benefits take longer to 
accumulate and the effort may become unfocused and 
unmanageable (Travis et al., 2004, p. 903). 
 
Hafner and Shiffman (2013) argue, however, that while more 
funders now embrace health systems strengthening, this does not 
constitute a cohesive policy community. The concept of health systems 
strengthening is vague, and there is a weak evidence base for informing 
policies and programmes for strengthening health systems. They, 
therefore, question the sustainability of the sustainability agenda. From 
their criticism of the Paris Agenda, Goldberg and Bryant (2012) suggest 
that funder-recipient relationships for health interventions should start 
with an initial capacity assessment that includes both funders and 
recipients. By taking this approach, donors are acting in good faith 
because they position recipients to evaluate and increase health system 
capacity independent of whom is the source of external funding. The way 
in which capacity is built should not be defined by the donors, but should 
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instead use the existing capabilities of the recipient country as a starting 
point to strengthening health systems for the long-term.   
This chapter has shown that Global Fund and PEPFAR practices 
at a national level have proven contrary to the principle of country 
ownership and institutional autonomy. Most of the literature reviewed 
refers to the potential negative implications for the recipients to maintain 
services at the levels that were facilitated by GHIs after their funding 
departs. The literature has, however, tended to focus on examining the 
impacts of GHIs while the are present in the recipient countries (Biesma 
et al., 2009; Chima and Homedes, 2016; Hanefeld, 2010; Kapilashrami 
and O’Brien, 2012; Oomman et al., 2008).  
The existing research has shown less of an analytical focus on what 
might happen when they exit, given the ways in which they initially 
sought to direct their financial support. This thesis contributes to the 
literature that examines the practices of Global Fund and PEPFAR 
practices and their implications for country ownership and institutional 
autonomy. Before the year 2010, there are barely any academic writings 
that specifically address the issues of HIV and AIDS GHI transition at 
the country level. A few useful studies have, however, emerged since then 
(Amaya et al., 2014; Bennett et al., 2015; Craveiro and Dussault, 2016b; 
Marten, 2015). Looking at GHI practices over time has the potential to 
give a more comprehensive picture of their influence on health systems 
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strengthening, rather than just looking at them regarding the amount of 
funding that they provided at one point in time. 
Amaya et al., (2014) examined the transition from Global Fund 
support to increasing national HIV and AIDS funding in Peru (2004–
2012). They conducted thirty-five in-depth interviews from October to 
December 2011 in Lima, Peru, among the major stakeholders involved in 
HIV and AIDS work. From their findings, Amaya et al. (2014) argue that 
strengthening government and regional capacity and fostering 
accountability mechanisms will facilitate an effective transition to 
government-led financing. They position their study as providing lessons 
for countries seeking to sustain programmes following donor exit (Amaya 
et al., 2014). 
For Peru, Amaya et al. (2014) argue that the vast amounts of 
funding that many countries receive to support HIV and AIDS 
interventions make the questions on how to sustain these programs 
central to understanding the current international development agenda. 
They define sustainability as "the capability of a government to manage 
health programmes long term without depending on the intervention of 
external bodies for technical or financial support within a given social, 
political and economic environment" (Amaya et al., 2014). By their 
definition for sustainability, Amaya et al. (2014) posit that their findings 
demonstrate that Peru made significant steps towards the viability of 
their HIV and AIDS response as funded by the Global Fund. They argue 
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that the creation of partnerships and initial alignment of Global Fund 
activities with national policies were found to be enabling factors for 
sustainability. The Peruvian government started the process of aligning 
Global Fund activities with local priorities early on. Alignment with 
existing structures then contributed to ensuring that activities were 
integrated into the national response and demonstrated a potential to be 
sustainable independent of support from the Global Fund.  
Marten (2015) is another researcher that has recently sought to 
understand the impacts of GHI transition at a country level. In 
particular, Marten (2015) examines the issues of health system 
sustainability and country ownership of HIV programmes on Tanzania as 
impacted by the shift of PEPFAR funding and interventions in the 
country. Advocating for health systems strengthening while funds are 
still plentiful can be a good strategy for building health systems that are 
better able to deliver more sustainable and equitable care in many 
different countries. Marten (2015) argues that central to building the 
sustainability in PEPFAR's policies was the expansion of national 
ownership. 
 
2.4 Thesis Research Contributions  
 
A disproportionate amount of Global Fund and PEPFAR funding 
initially went to countries with a low-income ranking according to global 
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economic indicators (Druce and Dickinson, 2008; Hecht et al., 2010). 
According to Hecht et al. (2010), Namibia, South Africa, Botswana and 
Swaziland "form a small group of countries combining high disease 
burden with middle-income status (defined as middle-income country as 
$2250-5700 per head) (p.1256)." Until about 2003/04 there was minimal 
donor involvement in the Namibian health sector (MoHSS, 2010b; 
MoHSS and ICF Macro, 2010). From 2004 onwards, donor spending 
began to make up a larger share of total health expenditures. In 2001/02, 
donor funding as a percentage of total health spending in Namibia stood 
at 3.8% (MoHSS, 2010b; MoHSS and Health Systems 20/20, 2008). By 
2006/07, donor contributions to the Namibian health sector had grown to 
22.4% and then stood at 21.7% in 2008/09 (MoHSS, 2010b).  
Much of the increase in external funds in Namibia was due to HIV 
and AIDS-specific funding from the Global Fund and PEPFAR (MoHSS, 
2010b; MoHSS and Health Systems 20/20, 2008). As in many other 
countries, Global Fund and PEPFAR resources arrived in Namibia 
around the same time (MoHSS et al., 2010; Oomman et al., 2008). Thus 
the combined money from the two GHIs made a significant impact on the 
proportion of donor funding to the Namibian health sector.  
Table 2-1 Funding of Namibian Health System 2001/02 to 2008/09: (MoHSS and Health 
Systems 20/20, 2008) 
Namibian Government Budget 
Year 
2001/02 2004/05 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 
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Total Health Expenditure (real 










Government Contributions to 
Total Health Expenditures (real 
2006 US$ million) 165 224 241 277 292 
Government Contributions as a 
Percentage of Total Health 
Expenditures 63.3% 57% 44% 53.4% 53.8% 
Donor Contributions as a 
Percentage of Total Expenditures 3.8% 9.7% 22.4% 20% 21.7% 
 
Table 2.1 shows that between the financial years 2001/02 to 2006/07, 
total health spending in Namibia doubled during the 5-year period, going 
from US$261million to US$549 million (MoHSS et al., 2010; MoHSS and 
Health Systems 20/20, 2008). In 2000/01, the Namibian government 
contributed US$165 million (63.3%) out of the total health sector budget 
of US$261 (MoHSS and Health Systems 20/20, 2008). By 2006/07, the 
Government's contributions had increased to US$241 million. However, 
despite the total increase in health sector budget, the Namibian 
Government's contributions only made up 44% of the total health sector 
budget for 2006/07 (MoHSS et al., 2010). 
Within Namibia's National Health Accounts (NHAs), the increase 
in donor support as a percentage of total health sector spending has been 
mainly attributed to the presence of Global Fund and PEPFAR support 
(MoHSS et al., 2010; MoHSS and Health Systems 20/20, 2008). For 
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instance, in the Namibian Government's fiscal year 2008/09 for which 
21.7% of health sector funding came from external funders, more than 
90% of that funding came from either the Global Fund or PEPFAR 
(MoHSS et al., 2010). In the 2008/09 budget year, the PEPFAR initiative 
contributed 13.5% of total health sector spending in Namibia, while the 
Global Fund contributed 5.4% of total health sector spending (MoHSS et 
al., 2010). The contributions from the Global Fund and PEPFAR 
amounted to more than 18% of Namibia's total health care expenditures 
(MoHSS, 2010b).  
There was an increase in the portion of the Ministry's budget that 
came from donors, as a result of funding that came from the Global Fund 
and PEPFAR. In 2001/02, the Ministry of Health received 96% of its 
funding from central government revenue and only 4% from donors. In 
2006/07, 86.1% of its funding came from central government revenue, and 
13.9% came from donors (MoHSS and Health Systems 20/20, 2008). 
Funding to the Ministry of Health primarily went towards the provision 
of clinical HIV and AIDS services at government-run facilities 
(Presidential Commission of Inquiry: MoHSS, 2013). In addition to their 
total contributions to the health sector, the resources from the two GHIs 
also led to a shift in the funding that the non-government health sector in 
Namibia managed. Between 2001/02 and 2006/07, the share of total 
health funds controlled by the Government fell from 57% to 43%, while 
the share controlled by NGOs rose from 1.6% to 16% during the same 
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period (MoHSS and Health Systems 20/20, 2008). This change in the 
proportion of NGOs controlling health sector funds is a reflection of the 
Global Fund and PEPFAR funding that was allocated to recipients 
besides the Ministry of Health.   
Due to its HIV and AIDS prevalence, Namibia was initially one of 
the highest per capita recipients of both Global Fund and PEPFAR 
funding (Hecht et al., 2010; Youde, 2010). The country remains with one 
of the highest HIV and AIDS prevalence in the world, although there has 
been a clear transition in the financial attention that it has received from 
the Global Fund and PEPFAR (PEPFAR, 2011; The Global Fund, 2013a; 
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) and MoHSS, 
2010). 
Peer-reviewed literature that focuses on the interactions between 
GHIs and the Namibian health system is practically non-existent. No 
existing research questions the nature of Global Fund and PEPFAR 
engagement in Namibia with a focus on the issues of ownership and 
institutional autonomy, and their implications for health system capacity 
and the sustainability of this capability. Research on Global Fund and 
PEPFAR practices in Namibia primarily provides financial information 
on the involvement of the two GHIs in Namibia (MoHSS and Health 
Systems 20/20, 2008; PEPFAR, 2011). The background information on 
Namibia's engagement with the Global Fund and PEPFAR presented 
within this thesis mainly derives from documents produced by 
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stakeholders in the Namibian health actors, such as the Ministry of 
Health and Social Services, the two GHIs, and other national and 
international agencies operating in the country.  
For this study, the Namibian context presented an opportunity to 
examine the impacts of changes in HIV and AIDS funding on the 
operations of a particular agency within a given country. This thesis 
seeks to make a research contribution on three main fronts: 
1. It is a case study of the Namibian health sector concerning 
the Ministry of Health's engagement with the Global Fund 
and PEPFAR. It examines the extent to which the Ministry 
of Health was able to retain ownership of health policy 
development and implementation in its engagement with 
the Global Fund and PEPFAR through the rise and decline 
of funding to Namibia. 
2. It examines the health systems policy effects of Global Fund 
and PEPFAR funding to Namibia mainly as associated with 
financial flows; human resources management; and civil 
society engagement.  
3. This thesis examines whether the initial operations of the 
Global Fund and PEPFAR undermined country ownership 
and the autonomy of the Ministry of Health.  
 
One of the main contributions of this research is to provide empirical 
findings on Namibia's health system, and its associated relationship with 
Global Fund and PEPFAR funding. Rather than GHI effectiveness being 
the focal point of analysis, the ability for Namibia to steer its health 
system in the presence of support from the Global Fund and PEPFAR is 
the focus of study. Another key contribution of this thesis is its attempt to 
understand the changing relationship that GHIs have on countries as 
they increase and decrease funding. It is easy to give GHIs a lot of credit 
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if the evaluation focus is only on understanding their contributions as 
they increase funding.  
Spicer et al. (2010) argue that while single country studies and 
broad-brush reviews are starting to reveal the complicated relationship 
between GHIs and efforts to coordinate the HIV and AIDS response, 
synthesis of primary data from multiple countries is required to identify 
cross-country challenges and lessons learned (Spicer et al. 2010). Country 
situations differ widely in the sense that health systems are complex and 
their organisation and performance are highly context–specific; hence 




This chapter has examined the ways in which the existing 
literature on the country level interactions of HIV and AIDS GHIs has 
considered the issue of recipient ownership and its association with 
health systems strengthening. Although sustainability calls for greater 
integration into health systems, GHIs have often had to circumvented the 
recipient country systems to make a quick impact. The research emphasis 
has been on whether the health systems infrastructures of the beneficiary 
countries can enable GHIs to meet their objectives. In contrast, this 
thesis argues for a research focus that examines the extent to which GHIs 
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provide an additional boost of resources, which can then make the 
recipient countries better able to handle their affairs in the future.  
Even as this thesis approaches the interaction of the Global Fund 
and PEPFAR with national health systems issue from the perspective of 
country's existing policies and operational arrangements, it draws from 
the analytical frameworks used in earlier studies that have approached 
the evaluation from the viewpoint of determining the effectiveness of 
GHIs. Previous studies are in particular useful for identifying the points 
of GHI and health system interactions from which an assessment of their 
relationship can commence. 
The concerns around sustainability do not take away from the 
impact of GHIs. Rather it becomes a question of how GHIs can be made to 
be effective in the long-term. Strengthened health systems may become 
undermined if the starting relationship between GHIs and country health 
system subverts the autonomy of the recipient. Success in the presence of 
GHIs does not necessarily translate to continued health systems success 
after GHIs depart. There is the general tendency in the literature 
reviewed in this chapter to discuss country ownership as regards to the 
presence of donors. There is not enough discussion on the implications of 
that effectiveness once the donors have departed. Thus this thesis 
examines country ownership in the presence of the Global Fund and 
PEPFAR in Namibia, and its implications for a health system that 
remains strengthened once the two GHIs depart the country. 
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3. Research Design 
3.1 Introduction 
	
This chapter outlines the research design of the study and gives a 
reflective account of the research journey that underlies this thesis. Yin 
(1994) defines the research design as the “logical sequence that connects 
the empirical data to a study’s initial research questions and, ultimately, 
to its conclusions” (Yin, 1994, p. 19). The research design presented in 
this chapter is about the methods taken to examine the extent to which 
the Global Fund and PEPFAR influenced country ownership in Namibia 
at the rise and decline of their financial support to the country. With 
primary reference to the qualitative case study research design, this 
chapter describes the processes for data collection and analysis that were 
used to address the research aims described in chapters one and two.  
As a research design, one of the strengths of the case study 
approach is its potential for the findings to be informed by more than one 
method for data collection (De Vaus, 2001). The results presented in this 
thesis derive from the analysis of data that was gathered from reading 
electronic and hardcopy documents; conducting semi-structured 
qualitative interviews, and from participating in and observing the 
Ministry of Health’s engagement with funding from the Global Fund and 
PEPFAR. Since the data for this thesis were collected through different 
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methods, which focus on the same issue, this study can be said to have 
adopted a multi-method approach (De Vaus, 2001). 
This thesis uses multiple sources of data to qualitatively analyse 
the influences of Global Fund and PEPFAR support to Namibia from 
when the two initiatives were first established in 2002 and 2004, 
respectively, to 2012. The findings presented in this thesis derive from 
the analysis of data that was gathered from reading electronic and 
hardcopy documents; conducting semi-structured qualitative interviews, 
and from participating in and observing the Ministry of Health’s 
engagement with funding from the Global Fund and PEPFAR.  
A principal source of data was 43 semi-structured interviews 
conducted in Namibia during a placement with the Directorate of Special 
Programs in the Ministry of Health. Interview data was supported by 
observations gained from participation in Ministry of Health meetings 
and other discussions concerning the two GHIs. Interview data and 
participant-observation data were collected between February 2012 and 
June 2012, during the research placement.  
 
3.2 Why the Qualitative Case Study Approach? 
 
What is a case study? According to Gillham (2000, p. 1) the case study 
research design has four key features: 
1) It is a unit of human activity embedded in the real world;  
2) It can only be studied or understood in context;  
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3) It exists in the here and now; and  
4) It merges in with its context so that precise boundaries are 
difficult to draw.  
 
Gillham (2000) adopted these four characteristics of a case study 
from Yin (1994) who argued that the case study approach is particularly 
useful for examining contemporary events when the relevant behaviours 
cannot be manipulated (Yin, 1994, p. 8).  The importance of real-life 
context is captured by qualitative research in general and in particular by 
a case-study approach (Diefenbach, 2009; Flyvbjerg, 2006; Ritchie et al., 
2014). The case study approach is better suited than other research 
methodologies, such as a structured survey or quantitative analysis, to 
achieve this objective (Yin 1994). The defining feature of the case study is 
that it considers a phenomenon in its real-life context. 
By emphasising the context, the case study approach allows the 
researcher to derive the significance of the research outcomes through 
reflecting on the context from which the data were collected (De Vaus, 
2001, p. 235). By clearly situating the study within its larger context 
through description, the descriptive case study enables appropriate policy 
action to take place in response to the findings from the research (Hakim, 
1987, p. 4). For health policy engagement at the global level, descriptive 
case studies from different geographic locations can be useful for 
answering questions on how to achieve an effective global health system 
(Szlezák et al., 2010).  
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A detailed understanding of the context of a single case study can 
provide ample information to determine if the findings from one context 
are applicable and replicable elsewhere (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Ritchie et al., 
2014; Schofield, 2000a). In research on the interaction between the Global 
Fund, PEPFAR and country health systems, the country context has been 
found to be a mitigating factor for their perceived outcomes (Atun and 
Kazatchkine, 2009; Biesma et al., 2009; Collins and Beyrer, 2013; WHO 
Maximizing Positive Synergies Collaborative Group, 2009).  
Although the context is important in explaining the findings from 
case studies, it can be difficult to delineate the boundaries of a research 
project. For practical policy implications, even the most clearly delineated 
unit of analysis does not mean that the causal factors of the outcomes 
within a study are clearly identifiable (Gillham, 2000; Yin, 1994). Within 
a larger and complex world, there are often multiple visible and invisible 
explanations for a perceived outcome. The multiple explanatory variables 
can then make it difficult for research to lead to the development of a 
clear and appropriate policy response to an issue (Gillham, 2000).   
One of the challenges in any descriptive case study is answering 
the question of where to begin and where to end with the data collection. 
A case study deals with the whole case, but this cannot possibly mean 
that the case study consists of everything about the case. To describe 
everything is impossible: there must be a focus (De Vaus, 2001, p. 225).  
For policy research to be useful for practical considerations, it is 
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important to choose a unit of analysis for which the outcomes from the 
study could be practically applicable (Hakim, 1987, p. 132). 
Regarding what the case study research design does, Hakim 
(1987), defines it as "the social equivalent of a spotlight or microscope". 
Its value depends on how well the study is focused (Hakim, 1987, p. 61). 
In the broadest sense, the ‘case’ within a case study design is the unit of 
analysis for which information is collected within a specified unit of time 
(De Vaus, 2001; Hakim, 1987). A case is the ‘object’ of study. It is the unit 
that we seek to understand as a whole (De Vaus, 2001, p. 220). The unit 
of analysis for a case study can be many different things. It can be an 
individual, group, institution or community (Gillham, 2000). A case can 
also be an event, a decision, a programme, an implementation process, 
and change within an organisation as a whole or even a change within a 
team or department (Rowley, 2002).  
 As will be described in Chapter four, the Directorate of Special 
Programmes (DSP) in the Ministry of Health is the Directorate tasked 
with the responsibility of overseeing and managing the Namibian 
Government’s national response to HIV and AIDS (MoHSS, 2008ab). To 
focus the study, data collection within the Ministry of Health centred on 
the DSP (Rowley, 2002; Yin, 1994). Thus more narrowly, within the 
Ministry of Health, the DSP was the primary unit from which most of the 
interview and observation data were drawn.  
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For this research, the Ministry of Health is a case study embedded 
within the case of Namibia as a country. The Namibian health system 
consists of various government, private and non-government agencies 
seeking to address HIV and AIDS in the country. The Ministry of Health 
is just one of the organisations that could have been picked for analysis in 
Namibia. Through an embedded case study design, a phenomenon is 
more closely examined than it otherwise would be from a holistic design, 
which would seek to consider as many of the health system variables as 
possible (Yin, 1994). An embedded case study design ensures that the 
research has clear measures and seeks to avoid viewing an issue through 




The most frequent criticism of case studies is that they are often 
unable to meet the criteria of external validity, critical for verifiable 
research (de Vaus, 2007; Dooley, 2002; Flyvbjerg, 2004; Hammersley and 
Gomm, 2000; Rose, 1991; Schofield, 2000; Yin, 1994). The issue of 
external validity explores the likelihood that a case study will speak to 
situations beyond the one that was investigated, and therefore make the 
study generalisable (de Vaus, 2007; Dooley, 2002; Schofield, 2000; Yin, 
1994). For purposes of generalisability, single case designs are considered 
to be the weakest of case study designs (de Vaus, 2007; Flyvbjerg, 2004; 
Yin, 1994). Applying the logic of replication, de Vaus (2007) argues that 
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"a single case design is less compelling than multiple case designs 
because it is only one replication and does not necessarily provide a 
robust test of a theory" (p.227). Replications give more confidence in the 
findings from research because there is always the possibility that if more 
case studies are done, some might not meet the researcher's expectations 
and thus demonstrate the need to revise the theory (de Vaus, 2007; 
Diefenbach, 2009; Yin, 1994).  
In qualitative research, single cases are analogous to individual 
experiments in quantitative research and laboratory experiments (Yin, 
1994). In this case study of the Namibian Ministry of Health, the findings 
from data collected were evaluated to determine whether they supported 
the theoretical propositions derived from existing literature (Schofield, 
2000; Yin, 1994). Schofield (1993) argues, however, that unlike laboratory 
experiments, the purpose of describing the research design is not to 
enable someone else to replicate it and achieve the same results:  
Rather it is to produce a coherent and illuminating description of 
and perspective on a situation that is based on and consistent with 
the detailed study of that situation (p.202). 
As much as having multiple case study sites can increase the 
generalizability of qualitative work, Schofield (1993) argues that a study 
of a vast number of locations may also take away from a deeper 
understanding of an individual case (Schofield 1993, p.211). A detailed 
knowledge of the context of a single case study can provide ample 
information to determine if the findings from that context are applicable 
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elsewhere. In-depth descriptive work is necessary to demonstrate that 
findings are in fact comparable from one setting to another. This 
contextual understanding can also act as a determinant of whether the 
research would be worth replicating in another setting. 
A case study calls for and requires an issue to be explored or 
understood within its original context (de Vaus, 2007; Flyvbjerg, 2004; 
Gillham, 2000; Gomm et al., 2000b; Luck et al., 2006; Rose, 1991; Stake, 
2000; Yin, 1994). The meaning of human behaviour stems primarily from 
the context in which it occurs, and the case study research design is 
useful in allowing for a context-specific derivation of this meaning (de 
Vaus 2007, p.235). In seeking to embrace the context within which events 
occur the case study method demonstrates a strength absent in other 
research designs such as surveys, which are often premised on screening 
out the context (de Vaus, 2007; Yin, 1994; Yin, 1981). Generalisation of 
human behaviour often requires generalisation from one group of people 
to another, or one institution to another, all of which have many elements 
that are specific or unique to them (Evers and Wu, 2006; Gillham, 2000).  
An in-depth description of the case study context is, therefore, 
necessary to demonstrate that findings are in fact comparable from one 
setting to another (Mitchell, 2000). Most other research designs rely on 
controlling out the influences of the context (De Vaus, 2001, p. 247). An 
experiment, for instance, deliberately divorces a phenomenon from its 
context, so that attention can be focused on only a few variables 
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(typically, the context is “controlled’ by the laboratory environment) (Yin, 
1994, p. 13). Rather than seeking to screen out the context, as in 
experiments or surveys, case studies attempt to understand the 
significance of particular factors within the context (De Vaus, 2001; Yin, 
1994).  
For case studies, the engagement with the previous theory before 
data collection enables a researcher to select cases and units of analysis 
that are typical and representative of other situations and thus enhance 
the usefulness of case studies (De Vaus, 2001). Nationally representative 
policy research is more generalizable than localised studies (Hakim, 1987, 
p. 5). With particular reference to Namibia, the Ministry of Health was 
also chosen as the unit of analysis because it represents the national 
institution at which health policy is primarily legislated and 
operationalised in the country (El Obeid, 2001; MoHSS, 2008a).  
Within qualitative case study research, a "thick" description of the 
study setting enables an independent assessment of the generalisability 
of a particular case study (De Vaus, 2001; Schofield, 2000b). Schofield 
(1993) argues that whatever the guiding principles of choosing a site may 
be, a “thick description provides the information necessary to make an 
informed judgment about the degree and extent to which the case of 
interest meets the criteria of typicality” (1993, p.210). A "thick" 
description of the study context also allows for an independent 
assessment of the extent to which the case at hand meets the criteria of 
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typicality for existing research (Schofield 1993, p.210). In addition to 
illuminating the situation in general, the contextual information provided 
within is meant to enable readers of this thesis to determine whether the 
study is generalizable to other contexts beyond Namibia (Evers and Wu, 
2006; Schofield, 2000). Although this thesis focuses on the engagement of 
the Global Fund and PEPFAR in Namibia, the findings on the impact 
that they have on Namibia can add to a generalised understanding of the 
effects of the two initiatives at the country level, in other contexts.  
Flyvberg (2004) argues that thick description is also necessary for 
accepting a case at face value rather than aiming to generalise it. The 
knowledge that cannot formally be generalised is also relevant and finds 
a way to enter into collective knowledge accumulation. As important as it 
is to be able to generalise from a case study, there is also value in the 
insights that can be revealed by an isolated incident (Flyvbjerg, 2004). 
Thus this case study of the Ministry of Health in Namibia is also useful 
as a standalone case for contributing to existing knowledge on the 
engagement of GHIs with country health systems.  
 
3.3 Benefits of Research Placement with Ministry of 
Health  
 
In November 2011, I emailed the director of DSP and requested a 
placement with the Directorate to enable me to collect data for this 
thesis. The application consisted of a formal letter of request with a 
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University of Edinburgh letterhead, a 2-page summary of the research 
objectives and my curriculum vitae (CV). The director approved my 
request for a research placement but informed me that I needed to apply 
for an official research internship through the Ministry of Health’s 
Research Management Committee (RMC) for ethical review. On the 7th of 
December 2011, I submitted my full PhD proposal (as approved at the 
first-year PhD review that underlies this thesis, in July 2011) to the 
RMC. On the 20th of February 2012 (see Appendix 2), I was informed that 
the Ministry of Health ethical review panel had approved my request for 
a research placement with DSP. 
In my initial letter seeking a placement with the DSP, I 
emphasised that the focus of the research was on understanding the 
health systems information requirements of the Global Fund and 
PEPFAR in Namibia. To accommodate my request, I was informed when 
I arrived that I would be located with the Division of Monitoring and 
Evaluation (M&E) to assist with activities within the division. I was 
given a desk, a computer, access to a telephone and an email address. For 
the three months that I was with the Ministry of Health, I worked official 
Namibian Government working hours (9 am to 5 am, Monday to Friday).  
Although it became apparent that I would not be focusing the 
research on information systems early on, I continued to be engaged in 
activities related to M&E throughout the placement. For instance, I was 
involved in collecting data for the National Commitments and Policy 
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Index as well as the National Funding Matrix. The two databases were 
supposed to enable the department to develop its sustainability strategy 
but was mainly part of Namibia’s report to the United Nations General 
Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on the country’s response to HIV 
and AIDS for 2010/11. On behalf of the Ministry of Health, which 
organised the event, I was also the transcriber for a multi-sector 




When the phenomena under study are not purely historical, 
observations are a useful source of evidence because they enable the 
researcher to examine the context first-hand (Yin, 1994, p. 86). In my 
position as a DSP intern, I was both a participant and observer in 
Ministry of Health activities. From the first day of my three-month 
placement with the Ministry of Health, I kept a diary of my observations. 
I walked around with the notebook as I went about my daily activities 
with the Ministry of Health, and made notes of things that I thought 
might prove useful to the research.  
As a result of the placement with DSP, I also found out early on 
that there are various components of the DSP operational structures that 
were not revealed in documents that I found through internet searches.  
Several documents only existed for public sharing in hardcopy forms. I 
thus kept an eye out for policy documents as I went about my activities 
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with the Ministry of Health.  I also made notes of the various sources of 
data that were available for me to access. For instance, in an entry on the 
12 of March 2012, I made a note of the fact that the Director of the DSP 
had newspaper articles on Global Fund and PEPFAR activities on her 
wall. I made a note to come back and read these articles. My notes also 
enabled me to keep track of policy documents I should make sure to look 
into, names of people, and organisations that could be useful to informing 
the study. The notebook also allowed me to start doing some preliminary 
analysis on the events that I was witnessing as well as on the data that I 
was collecting. In writing this thesis, I frequently looked back on these 
notes to track my thinking and understanding of the issues discussed 
within the thesis.  
Since the placement with the DSP took place at around the same 
time that both initiatives were looking to decrease their funding to 
Namibia, the issue of country ownership and implications of the 
departure of GHI funding was already something that was on the radar of 
the Ministry of Health.  Being in Namibia made clear that Global Fund 
and PEPFAR financial support to the country were on the decline. When 
I arrived in Namibia to collect data for research a Sustainability 
Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) was formed by the Ministry of 
Health to strategically plan for the decrease of Global Fund and PEPFAR 
funds. As part of the sustainability TAC, on the 27th of March 2012, I 
attended a Finance Strategy Meeting that was run by the Ministry of 
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Health (the DSP). Thus the data presented in this thesis ended up 
becoming driven by what was going in Namibia. As a representative of 
the Ministry of Health, I was able to attend a Namibian health sector 
stakeholder meeting, on the 29th of March 2012 at the Hilton Hotel in 
Windhoek, which mainly consisted of external funders to the Namibian 
health sector. 
 
3.4 Documents  
 
Documents were another important source of evidence for this 
study. They included printed and electronic books, peer-reviewed journal 
papers, policy white papers, annual reports, project reports, letters, 
emails, newspaper articles and blog posts. Most of the academic literature 
was accessed through Internet searches of journal databases such as 
EBSCOhost, Google Scholar, and the websites of the Global Fund and 
PEPFAR. Books and printed reports were obtained through the 
University of Edinburgh Library directly and through inter-library loans 
from other universities in the UK. Academic documents and articles were 
critical to helping me understand how to do research for a PhD thesis. 
Those relevant to qualitative research case study design helped me to 
understand some of the weaknesses, strengths and pitfalls of doing this 
kind of the investigation. The types of documents used and specifically 
referenced within this chapter were informed by lectures, readings and 
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discussion groups required in year one for all social sciences PhD student 
in the School of Social and Political Sciences. 
Academic documents also informed my overall understanding of 
the perceived outcomes of the engagement between HIV and AIDS GHIs 
and country health systems. These were essential for helping me to 
understand the methodological approaches, theories and other issues that 
are critical to studying country-specific health systems of HIV and AIDS 
GHIs. When I first searched on the University of Edinburgh Library 
Searcher for documents relating to Namibia, there were very few 
documents relevant to this research.  
On EBSCO Discovery Service, the website retrieved 670 entries 
under the subject Namibia. There were no books, book chapters or peer-
reviewed articles that dealt with the question of the extent to which 
Namibia can exercise ownership in the presence of Global Fund and 
PEPFAR funding. On other websites such as Google Scholar, JSTOR, 
OCCLC AF, PubMed Central, World Cat, I searched for publications 
containing the general words Namibia and health, in conjunction with 
other broad words and terms such as: 
“Financing” 
“National policy” 
“HIV and AIDS policy” 
"Health sector organisations" 
"global health initiatives" 
"Funding, Global Fund" 
"PEPFAR funding" 
"policy history" 
"Ministry of Health and Social Services" 
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"Ministry of Health, Directorate of Special Programs" 
"HIV and AIDS civil society organisations" 
 
Academic documents on GHIs and health systems were useful for 
providing definitions of key terms; highlighting controversies and 
different positions; as well as providing ideas on the different directions 
and emphasis of the thesis research. 
Documents are an important method for revealing how events are 
constructed (May 2001). Yin (1994), however, warns against a potential 
overreliance on documents in case study research. Documents are written 
for specific purposes and audiences independent of the case study 
research question, and should not be treated as if they contain 
"unmitigated truth" (Yin 1994, p.82). Yin's (1984) warning to be cautious 
of the intentions behind information contained in documents is especially 
relevant for the analysis in this thesis because peer-reviewed literature 
that focuses on the interactions of the Namibian health system with the 
Global Fund and PEPFAR is practically non-existent. The information on 
their engagement presented within this thesis was therefore mainly 
derived from descriptive documents which were produced by stakeholders 
in the Namibian health actors.  
Policy documents as written for or by the Namibian Government 
and the Ministry of Health were essential to understanding the Namibian 
Government's stated objectives for the country's health sector. I started 
asking some interview respondents to identify the policy documents that 
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they viewed as most governing the Ministry of Health's goals and 
approaches to addressing HIV and AIDS. Policy documents provided an 
understanding of the Ministry of Health's defined practices for overall 
engagement with external funders; existing practices and objectives for 
HIV and AIDS; and current practices and goals for financial flows, 
human resources management and civil society participation.  
The documents were also important for helping to provide me with 
understanding the institutional origins, policy objectives and operational 
structures of the Global Fund and PEPFAR. Important historical 
documents that provided funding information included original funding 
agreements between the Ministry of Health and the Global Fund; signed 
agreement between the Ministry of Health and PEPFAR; and Namibian 
Government proposals to the Global Fund. Newspaper articles written 
before and during my research placement with DSP also informed me of 
the issues that were considered as important by Namibians concerning 
Global Fund and PEPFAR money. 
Understanding the structure of the DSP and other organisational 
arrangements between the Ministry of Health, the Global Fund and 
PEPFAR was critical to meeting the objectives of this thesis. There were 
a variety of useful documents that were only available as paper from the 
Ministry of Health and other relevant agencies such as the National 
Planning Commission and the Office of the Prime Minister. There were 
several documents that I was only able to discover because I was 
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physically in Namibia and able to search around and explore if there 
were any relevant documents that could be used for this thesis. For 
instance, there were some policy documents that I discovered by spending 
time in the Resource Centre of the Ministry of Health and the library at 




Interviews are important sources of data when a case study deals 
with human affairs (Yin, 1994), as this research does: 
…human affairs should be reported and interpreted through 
the eyes of specific interviewees, and well-informed respondents 
can provide important insights into a situation. They can also 
provide shortcuts to the prior history of a situation, helping you to 
identify other relevant sources of evidence (Yin, 1994, p. 85). 
 
Semi-structured, in-depth, qualitative interviews were the primary 
source of data for this study. In total, I conducted 43 interviews for 
analytical purposes with individuals from organisations associated with 
the Global Fund and PEPFAR programs in Namibia. Respondents were 
senior management officials from the Ministry of Health, U.S Centres for 
Disease Control (CDC) Namibia, and the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) Namibia, the PEPFAR Country 
Coordinator Office and the Global Fund Program Management Unit in 
Namibia. Further respondents came from NGOs in Namibia.  
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The interviews were all conducted in Namibia. They took place 
over three months primarily occurred during the fourth semester of the 
PhD studies. Interviews were used to provide a more detailed 
understanding of the priorities and objectives of the three actors, their 
undocumented interactions, and their perceived tensions or confluences. 
Due to the limited time available for conducting interviews, the strategic 
decision was made to interview respondents from Umbrella NGOs that 
were associated with the Global Fund and PEPFAR programs in 
Namibia. Respondents came from the Namibian Council of Churches, 
Namibian Business Coalition on AIDS, Namibian Network of AIDS 
Services Organisations, National Planning Commission, Ministry of 
Education, and the Office of the Prime Minister.  
Because of their professional authority within the organisations 
that they worked for, the interviews were with individuals who would be 
considered elite (Gillham, 2000; Hakim, 1987). Elite respondents are 
recruited on their perceived in-depth awareness of an environment or an 
issue (Hakim, 1987). They are most useful when they are capable of 
giving answers with insight and a comprehensive grasp of the subject 
under inquiry (Gillham, 2000, p. 63). The specialised knowledge of elites 
makes them both informants and respondents for a study. The 
interviewer needs to demonstrate a good deal of prior knowledge of the 
subject of inquiry during the interview to get comprehensive answers to 
the questions posed (Hakim, 1987, p. 74).  
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In order to enhance my contextual understanding of Global Fund 
and PEPFAR operations in Namibia, I initially conducted nine 
informational interviews with officials from the Ministry of Health, CDC, 
PEPFAR Country Coordinator Office and the Global Fund PMU. They 
were structured discussions that focused on providing background 
information on the Namibian health sector independent of and with 
Global Fund and PEPFAR funding. The informational interviews were 
conducted to provide useful background knowledge, which would 
facilitate the elite interviews. I further prepared for the analytical 
interviews by reading documents on the Namibian health systems before 
and during the research placement with DSP, and through having 
informal conversations with officials from the Ministry of Health and 
other agencies. My time with the Ministry of Health gave me a 
contextualised understanding of the organisational roles of various 
interviewees and enabled me to engage with them on an individual basis 




In total, there were 43 interviews conducted with a variety of 
Namibian health stakeholders (see table 3.1 for their organisational 
affiliation). The way in which the sample of respondent was recruited was 
informed by the existing Namibian policy and institutional arrangements 
concerning the Global Fund and PEPFAR. Respondents were selected 
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from their involvement in HIV work or expertise during the period of 
study, as well as direct or indirect participation in Global Fund and 
PEPFAR projects. Before the research placement with DSP, I reviewed 
policy documents, which revealed the organisations and that were 
associated with the Global Fund and PEPFAR programmes in Namibia. 
Table 3-1 Organisational Affiliation of Interview Respondents 
 
The sources of information primarily included policy documents 
that were either written by the Ministry of Health or by the two 
initiatives. Once I had identified the organisations that would be useful, I 
asked around and read policy documents, and read conference and 
workshop minutes and attendance lists to determine the individuals who 
tended to be present at events relevant to the Ministry of Health's 
relationships with the Global Fund and PEPFAR. From this preliminary 
review, I created an initial list of the individuals that I wanted to 
interview. During the first three weeks of my research placement with 
the Ministry of Health, I refined the respondent's list from information 











individuals associated with the two initiatives in Namibia. By being 
based within the Ministry of Health, I was also able to secure interviews 
that might have been difficult to obtain. I often had to go back to the 
offices of some respondents a few times just to make sure that I was 
catching them at a good time. I went to the office of one person in the 
Ministry of Health about six times in an attempt to secure an interview 
but ended up being unsuccessful.  
Interview respondents were recruited via email and in-person. For 
Ministry of Health officials, I either approached the potential interviewee 
directly in-person or asked someone in DSP to introduce me and my 
research. I met many of the non-Ministry of Health respondents at 
meetings and events that I attended in my capacity as an intern for DSP. 
I either requested an interview with the interviewee when I first met 
them or sent an email to them later requesting an interview. I obtained 
the contact details of individuals by either asking them for their contact 
information when I first met them; by asking to be connected to them by 
mutual acquaintances (usually someone from the Ministry of Health); 
and by copying the contact details, they provided on sign-up sheets at 
workshops and conferences. 
By directly speaking to people about their expected jobs as well as 
the ways in which these roles played out, I was better able to understand 
the terms of engagement between the Ministry of Health and the GHIs. 
For instance, in one informational conversation with an individual 
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directly associated managing human resources for PEPFAR funding, I 
answered a lot of questions on the influence of GHIs at both the rise and 
fall of financing to Namibia just by speaking to the respondent at length 
about what they did in their everyday job. By participating in Ministry of 
Health activities, I gained access to individuals from other relevant 
Namibian government bodies and international organisations such as 
UNAIDS, USAID, National Planning Commission, Ministry of Health 
Education. I got the impression that since individuals from these agencies 
met me while I was engaged in activities on behalf of the Ministry of 
Health, they were more willing to talk to me because my association with 




No analytical interviews were conducted during the first month of 
the placement. That month was used as a time for observation with the 
purpose of understanding how things operated in the Ministry of Health 
(See Appendix 5). All interviews were one-to-one and face-to-face. The 
interviews primarily took place in the offices of respondents. An interview 
guide was used for all meetings. Through the discussion guides, I defined 
the topics that were important. The interview questions required 
respondents to provide information on the organisations that they worked 
in, not on themselves. Respondents were asked to reflect on the 
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characteristics, activities, and processes and events taking place within 
the Ministry of Health (Hakim, 1987).  
During the interviews, the interview guide was a tool to help keep 
the conversation focused on the research question (See Appendices 6, 7 
and 8 for different interview guides). However, given that the 
respondents were accessed for their specialised knowledge, I left it to 
them to bring to my attention the issues that they thought would be 
relevant to the study inquiry based on their in-depth understanding of 
the situation. As long as they stayed on topic, respondents were 
encouraged to describe the relationship between the organisations in 
their words (Richards, 1996; Rubin and Rubin, 2011). 
Most of the interviews were conducted in April 2012. There was, 
however, one interview in which I had to join the interviewee during 
lunch at a hotel as they were taking a break from a conference they were 
attending at the hotel. On average, the interviews were 1-hour long. The 
shortest interview lasted 40 minutes, and the longest was 2 hours. Aside 
from one, all interviews were recorded with an electronic audio recording 
device after seeking written confirmation from respondents.  
When compared to just writing what an interviewee is saying, 
recording interview conversations enables the interviewer to concentrate 
on and engage more with what is said (Richards, 1996; Yin, 1994). I found 
that I was more quickly and directly able to listen to what the 
respondents were saying when I did not have to worry about hurriedly 
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writing down everything that they said. Recorded interviews also enable 
the interview conversation to be transcribed word-for-word, which makes 
it easier to later analyse the information received (Richards, 1996). For 
this research, the recordings of all the interviews were transcribed word-
for-word and organised using Microsoft Word.   
In asking representatives from external funders to reflect on their 
influences in Namibia, I asked them to think about both their history and 
future in the country. In the interviews, I was mainly seeking to 
understand the extent to which respondents viewed GHI activities as 
integrated within the Ministry of Health. I was then asking respondents 
to reflect on the degree to which they perceived actions as requiring more 
integration. For Ministry of Health respondents, I asked them to think 
about operations both independent of and in association with GHIs.  
 
3.6 Ethical Considerations 
 
The ethical issues that need to be addressed for case studies 
largely depend on the methods used to collect data (De Vaus, 2001; 
Ritchie et al., 2014; Rubin and Rubin, 2011). For example, the ethical 
issues will be different if the case study involves an active intervention or 
a passive intervention. The ethical issues will also differ according to 
whether data are collected by interviewing individuals, using informants, 
analysing official records, passive observation, conducting a survey of 
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case elements, or using participant observation (De Vaus, 2001). Under 
the University of Edinburgh ethics procedures, in July 2011, I carried the 
Self-Audit Checklist for Level 1 Ethical Review. The research design of 
this project was therefore confirmed as Level 1. It "did not present 
complex ethical issues and did not require formal ethical review" (The 
University of Edinburgh, 2011). The answers to all the questions on 
potential ethical risks were "no", and this PhD project was confirmed as 
Level 1 as it identified no particular ethical risks. The ethical review 
process through the Ministry of Health's RMC also did not identify any 
ethical risks to respondents (See Appendix 2).  
Respondents were, however, still made aware of the ethical 
implications of being interviewed for the study. Before the first interview 
question was asked, each interviewee was required to read an 
information sheet that described the goals of the research (See Appendix 
3). They were then requested to sign a consent form, which informed 
them that the interviews would be recorded, and of how the data would 
be protected (See Appendix 4). There were different reasons for asking 
respondents to sign a consent form. The consent form that interview 
respondents were asked to sign sought to achieve the following: 
• To help interviewees understand why they were being 
interviewed and make them aware of the potential risks. 
• Provide interviewees with with sufficient information for 
reasoned and free decision on whether to take part in the 
interview 
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• It was made clear to respondents that participation was not 
mandatory. They could refuse to answer questions and 
withdraw from being interviewed, when if they wanted to. 
 
There was a confidentiality provision within the consent form, 
which sought to assure respondents of two main things:  
• The voice recordings and transcripts of interview data are 
stored safely and with restricted access. 
• The sound recordings and transcripts and other data would 
not be shared in a way that directly linked to the 
respondent, without explicit consent from the interviewee.  
 
When respondents are accessed for their professional knowledge, 
documents such as consent forms enable officials to protect themselves as 
the source of information revealed through the interviews (Gillham, 
2000). This control is, however, subject to the researcher/interviewer 
keeping their word that data would be stored as indicated in the consent 
form, and that respondents could not be easily identified by the 
information presented in this thesis.  
The respondents interviewed were some of the key decision-makers 
in Namibia's engagement with the Global Fund and PEPFAR within 
their organisations. As an interviewer, I needed to remain sensitive to the 
fact that it was highly possible that their public opinion might be very 
different from their private views (Hakim, 1987). While located within 
the DSP, I was an observer of things such as the arrangements of offices 
and dynamics between various colleagues (Yin, 1994). My placement with 
DSP had potential to be ethically tricky when taking into account issues 
of informed consent and voluntary participation. De Vaus (2007) argues, 
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however, that so long as certain behaviours already occur publicly, then 
the issue of informed consent to observe those actions is not as important 
as long as individuals are not identified by name (de Vaus, 2007). 
However, given that the respondents interviewed for this thesis were 
interviewed within their official capacities, it is vital to protect their 
identities. Depending on what aspects of institutional arrangements and 
dynamics are being described, it might still be hard to fully hide the 
identities of respondents even when their names are not specified. 
 
3.7 Data Processing and Analysis 
 
Because data collection and analysis processes tend to be 
concurrent, with new analytic steps informing the process of additional 
data collection and new data informing the analytic processes, qualitative 
data analysis processes are not entirely distinguishable from the actual 
data. The theoretical lens from which the researcher approaches the 
phenomenon, the strategies that the researcher uses to collect or 
construct data and the understandings that the researcher has about 
what might count as relevant or important data in answering the 
research question are all analytic processes that influence the data 
(Ritchie et al., 2014; Rubin and Rubin, 2011). 
Although there are many qualitative data analysis computer 
programs available on the market today, these are essential aids to 
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sorting and organising sets of qualitative data, and none are capable of 
the intellectual and conceptualising processes required to transform data 
into meaningful findings (Ritchie et al., 2014; Saldana, 2013). A key 
aspect of data analysis is how the data is coded (Saldana, 2013). The type 
of coding, however, depends on the type of research that is conducted. As 
identified by Saldana (2013), some of the key types of coding methods 
implicitly and explicitly incorporated in the analysis of interview data for 
this thesis are grammatical, elemental and exploratory methods 
(Saldana, 2013): 
• Grammatical methods relate to the type of coding approaches that 
apply grammatical principles. For instance, in attribute coding, 
essential information about the data and demographic 
characteristics of the participants is noted for future management 
and reference. According to Saldana (2013), virtually all qualitative 
studies (including computer-assisted coding employ attribute 
coding). 
• Elemental methods of coding are primary approaches to qualitative 
data analysis. They have basic filters for reviewing the body of 
work and build a foundation for future coding cycles. For instance, 
descriptive coding assigns basic labels to data to provide an 
inventory of their topics. 
• Exploratory coding methods are exploratory and preliminary 
assignments of codes to the data before more refined coding 
systems are developed. 
 
Since qualitative inquiry is an emergent process of investigation, 
these coding methods are tentative labels as the data are initially 
reviewed. Holistic Coding applies a single code to each large unit of data 
in the content to capture a sense of the overall contents and the possible 
categories that may develop. At the start of data, analysis, I extensively 
applied holistic coding to the interview data (Saldana, 2013) (See 
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Appendix 9 for the an example of some of the main issues that initially 
emerged from interview data). 
I initially transcribed the first interviews soon after they took 
place, often on the same day on which they occurred. It, however, became 
time-consuming to keep this up as I conducted more and more interviews. 
For instance, on the 28th of April 2012, I had four different meetings on 
the same day. In the end, transcribing the interviews took almost four 
months from when the interviews were mainly. I transcribed the 
interviews by listening back to the recordings of the conversations with 
respondents. I then wrote down every word that was said, indicating 
whether it was me who said something or whether it was said by the 
interviewee. 
During and after the placement with the Ministry of Health, the 
methodological approach of the research and thesis did not change much 
from what was decided when I went to Namibia to collect qualitative 
interview data. What did end up changing was the particular focus of 
health issues that were presented in the thesis. The thesis focus was 
informed by the issues that appeared to matter to Namibians during the 
interview data collection.  
Using the same logic that underlies the function of qualitative data 
analysis software packages, interview data were organised with the Table 
of Contents and Headings functions of Microsoft Word. Quotes from 
various respondents that dealt with specific themes or issues were 
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grouped under headings and sub-headings. A table of contents list was 
then produced from the headings and sub-headings. The table of contents 
enabled me to quickly locate and analyse interview respondent quotes 
under their appropriate themes. 
There was a lot of data available, so I decided to reduce the amount 
of data that needs to be digested by focusing on re-occurring themes. I 
described data, noted ideas and categorised ideas and issues so that I 
could incorporate them into the thesis. During preliminary data analysis, 
the focus was on identifying issues. The initial analysis of the data was 
what enabled me to identify some of the major problems that were viewed 
as important by both the interview respondents and the larger Namibian 
policy environment. I was able to identify what appeared to be significant 
connections between the processes by which the Ministry of Health was 
required to engage with the Global Fund and PEPFAR, and the concerns 
that respondents raised about ownership.  
Although the findings from my placement with the Ministry of 
Health revealed to me that the thesis was going to have a general focus 
on financial flows; human resources management and civil society 
engagement, it was hard to determine the angle from which to tackle 
these issues. The approach to the problem of human resources was the 
easiest of the three themes because the problem of human resources 
management dominated discussions in Namibia concerning the exits of 
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the Global Fund and PEPFAR. Thus this made it clear to focus on an 
issue that the Ministry of Health viewed as critical.  
After the interviews, the documents were used to corroborate and 
augment information from the interviews (Yin, 1994). I also used 
documents verify the correct spellings of names of individuals, processes, 
policies and organisations. They were also used to check the dates and 
places of events that were revealed during the interviews.  It significantly 
makes a case study more convincing and accurate when its sources for 
evidence corroborate each other (Yin, 1994). I triangulated the evidence 
that came from participant observations, with data from documents and 
interviews to determine if it converged to tell the same general story 
concerning the focus of the study inquiry (Gillham, 2000; Yin, 1994). 
When data from different methods converge (match), then we can be 
reasonably confident that we are getting an accurate picture. If they do 
not match, then we have to be cautious about basing our understanding 
on any one set of data (Gillham, 2000, p. 13).  
 
3.8 Case Studies and Issues of Subjectivity  
 
When compared to other methods for data collection, the 
qualitative case study approach has faced criticism for not being 
scientifically rigorous because of the individual role that the researcher 
plays in both collecting and analysing the data (Yin, 1994). It has been 
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viewed as much more biased towards the views and attributes of the 
researcher than other forms of research (Flyvbjerg, 2004; Schofield, 2000; 
Yin, 1994). Gillham (2000) argues, however, no research investigation is 
without subjectivity (p.7): 
A research study is not neutral; it has its dynamic, and there will 
be effects (on individuals, on institutions) precisely because there is 
someone there asking questions, clarifying procedures, collecting 
data. 
 
Gillham (2000) is arguing that all research is inherently subjective. Even 
in quantitative studies, someone decides on the topic and conducts the 
research. Scientifically rigorous studies call for a refutable hypothesis or 
question. The question itself, however, is rooted in the opinions of the 
person asking it. A refutable hypothesis allows for a fair evaluation of 
whether the evidence supports or disagrees with the original opinion 
(Evers and Wu, 2006; Flyvbjerg, 2006; Mitchell, 2000). Subjectivity is 
inherent in both the choice of the research questions and how they are 
asked. 
Subjectivity in research is therefore not necessarily a negative 
thing. To advance human knowledge, Flyvbjerg (2004) argues that 
subjectivity in qualitative research is a strength rather than a limitation 
(p.429):   
If one assumes that research, like other learning processes, can be 
described by the phenomenology of human learning, it then 
becomes clear that most advanced form of understanding is 
achieved when researchers place themselves within the context 
being studied. Only in this way can researchers understand the 
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viewpoints and behaviours that characterise social actors. 
 
Flyvjberg (2004) is arguing that, in essence, by being human, a scientist 
cannot help but be touched and should, in fact, embrace their unique 
contribution to the issue under investigation. In qualitative case study 
research, "intellectual rigour goes together with personal conviction as in 
any other profession (Diefenbach, 2009, p. 877)". My nationality as a 
Namibian and the country's global political position influenced my choice 
of the focus of this research. My connection to the country, as well as 
cultural knowledge of the country, were also an advantage both in 
securing the placement with the Ministry of Health and in enabling me to 
engage the various respondents quickly.  
The staff from Monitoring and Evaluation were very 
accommodating and generous with sharing their data. I was given a 
variety of policy documents to help me familiarise myself with HIV and 
AIDS systems, and data collection in the Ministry of Health. Many DSP 
staff were eager to give me their opinions about the two initiatives under 
study. Early on in my time with the DSP, I happily noted in my research 
diary, "Everybody is so super helpful" (12 March 2012). People, however, 
were most candid with me about their perceptions on external funding 
when they were alone with me. For example, early on (13 March 2012), I 
overheard a conversation between two DSP staff, in which one of the 
people was expressing frustration and annoyance on the influence of 
PEPFAR on human resources practices. This conversation took place in 
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my native Namibian language, Oshiwambo. At the time, the people 
having the conversation were not aware that I spoke Oshiwambo. It was 
not an issue that I had hidden from anyone. It just had not come up 
before. I would not have been aware of this situation if I had not been in 
the room, and if I did not speak the language.  
This conversation ended up opening up some key questions for me 
on Global Fund and PEPFAR practices for human resources 
management, which was pivotal to framing the findings presented in 
Chapter six. On the day that I overheard the conversation, one of the 
notes that I made to myself was: "Ask about recruitment procedures as 
well as the various organisations involved in making decisions on human 
resources (13 March 2015)". 
It was important not to allow myself to be captured by the DSP. It 
was important to remember that the thesis seeks to add to a theoretical 
understanding of GHI interactions with country health systems. As a 
Namibian, I was inclined to side with the position of Namibia in my 
analysis of the observation, interview and documentary data. I had to 
remind myself of reflexivity so as not to allow the research to be dictated 
by context. My perceptions within the research context are important, but 
I had to strive to ensure that I kept a focus on the issue of country 
ownership. I got distracted by all the various things going on, and I 
needed to constantly remind myself to remain focused and not go chasing 
every issue or controversy.  
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As a Namibian who lives abroad, my biases come from the fact that 
I was interested in the extent to which external funders viewed 
Namibians as something to be managed instead of providing funding to 
enable recipients better to govern themselves. I got caught up in my 
larger concerns around the ways in which international actors view the 
role of developing country recipients as they seek to provide them with 
financial support. As a participant in Ministry of Health activities, I 
sometimes became quite vocal in representing the interests of DSP. I then 
had to remind myself to remain neutral. Ultimately, the goal of scientific 
research is not to prove if the hypothesis is infallibly wrong or right. The 
goal is to show that the evidence plausibly supports the presented 
opinion. The goal is to make a sound scientific contribution, which is 
carried out according to sound, accepted, scientific procedures (Flyvbjerg, 





This chapter describes the research design that underlies the 
findings presented in this thesis. It details the research design as a 
qualitative case study approach, which uses evidence from interviews, 
documents and participant observations. The chapter shows what was 
done to reach the findings and conclusions presented in the ensuing 
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chapters as a means to demonstrate this study's internal validity and 
argue for its external validity. The chapter started off by justifying the 
choice of the qualitative case study approach for the research. It 
explained why the case study method is useful when a phenomenon is 
explored within its context.  
Within the Namibian context, the chapter then justified the choice 
of the Ministry of Health as the primary unit of analysis for the research. 
The Ministry was also chosen because it represents a similar unit of 
study for other studies on the country-specific influences of the Global 
Fund and PEPFAR. The chapter explained the focus on the DSP, which is 
the directorate tasked with managing the Ministry of Health's national 
HIV and AIDS response. Through an embedded case study, of the DSP 
within the Ministry of Health, the study was able to pinpoint the level 
where a change occurred. The placement with the DSP facilitated access 
to documents and relevant stakeholders. 
The findings presented within the ensuing empirical chapter are 
primarily based on data from semi-structured qualitative interviews with 
senior management individuals that work for organisations associated 
with the Global Fund and PEPFAR programmes in Namibia. Within the 
Ministry of Health, interviews were primarily conducted with 
respondents related to the DSP. The findings from the interview data 
were corroborated and augmented with evidence gained from documents 
and participation in and observation of Ministry of Health activities. 
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Case studies have been criticised for not being widely 
generalisable. Generalisability can be improved through replications in 
the form of multiple cases, but, as in this research, these are not always 
feasible, and a single case has to suffice. A single case study approach is, 
therefore, a limitation of the research design for this thesis. Finally, case 
study research has been criticised for being more subjective than other 
forms of research. This chapter showed, however, that subjectivity occurs 
in all research because humans are involved in the process. 
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4. Namibian HIV and AIDS Policy Context  
4.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the Namibian health 
sector within the context of the Ministry of Health’s response to HIV and 
AIDS, and its overall institutional relationship with the Global Fund and 
PEPFAR. This chapter starts by describing the role that the Ministry of 
Health has played in the national response regarding overriding policies 
and their associated institutional arrangements for HIV and AIDS. The 
chapter then describes the types and amounts of financial contributions 
that the Global Fund and PEPFAR have made to Namibia. The chapter 
also introduces some of the agencies within the country, which have been 
associated with funding by the two initiatives.  
 
4.2 Namibian Health Policy Foundations 
 
The origins of Namibia’s post-independence health policy 
framework are similar to that of the country’s constitutional framework. 
It was developed within the context of United Nations-led support to 
prepare the country for independence (Kaela, 1996; Namibia Support 
Committee et al., 1984). Between 1938 and 1990, South Africa governed 
Namibia as one of its provinces. As a reflection of the apartheid policies in 
its country, the South African Government established self-governing 
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homelands for non-white population groups in Namibia in 1968 (Cliffe, 
1994). The homelands were divided according to the 11 ethnic identities 
in Namibia. All public services including health were provided along 
racial and unequal means, favouring white people (Namibia Support 
Committee et al., 1984). 
A 1980 health sector assessment established the blueprint to 
Namibia's post-independence health policy framework in a policy 
document titled A Country Health Programme for Independent Namibia. 
Within this document "Health for all by the year 2000 through Primary 
Health Care (PHC)" was established as the overriding goal for an 
independent Namibia (Namibia Support Committee et al., 1984). This 
strategy was a reflection of the WHO's general strategy for health, 
following the Alma Ata Conference of 1978 at which "Health for All" was 
established as the desired outcome for health by UN member states 
(World Health Organization, 2010).  
Following independence, the Namibian Government consequently 
adopted the PHC approach as the main strategy for implementing health 
interventions in the country  (MoHSS, 2009). In 1990, the newly elected 
Namibian Government established the Ministry of Health and Social 
Services (MoHSS) to oversee the national response to health in the 
country by designing, developing and implementing health programs for 
the whole population (MoHSS, 2009).  Through the Ministry of Health, 
the Namibian government mainly set out to redress the pre-independence 
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health inequities, which had been perpetuated by the Apartheid 




The Namibian health system has two main components: a public 
service and a private sector. The Government provides the public health 
services through the Ministry of Health and Social Services (Ministry of 
Health). Private health services are delivered by private practitioners, 
private hospitals and clinics, and by traditional healers (El Obeid et al., 
2002). Since the country gained independence in 1990, the Government 
has been estimated to provide 75%-80% of all health services in Namibia 
annually (Ministry of Health, 2005; Ministry of Health, 2007a; Ministry 
of Health and Health System 20/20, 2008; Office of the President of 
Namibia, 2009). Faith-based organisations, which are fully subsidised by 
the Government, have been found to provide approximately 10% of total 
health services, while the private sector provides the remaining 10% 
(Ministry of Health, 2005; Ministry of Health, 2007a; Ministry of Health 
and Health Systems 20/20, 2008).  
The Namibian Government is the largest source of revenue for the 
Ministry of Health through general taxation (Ministry of Health, 2003; 
Ministry of Health, 2006; Ministry of Health, 2010; Office of the President 
of Namibia, 2009). The Namibian public health sector is governed at two 
levels, the national and regional levels (el Obeid et al., 2002; Low et al., 
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2003; Ministry of Health, 2007a; Ministry of Health, 2003). At a national 
level, the Ministry of Health develops and oversees national health policy 
(Ministry of Health and Health Systems 20/20, 2008). Health policy 
implementation and service provision are primarily managed at the level 
of the 13 administrative regions and 34 health districts (el Obeid et al., 
2002; Ministry of Health, 2006; Ministry of Health, 2010). 
At the national level, politically appointed Minister and 
accompanying Deputy Minister, who are both members of parliament, are 
the heads of the Ministry of Health. The Ministry of Health head office is 
responsible for policy formulation, strategic planning, legislation and 
regulation, monitoring, and overall coordination of the health sector (el 
Obeid et al., 2002). The national Ministry is made up of three main 
subdivisions: Policy, Planning and Resource Development; Regional 
Health and Social Welfare; and Health Care Services. These are further 
divided into eight functional directorates (See Figure 4.1).  
The Namibian Government recognised HIV and AIDS as a national 
problem early on in the country's epidemic. As stated in chapter 1, the 
first case of AIDS in Namibia was detected in 1986 (Slotten, 1995). In 
1989, while Namibia was still under the political administration of South 
Africa, a group of Namibian nurses and doctors formed an HIV and AIDS 
Advisory Committee (The Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) and MoHSS, 2010). According to a founding member of the 
Committee, who was interviewed for this thesis, the members came 
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together to plan for the response to HIV and AIDS in anticipation of 
Namibia's independence because "South Africa did not have a clear 
intervention plan". 
 
Figure 4-1 Organisational Structure of Ministry of Health 
 
In 1990, as the Namibian Government was putting its post-
independence administrative structures in place, the newly elected first 
president, Sam Nujoma, made a public statement on the worrying impact 
of the HIV and AIDS for the country (Slotten, 1995). Since the initial 
policy statement on HIV and AIDS, the Namibian Government’s response 
has been governed by several national strategies. The framework was 
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followed by three different Medium-Term Plans (MTPs) for HIV and 
AIDS specifically for the health sector, as administered by the Ministry of 
Health. The MTPs were in turn linked to the Namibian Government's 
overall economic development policies as represented by the National 
Development Plans (NDPs), which covered the same years as the MTPs 
(National Planning Commission, Office of the President, 2008, p. 188).  
In 2007, while MTPIII was still in operation, a Policy on HIV and 
AIDS was approved by Parliament and launched by the President of 
Namibia. This policy set the foundation for the establishment of the 
National Strategic Framework for HIV and AIDS Response in Namibia 
2010/11-2015/16 (NSF). Once it was promulgated, the NSF then replaced 
the MTPs as the short-term framework for HIV and AIDS (MoHSS: DSP, 
2010). The NSF extended the earlier national HIV and AIDS policy 
frameworks by consolidating and expanding access to treatment with 
anti-retroviral medicines to those carrying HIV or AIDS.  
In its policies for addressing HIV and AIDS, the Namibian 
Government recognises the important role that multiple stakeholders can 
play in reaching health objectives (Government of the Republic of 
Namibia, 2004; National Planning Commission, Office of the President, 
2008). As was done in the MTPs, the Namibian government's policy for 
engaging with other stakeholders in efforts to address HIV and AIDS was 
also defined within the NSF (MoHSS: DSP, 2010). Thus, the NSF  pulled 
together efforts of Government agencies, NGOs, faith-based 
 143 
organisations, community-based organisations, the private sector and 
international development partners. To meet its stated Response 
Management objectives, a key element of the NSF was "to strengthen the 
capacity of the coordinating and management structures to improve 
effectiveness and increase efficiency (MoHSS: DSP, 2010, p. 9)."  
Through the NSF, the Namibian Government also recognised the 
importance of developing sustainable financial resources for the various 
organisations involved in the country’s multi-sector response to HIV and 
AIDS. In particular, the Namibian Government positioned itself as being 
committed at a policy level to building the capacity of and mobilising 
domestic financial resources for non-government stakeholders:  
…special attention will be paid to develop the capacity of key 
stakeholders in critical areas including human resources, 
leadership and governance, monitoring and evaluation, planning 
and programming using evidence, results-based approaches, 
resources mobilisation and resources tracking. Innovative 
strategies for resources mobilisation in the country will be explored 
and Government will be encouraged to increase its funding for HIV 
and AIDS, strengthen public-private partnerships and reduce 
dependence on international resources (MoHSS: DSP, 2010, p. 10).  
 
Thus through the NSF, the Namibian Government recognises 1) the 
importance of a multi-sector response to HIV and AIDS and 2) the 
importance of having a central body to coordinate the activities of 





The Namibian Government was a direct recipient of both Global 
Fund and PEPFAR funding, primarily through the Ministry of Health of 
Health and Social Services (Office of the Inspector General, DHHS, 2013; 
The Global Fund, 2004; The Global Fund Office of the Inspector General, 
2012). An essential element of the case study underlying this thesis is the 
Directorate of Special Programs (DSP) in the Ministry of Health. The 
DSP is one of the seven operational directorates within the Ministry of 
Health. It was established in 2002 to coordinate and monitor the Ministry 
of Health's national response to HIV and AIDS, TB and Malaria (GAMET 
and UNAIDS, 2006).  
In 1990, the Namibian Government launched the National AIDS 
Control Program (NACP), which was placed within the Ministry of 
Health, to oversee its HIV and AIDS policy. In 1994 the National AIDS 
Control Program (NACP) was renamed the National AIDS Coordination 
Program (NACOP). The Namibian Cabinet then approved the 
restructuring of the Ministry of Health to make provision for the creation 
of the Directorate of Special Program (DSP). The DSP was established in 
2004 to oversee the National AIDS Coordination Program (NACOP). 
NACOP was previously housed in the Primary Health Care Directorate of 
the Ministry of Health (MoHSS, 2008ab). The expanded staffing of the 
DSP was supposed to strengthen the Ministry of Health's capacity to co-
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ordinate and manage the breadth of programmes and national HIV and 
AIDS policies (MoHSS: DSP, 2010).  
In comparison to NACOP, the new mandate of the DSP was to 
mobilise financial resources for HIV and AIDS and manage them when 
they came into the Ministry (MoHSS: DSP, 2010, 2008a). Within the 
overall Ministry of Health structure of seven directorates, the mandate 
for donor engagement lies with the Directorate of Policy Planning and 
Human Resources Development (PPHRD). By establishing the DSP, 
Ministry of Health officials envisioned that it would serve as the 
structure that would coordinate and manage grants from donors such as 
the Global Fund and PEPFAR (MoHSS, 2008ab). As shown in figure 4.2, 
the DSP was established to have two main divisions: health sector 
response division and multi-sector response. 
 
Figure 4-2 Ministry of Health, DSP Structure 
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The multi-sector response is broken down into three units: 
Resource Mobilisation and Development Cooperation (RM&DC); 
Expanded National AIDS Response Support (ENARS); and Response 
Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E). The NSF includes a National 
Coordination Framework, which "clarifies the mandate, roles and 
responsibilities, membership and the terms of reference for all the 
coordinating structures (MoHSS: DSP, 2010, p. 9)." The NSF is described 
as having developed with the recognition that the HIV and AIDS 
response requires "robust and sustained political commitment and 
leadership, availability of adequate resources, appropriate policies, and 
effective coordination of a multi-sectorial HIV and AIDS response" 
(MoHSS: DSP, 2010, p. 87). The Ministry of Health is meant to play a 
vital role in realising the objectives of the NSF. 
As shown in Figure 4.3, the coordination of the Namibian HIV and 
AIDS response is also meant to take place at the national, sector, regional 
and community levels (MoHSS: DSP, 2010, p. 89). As with previous 
Government policies that defined national HIV and AIDS coordination in 
Namibia – such as the MTPs – the NSF positions the Ministry of Health 
as the overall steward of the country's response (MoHSS: DSP, 2010, 
2008b). Specifically, the sub-division of Expanded National AIDS 
Response Support (ENARS) has the mandate to coordinate the multi-
sector response on behalf of the Ministry of Health (MoHSS: DSP, 2010). 
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Figure 4-3 Namibian NSF HIV and AIDS Coordination Structures 
 
 
Through National AIDS Executive Committee (NAEC), the DSP is 
mandated to coordinate all the various structures and agencies associated 
with meeting the objectives of the NSF. NAEC is meant “to work through 
technical advisory committees, sector steering committees, programme 
and specialised steering committees that may be established, and whose 
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mandate impact directly or indirectly on the national HIV and AIDS 
response (MoHSS: DSP, 2010)”. 
 
4.3 Namibia’s Relationship with the Global Fund 
 
When the Global Fund initiative was established, countries 
submitted proposals during an open call for proposals, in agreement with 
Global Fund guidelines and eligibility criteria. Each open call for 
proposals was called a Round of funding (The Global Fund, 2012a). 
Namibia's first successful approval for Global Fund resources was under 
the Round 2 call for proposals in 2002. In addition to a request for HIV 
and AIDS funding, Namibia’s Round 2 grant proposal also included 
requests for grant financing towards TB and Malaria. The Round 2 
project was titled, "Scaling up the fight against HIV/AIDS, TB & Malaria 
in Namibia" (The Global Fund, 2004). 
As was the norm for Global Fund grants, Namibia's  Round 2 grant 
was awarded for five years, but funding was disbursed, and the program 
was implemented in two phases (The Global Fund, 2012b). The 
implementation of Namibia's Round 2 grant was supposed to begin in 
January 2004 but started in January 2005 instead (NaCCATuM, 2007; 
The Global Fund, 2004). Phase 1 of the Round 2 grant began in January 
2005 and ended in December 2006. Phase 2 started in January 2007 and 
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was supposed to come to an end on 31 December 2009 (NaCCATuM, 
2009).   
In 2008, in anticipation of the end of the Round 2 grant, Namibia 
applied for Round 8 funding for HIV and AIDS, but the proposal was not 
successful (NaCCATuM, 2009). In 2008, after the rejection of the Round 8 
proposal, the country was positioning itself to apply for Round 9 when it 
was informed that it was eligible to apply for the Global Fund’s newly 
established Rolling Continuation Channel (RCC) funding (NaCCATuM, 
2009). Countries that apply for RCC funding have had to be invited to do 
so by the Global Fund based on a country's performances on its grant 
during the regular rounds of financing. 
 On the 1st of April 2009, the Ministry of Health received a letter 
from Global Fund Geneva, inviting the country to apply for Wave 7 of the 
RCC (Churchill, 2009). Namibia had first been offered to apply for RCC 
under the 6th Wave (September 2008). The country was dropped as part of 
Wave 6 because the verified implementation review period for Namibia’s 
existing Round 2 grant was only 15 months instead of the preferred 
period of 18 months or more. As defined by the Global Fund under the 
RCC, Namibia had been successful in its implementation of the Round 2 
grant, which then made it eligible for further support. According to the 
Wave 7 RCC invitation for the country to apply, Namibia had met the 
three main “RCC Qualification Factors” for the Round 2 grant (Churchill, 
2009):  
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1. Sustained strong performance; 
2. Evidence of potential for impact; and  
3. Programmatic sustainability.  
 
Following the Wave 7 invitation, Namibia was successful in its 
application for the RCC grant, which was meant to reflect a continued 
implementation of the Round 2 HIV and AIDS, TB, and Malaria grants 
(Bampoe, 2011). The start date for the RCC grant was July 2010, and it 
was expected to end in April 2016. At the time of data collection for this 
thesis, in early 2012, Namibia was in its second year of implementing the 
RCC grant (Bampoe, 2011). Table 4.1 shows the various amounts 
rewarded to Namibia for HIV and AIDS, TB, and Malaria for Round 2 
and RCC grants. 
Table 4-1 Global Fund Signed Amounts to Namibia, Round 2 and RCC: (MoHSS, 2011; 
The Global Fund Office of the Inspector General, 2012) 




amounts (USD) 6 
Years 
HIV/AIDS 104,004,211 211,472,886 
TB 1,294,610 1,776,976 
Malaria 6,235,950     17,363,919 
Total 111,534,771 230,613,781 
 
Table 4.1 shows that during Round 2 and RCC, most of Namibia’s 
financial support from Global Fund was for HIV and AIDS. The amounts 
allocated to TB and Malaria interventions, respectively, were 
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significantly smaller. For Round 2, Namibia was awarded 
US$104,004,211 for HIV/AIDS programs, as compared to US$6.2 million 
for malaria and US$1.3 million for TB. Under the RCC grant, Namibia 
was awarded US$211,472,886 for HIV/AIDS, as compared to US$17.4 





The Global Fund Secretariat: The Global Fund Secretariat is the 
primary structure for the GHI’s operations. It is based in Geneva, and in 
general terms, it is charged with "executing Board policies; resource 
mobilisation; providing strategic, policy, financial, legal and 
administrative support; and overseeing monitoring and evaluation (The 
Global Fund, 2001a)." For grant applications and management, it 
manages the grant portfolios by screening the proposals submitted and 
issuing instructions on the disbursement of funds to recipients and 
implementing the performance-based monitoring functions of the grants.” 
All the Secretariat staff is based in Geneva (Garmaise and Greenall, 
2008; Riddell, 2007). 
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Figure 4-4 Global Fund Proposal Process 
 
 
The Country Coordinating Mechanism: The Global Fund requires 
government and non-government stakeholders at the country level to 
define a mechanism for the coordination of their joint efforts around 
Global Fund financing (The Global Fund, 2013b). To meet these goals, the 
Global Fund at the onset of its establishment developed guidelines for the 
mechanism, which it refers to as the Country Coordination Mechanism 
(CCM). In 2002, Namibia established a CCM, which it called the Namibia 
Coordinating Committee for HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 
(NaCCATuM). In describing the CCM for Namibia, the acronyms 
NaCCATuM and CCM are used interchangeably within the thesis. 
In Namibia, the exact members of the CCM have changed of over 
the lifetime of Global Fund operations in Namibia, but they have for the 
most proportionally represent the same type of organisations. As Figure 
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4.5 shows, the members of the Namibian CCM can be grouped into four 
main categories: government agencies, civil society, international 
development institutions, and private entities (The Global Fund Office of 
the Inspector General, 2012). 
 





The Technical Review Panel: The grant proposal that is submitted 
to the Global Fund Secretariat by a CCM (or its equivalent) are passed on 
to the Technical Review Panel (TRP) if they are deemed to meet the 
guidelines laid out by the Secretariat (The Global Fund, 2013c). The TRP 
is “an independent group of international experts in the three diseases 
and cross-cutting issues such as health systems.” They meet regularly to 
review proposals, and then provide funding recommendations to the 
 154 
Global Fund Board on who needs to receive funding (The Global Fund, 
2013c).  
Principal Recipient: The legal grant agreement to a country is 
signed between the Global Fund and a Principal Recipient. The recipient 
is an entity nominated by the CCM to receive the Global Fund finances 
directly and then use the funding to implement the programs described in 
the application or pass the funding on to other organisations (sub-
recipients) who provide the services (The Global Fund, 2007).” As 
described within Global Fund guidelines, the role of the PR is to “directly 
receive the funding approved by the Global Fund Board and manage its 
implementation on a day-to-day basis on behalf of the CCM (The Global 
Fund, 2011b, p. 7)”. In Namibia, the Ministry of Health was the sole PR 
to the Global Fund grant under Round 2. For the RCC grant, the 
Namibian Network of AIDS Services Organisations (NANASO) was 
added as a second PR (NaCCATuM, 2009, 2007).  
Sub-recipients: Before NANASO became a PR, the Ministry of 
Health served a PR to all SRs in Namibia, ranging from private, 
government to civil society organisations. With the RCC funding, 
NANASO became the PR for all civil society groups funded by Global 
Fund in Namibia (NaCCATuM, 2009). The Ministry of Health remained 
the PR for all other SRs. In Namibia, respondents also frequently 
referred to SRs as individual recipients (IRs). For consistency with 
existing Global Fund literature, this thesis uses the term SRs. Figure 4.5 
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shows the Ministry of Health and NANASO in association with all the 
other key stakeholders of the Global Fund grants in Namibia.  
The RCC work plan identified civil society organisations as being 
essential to the HIV and AIDS response in Namibia particularly 
regarding community-based health care and support of people living with 
HIV (PLHV). The selection of NANASO as a second PR to the HIV and 
AIDS RCC grant to oversee the activities of civil society organisations 
was intended to strengthen the collaboration and coordination of CSOs 
involved in providing HIV and AIDS interventions in Namibia. 
When Namibia applied for the RCC grant, the HIV and AIDS grant 
was classified as performing very well by the Global Fund and had been 
assigned a performance of A- by the GHI. Within the RCC application for 
Round 2, the Ministry of Health was given credit for effectively managing 
the work of nearly 30 individual Sub-Recipients (SRs) during Round 2 
(RCC application). In total, the Ministry of Health had 19 SRs and seven 
Sub-SRs. The civil society SRs were selected to undertake the majority of 
implementation at the community level and for the primarily affected 
populations.  
Local Fund Agent: Since the Global Fund defines itself as a non-
implementing agency, it has no country presence of staff (The Global 
Fund, 2013a, 2001b). For financial systems for accountability at the local 
level, the Global Fund contracts a firm to act as Local Fund Agent (LFA). 
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The two primary responsibilities of the LFA as defined within the Global 
Fund Handbook are to provide recommendations on the capacity of the 
entities chosen to act as PRs/SRs to manage Global Fund resources. The 
LFA is also supposed to give recommendations on the soundness of the 
disbursement requests made by the PRs and be the first to evaluate the 
results reports before PRs submit them to the Global Fund Secretariat 
(The Global Fund, 2012b). For the Round 2 and RCC grants to Namibia, 
the Namibian office of the international accounting firm 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC) was contracted to serve as the LFA for 
the country (The Global Fund Office of the Inspector General, 2012). 
 
4.4 Namibia’s Relationship with PEPFAR Funding 
 
Namibia was a recipient of the first two rounds of PEPFAR bulk 
funding, which were authorised by the United States Congress in 2003 
and 2008 and identified as PEPFAR phase 1 and 2 (Office of the Inspector 
General, USAID, 2011). Regarding the countries that have received 
PEPFAR funds, Phase 1 had 15 focus countries that received most of the 
money, and a little over 30 other countries, which received smaller 
amounts (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2012). Primarily due to its high HIV 
and AIDS prevalence, Namibia was chosen as one of the 15 focus 
countries under PEPFAR Phase 1. Of the 15 focus countries, 14 of them 
were in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the other one was Vietnam (108th USA 
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Congress, 2003; 110th USA Congress, 2008).  During PEPFAR phase 1, 
between 2004 and 2008, funding to Namibia through the initiative 
increased steadily every year (PEPFAR, 2012, 2011). In the U.S 
Government’s 2004 fiscal year, Namibia received US$24.5 million of 
PEPFAR funds, it then received US$42.5 million in 2005, US$57.3 
million in 2006, US$91.2 million in 2007, and US$108.9 in 2008 (Kaiser 
Family Foundation, 2011). 
Chapter one shows that at the global level, the PEPFAR initiative 
was structured to facilitate joint planning and decision-making between 
US development agencies. In its first 5-year authorization, PEPFAR 
started off as an emergency response to HIV and AIDS. It sought to 
support national programs to scale up interventions rapidly. In its second 
5-year authorization, it had much more of a focus on sustainability and 
health systems strengthening. Under phase 2 of PEPFAR funding, the 
initiative removed the concept of “focus” countries and countries were 
considered for the financing by whether they were viewed as having a 
high or low burden of HIV and AIDS. Namibia was classified as a high 
burden country and remained in the top 10 recipients of PEPFAR funding 
as part of Phase 2 funding (110th USA Congress, 2008; Kaiser Family 
Foundation, 2012).  
In 2009, the Namibian Government and PEPFAR signed a 
Partnership Agreement, which led to the formation of the PEPFAR 
Steering Committee in the Country (PEPFAR, 2011). According to 
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Holmes et al. (2012), the partnership frameworks "map out five-year 
strategic alliances between PEPFAR and governments, Global Fund, and 
other in-country partners. According to a PEPFAR representative in 
Namibia, the Partnership Agreement allowed the country's program to 
start looking at sustainability and also allow recipients to begin 
managing a transition away from PEPFAR funding so that the country 
can achieve its response way long after PEPFAR or Global Fund or other 
donors have left Namibia. In 2012 when data for this thesis was collected, 
Namibia was in its 4th year of implementing interventions under Phase 2 




As described in chapter one, PEPFAR is a bilateral initiative. It 
came about through a decision by the U.S Government on how it wanted 
to contribute to tackling HIV and AIDS at the global level. For PEPFAR 
funding to initially become available to be spent on a global scale, the 
money first had to be authorised by the U.S Congress. The initial 
authorization also came with specific guidelines on how PEPFAR funding 
would be approved, planned for, and tracked at both the global and 
country levels (108th USA Congress, 2003; 110th USA Congress, 2008).  
Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator: On a global level, PEPFAR 
activities were established to be supervised by the Office of the US Global 
AIDS Coordinator (OGAC) in Washington D.C, which reports to the 
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President and the Congress of the USA (108th USA Congress, 2003). 
Among its various responsibilities for managing the PEPFAR initiative, 
OGAC was primarily established to “oversee the program and policy 
coordination among all the US Government agencies and their 
appropriate counterparts so as to avoid duplication of efforts” (Office of 
the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator (OGAC), 2004). 
PEPFAR Implementing Partners: From its establishment, most 
PEPFAR funding at the international level was channelled through 
agencies already associated with the U.S Government (Fan et al., 2013; 
Oomman et al., 2008; United States Department of State and the 
Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of Inspector General, 2010b). 
Within the first congressional approval for PEPFAR, the U.S Government 
agencies that were designated as funding recipients were collectively 
referred to as PEPFAR Implementing Partners (Office of the U.S. Global 
AIDS Coordinator, 2013). PEPFAR funding was then allocated to sub-
recipients associated with the primary partner as appropriate (Office of 
the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator, 2013). 
Primary Implementing Country Partners: At the national level, the 
U.S Government organisations that were designated as PEPFAR 
implementing partners varied between countries. As part of the 
authorization for PEPFAR Phase 1, agencies were initially assigned to 
work in countries with which they already had a relationship (108th USA 
Congress, 2003). At the national level, PEPFAR funds are allocated to 
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"Primary Partners" that ranged from the government, private sector, and 
local and international NGOs (Hanefeld, 2010; Oomman et al., 2008). 
During both PEPFAR phase 1 and 2, there were five central U.S 
Government implementing partners for the PEPFAR initiative in 
Namibia. These were the Department of State, the Department of 
Defense, Peace Corps, United Sates Agency for International 
Development (USAID), and the U.S Centres for Diseases Control (CDC) 
(PEPFAR, 2011; PEPFAR Namibia, 2012).  
Local Implementing Partners: In Namibia, each of the five U.S 
Government implementing partners implemented their interventions and 
also allocated funding to local implementing partners (PEPFAR Namibia, 
2012; USAID and TeamSTAR, 2006). Figure 4.7 shows the five Primary 
Country Implementing Partner in Namibia and their Local Implementing 
Partners.  
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Figure 4-6 Partners in Relation to PEPFAR and CDC in Namibia 
 
Each of the five US Government agencies associated with PEPFAR funds 
in Namibia was country versions of larger development organisations 
that are governed from the USA. The country offices were accountable to 
their headquarters in the USA, which in turn directly reported to the 
OGAC office for their PEPFAR activities. For instance, CDC Namibia 
reported to the CDC headquarters in Atlanta, not to OGAC in 
Washington D.C. For PEPFAR, the CDC headquarters was in turn 
accountable to the U.S Government’s Department of Health and Services 
(HHS) (Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the 
Inspector General, 2013; PEPFAR, 2011). 
The general international operations of CDC both within the USA 
and abroad are premised on its working in conjunction with existing 
health sector agencies. Thus in the chain of PEPFAR funding, the CDC 
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Namibia office was a sub-recipient of the CDC headquarters in Atlanta, 
and the Ministry of Health was one of CDC Namibia's sub-recipients in 
the country. During both phase 1 and phase 2 of PEPFAR funding to 
Namibia, the relationship between CDC and the Ministry of Health was 
governed by a financing mechanism called the Cooperative Agreement 
(CoAg). The CoAgs defined the general plan for the partnership between 
CDC and the Ministry of Health over the two 5-year periods covered by 
the PEPFAR authorizations (Department of Health and Human Services, 
Office of the Inspector General, 2012, p. 1).  
As described within their cooperative agreement (CoAG) for 
PEPFAR phase 1, the purpose of the Ministry of Health's relation with 
CDC was for "Ministry to implement a coordinated national response to 
the HIV/AIDS epidemic"(Department of Health and Human Services, 
Office of the Inspector General, 2013). The goals of the second CoAg 
between CDC and the Ministry of Health are laid out as being “to 
strengthen the Ministry’s capacity in the following three areas 
(Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Inspector 
General, 2013, p. 1): 
1. Deliver improved voluntary counselling and testing; support 
prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV;  
2. Perform HIV/AIDS-related surveillance; and 
3. Provide comprehensive HIV/AIDS care, including 
antiretroviral therapy. 
 
At the global level, CDC had the mandate to operate on a broad 
range of health issues on behalf of the U.S Government. As one of the 
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Implementation Partners under PEPFAR, CDC has had a leadership role 
in the areas of implementing HIV/AIDS programs, program monitoring, 
impact evaluation, and operations research (U.S Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC), 2004). CDC was designated to implement 
the PEPFAR initiative through its Global HIV/AIDS Program. Its 
functions were defined as “working with ministries of health and other in-
country partners to combat HIV/AIDS by strengthening health systems 
and building sustainable HIV/AIDS programs” (United States 
Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of 
Inspector General, 2010a).  
Although bulk PEPFAR funding for both Phase 1 and Phase 2 was 
each approved to cover five years, the first PEPFAR legislation mandated 
that funding to be spent on the implementation of activities had to be 
approved every year (108th USA Congress, 2003). Every PEPFAR year, 
representatives at the U.S headquarters of PEPFAR implementing 
partners receive a budget from the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator 
(OGAC), indicating the amount of funding that was collectively available 
to them. Several committees, made up of representatives from each of the 
main PEPFAR Implementing agencies, then made decisions on how to 
allocate the funding across their operations in the various countries. 
OGAC used this plan to notify Congress on how PEPFAR funds will be 
utilised for a given year (Fan et al., 2013).  
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Figure 4-7 Overall Structure of PEPFAR Partners 
 
At the country level, the implementing US Development 
organisations apply for the funding that is made available to OGAC 
through an annual process called the Country Operational Plan (COP). 
As defined in the PEPFAR Country Operational Plan Guidelines, the 
COP "is the vehicle for documenting the U.S Governments annual 
investments and anticipated results in HIV/AIDS". It enabled U.S 
Government agencies to provide a "single supporting narrative" to 
describe their PEPFAR management strategy for a given country 
(PEPFAR, 2011, p. 7). Not all countries, which receive PEPFAR funds, 
are required to submit a COP. The need for a COP depended on the size 
of the PEPFAR program within a country. For the budget year starting in 
2012, only 34 out of the 124 recipients needed to submit a COP (PEPFAR, 
2011). As one of the original focus countries, Namibia was required to 
submit a COP for each of the years it has received PEPFAR funds. 
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In Namibia, the COP processes for phase one and two were driven 
by the five PEPFAR implementing agencies through the Country 
Coordinator's Office. Once COP had been approved by both the Country 
Coordinator's Office and the OGAC headquarters, only then was PEPFAR 
funding potentially available to in-country sub-recipients such as the 
Ministry of Health. By design of the U.S Congress, the day-to-day 
implementation and oversight of PEPFAR funding at the country level 





4.5 Global Fund and PEPFAR Health Systems 
Implications for Namibia  
 
Since the country's independence in 1990, Namibia has had one of 
the highest total government health expenditures per capita and the 
lowest out-of-pocket payments for patients in Africa (Leive and Xu, 2008; 
Schmidt, 2009). Financial ability to pay does not, however, correlate with 
adequate provision of health services. Namibia’s performance for 
Disability Adjusted Life Expectancy (DALE) is often much lower than 
what would be expected for the level of financial resources spent on 
health in the country (European Economic Fund, 2008; Zere et al., 2006). 
The Namibian health system does not suffer from complete inadequacy of 
financial resources, it appears more to suffer from the inefficient and 
inequitable allocation and utilisation of resources (MoHSS, 2008ab).  
Rural populations are in particular more likely to be poor than 
their urban counterparts (Kaapama, 2007; Schmidt, 2009). Inadequate 
human resources capacity was perceived as one of the key issues limiting 
the rapid scale-up of HIV and AIDS services in Namibia when the 
country started receiving funding from the Global Fund and PEPFAR (El 
Obeid, 2001; McCourt and Awases, 2007). For purposes of scaling up HIV 
and AIDS services, government-run health facilities had a general 
shortage of skilled personnel such as doctors, senior managers, and other 
specialists (El Obeid, 2001). In the year 2000, for Namibia as a whole, 
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there were about 7,500 people per public service doctor, and about 950 
people per registered nurse (El Obeid, 2001). The country’s health worker 
capacity at three doctors per 1000 people was just above the WHO 
benchmark of 2.5 physicians per 1000 people (Callaghan et al., 2010; 
Iipinge et al., 2006; World Health Organization, 2007). However, as with 
many socio-demographic factors in Namibia, significant disparities in 
health workers existed between urban and rural areas (El Obeid, 2001; 
Iipinge et al., 2006).  
There were various factors, which defined the health worker 
situation in Namibia when Global Fund and PEPFAR resources arrived 
in the country. Until the first medical school was established in Namibia 
in 2011, all medical related training aside from nursing, radiography, 
social work and pre-medical training, had to be conducted outside the 
country. There was a high attrition of public workers from the public 
sector to the private sector where remuneration packages were perceived 
as more attractive (McCourt and Awases, 2007; MoHSS, 2008ab; MoHSS 
and CDC, 2010). Human resources attrition in the public sector adversely 
impacts on the scope and quality of health care, and this in turn 
negatively affects the poorest of the poor. The resulting high workload on 
remaining staff aggravated work-related stress and resulted in the poor 
attitudes towards clients, which in turn influences service acceptability 
and use (MoHSS, 2008ab). Scale-up of HIV and AIDS services was 
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specifically hampered by the scarcity of professional staff skilled the 
management of clinical treatment (MoHSS, 2008ab; NaCCATuM, 2009).  
A 2008 Review of Health and Social Services in Namibia, however, 
shows that the disparity in health worker capacity between the public 
and private sectors, and between the urban and rural areas that existed 
before the two initiatives arrived, was persistent in the presence of Global 
Fund and PEPFAR support (MoHSS, 2008ab). For example, 28 percent of 
Namibia's physicians were found to work in the public sector, while 72 
percent were in the private sector. Regarding the rural-urban disparity, 
only 24 percent of doctors in Namibia were found to work in rural areas 
as compared to 76 percent in urban areas (MoHSS, 2008ab). The 2008 
review also highlighted challenges under Governance such as weaknesses 
in leadership; duplication of structures and functions (including health 
information systems); weak coordination of donor activities; and limited 
involvement of non-Ministry stakeholders in policy formulation (MoHSS, 
2008ab). 
In August 2012, the second President of Namibia appointed a 
Commission of Inquiry “to look into the activities, affairs, management, 
and operations of the Ministry of Health and Social Services (MoHSS) 
(Presidential Commission of Inquiry: MoHSS, 2013, p. 4)." The Inquiry 
evaluated the quality of infrastructure, the skills and availability of 
human resources; the status and availability of medicines and medical 
equipment; maternal and child health; and general conduct of health 
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professionals (Presidential Commission of Inquiry: MoHSS, 2013). 
According to the Commission’s report, the Ministry of Health did well in 
stocking and making available medicinal and treatment supplies at the 
clinical level. For instance, the Commission found that the availability of 
medicines in public health facilities was excellent, with stock levels of 
above (CMS) (Presidential Commission of Inquiry: MoHSS, 2013). 
For all the other issues that the Commission evaluated, the 
Ministry was found to have significant weaknesses and challenges 
(Presidential Commission of Inquiry: MoHSS, 2013). According to the 
report by the Presidential Commission, the Ministry of Health’s greatest 
challenge at the national level was inadequate human resources, a 
problem that was then found to be directly tied to deficiencies in the 
Ministry of Health operations as a whole. Rural health clinics and health 
centres, in particular, were found to be inadequately staffed both for the 
number of employees and the appropriate skill sets required to provide 
adequate health services (El Obeid, 2001; MoHSS, 2008ab; Presidential 
Commission of Inquiry: MoHSS, 2013). Many health facilities were, 
therefore, overcrowded, and the quality of patient care was often lacking 
in public health facilities (Presidential Commission of Inquiry: MoHSS, 
2013, p. iv).  
The Commission found "an acute and critical shortage of health 
professionals such as doctors, nurses, pharmacist and allied health 
practitioners in the country (Presidential Commission of Inquiry: MoHSS, 
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2013, p. iv)”. The Presidential Commission argued that the identified 
weaknesses made it difficult for the Ministry of Health to provide 
consistent quality health services. There were a lot of health workers 
hired and trained on how to provide HIV and AIDS health services as 
result of GHI funding. In the country's application for HIV RCC support, 
the Namibian applications acknowledged that it would be crucial to 
sustaining the human resources capacity that was created with the 
assistance of the Global Fund and PEPFAR (NaCCATuM, 2009). The 
demand for ART for adults and children with HIV infection will most 
likely continue to grow (Hecht et al., 2010). The long-term implications of 
the current global HIV situation are the need for financing and the need 
for health systems that can not only retain those already on treatment 
but also absorb the new infections. HIV and AIDS will remain a challenge 
to Namibia for a while yet (NaCCATuM, 2009).  
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5. Financial Flows 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In chapter one this thesis defined what is meant by country 
ownership and its implications for institutional autonomy. Using these 
definitions, chapter one also justified the focus of this thesis on the 
Ministry of Health due to its mandated role to steer the Namibian public 
health sector's HIV and AIDS response. Chapter two then examined the 
extent to which the issues of country ownership and institutional 
autonomy have been taken into account in the academic literature on the 
country-specific interactions of the Global Fund and PEPFAR. The 
chapter criticised the bulk of the research for framing the issue of 
ownership from the perspective of seeking to prove the effectiveness of 
the HIV and AIDS global health initiatives (GHIs). In comparison, this 
thesis examines the ways in which HIV and AIDS GHIs impact country 
ownership of health systems.  
In the last chapter, this thesis then provided the background on 
Namibia's health policy context for HIV and AIDS both independent of 
and in its engagement with Global Fund and PEPFAR assistance. This 
chapter examines the structures and processes for financial 
disbursements that governed the Ministry of Health engagement with the 




5.2 Initial Global Fund Financial Flows  
 
When the Global Fund was first established, its guidelines stated 
that all PR’s were supposed to have “certain minimum capacities” in five 
functional areas, namely: Financial Management and Systems; Program 
Management; Sub-recipient Management; Pharmaceutical and Health 
Production Management; and Monitoring and Evaluation (The Global 
Fund, 2001). The Ministry of Health proved these minimum capacities, 
which then then enabled the country to be approved for Round 2 funding. 
Grant documents for the Round 2 grant show, however, that although 
Namibia was successful in its application for the funding in 2002, the 
country only received its first disbursement in 2004 (The Global Fund, 
2004). As defined in the Grant Agreement for Round 2, Namibia had to 
demonstrate specific grant management capacities before the Global 
Fund made its first disbursement to the country (The Global Fund, 2004).  
Rather than hiring people to carry out these responsibilities and 
then housing them within the Ministry of Health, a consortium between 
Ministry, the Royal Tropical Institute (KIT) and the Malaria Consortium 
of Liverpool was first established to meet the grant management 
capacities expected of a PR (NaCCATuM, 2009). The Ministry of Health 
and the two agencies formed a consortium that recruited and managed all 
the workers in Namibia who were employed to work on interventions 
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funded with Global Fund money (NaCCATuM, 2009). Then, in 2006, 
money from the Global Fund to Namibia began to be managed through a 
Programme Management Unit (PMU), which was established to work 
alongside the DSP. As described by interview respondents from both the 
DSP and the PMU, the PMU was created to serve as a contractor to the 
Ministry of Health.  
A respondent from the Operations Management Division of the 
PMU described the unit as existing to meet the reporting requirements of 
the Global Fund in the following ways:  
You need somebody to make the financial reports and to do the 
accountability for the GF funding going into the ART 
program…You need those people. Otherwise, you don't get the 
reports…these individuals are important to the donor relationship 
because there is quite a strong link between M&E and the donor 
funding in terms of proving performance and enabling the next 
disbursements (Global Fund Namibia PMU). 
 
According to the respondents representing the PMU, the Ministry of 
Health was responsible for the Global Fund money in the country at a 
high level, but the PMU was established to carry out the management 
functions of the grants on a day-to-day basis. Respondents associated 
with the Ministry of Health, on the other hand, understood the 
establishment of the PMU as a general requirement for receiving a Global 
Fund support.  
A respondent from the DSP therefore characterised the reasons for 
the establishment of the PMU in the following way:  
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That is the way that the Global Fund wants its money to be 
managed, and this is how it works in each country…Global Fund 
does not want the money to go into the coffers of the Ministry. The 
PMU is meant to administer the funds on behalf of the Ministry 
(Ministry of Health, DSP). 
 
The respondent from DSP perceived the Ministry of Health and Namibia 
as grant recipients of the Global Fund as having to establish the PMU for 
the country to receive money.  
Within the initial Round 2 grant agreement between the Ministry 
of Health and Global Fund Geneva, the decision was made that Namibia 
would request disbursements on its grants on a quarterly basis (The 
Global Fund, 2004). The role of the PMU was to accept; assess; and 
process the disbursement requests that the country made from the Global 
Fund; as well as manage and administer the sub- recipients for funding 
from the PR. In reflecting on their role in the flow of Global Fund money 
in Namibia, PMU staff interviewed for this research perceived 
themselves as working on behalf of the Ministry of Health: 
The PR is being assisted by the PMU, making sure that the money 
is available in the country in the time it is supposed to be here; 
that the reports are given to the Global Fund by PR. The Global 
Fund will never demand anything from PMU, in fact, they always 
refer to the PR, which is correct because they are in a relationship 
with PR (Global Fund Namibia PMU). 
 
Although the PMU was responsible for the administrative 
management and processing of the disbursement requests, both PMU and 
DSP respondents were quick to point out that the Ministry of Health 
always approved the final requests that the PMU made to the Global 
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Fund Secretariat. As reported by a respondent who managed finances in 
DSP, when the Ministry of Health was first approved for the Global Fund 
Round 2 grant, it established a bank account for Global Fund money. 
Thus when the Global Fund approved a disbursement request and sent 
money to Namibia, the money was put into this bank account. It was 
from this bank account that the Ministry of Health made payments to 
sub-recipients. Although the bank account belonged to the Ministry of 
Health as a whole, DSP was given the overall responsibility for managing 
the flow of money in and out of the Global Fund-related bank account. 
With approval from the DSP financial officers, the PMU then made 
funding disbursements to sub-recipients.  
DSP respondents also perceived the PMU as acting on behalf of the 
Ministry of Health in relation to managing its relationship with Global 
Fund grant sub-recipients: 
The sub-recipients submit quarterly cash forecasts to PMU. The 
PMU looks at the cash forecasts and decides if they are accurate 
and realistic. The finance staff of the PMU sometimes make some 
adjustments to the forecasts, or they go back to the recipients for 
more queries. When the PMU is satisfied with the sub- recipient’s 
forecasts, it then makes a request to the Ministry of Health to 
release money to the sub-recipients (Ministry of Health, DSP) 
 
As described by a finance officer within the DSP, the Ministry of Health 
had a distant and arms-length relationship to the sub-recipients. If the 
Ministry of Health was unhappy with something within the reports or 
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activities of the sub-recipients, they told the PMU, and then the PMU 
would engage with the sub-recipients. 
As described by various interviewees, the PMU served as the 
administrative intermediary in two different capacities. In the first 
instance, it was established to act as a liaison between the Ministry of 
Health and the Global Fund headquarters in Geneva (The Global Fund, 
2007, 2001b). In the second instance, the PMU was established to serve 
as a liaison between the Ministry of Health as the PR, and the sub-
recipients of the Global Fund grant. Respondents from the DSP argued 
that because money from the Global Fund was disbursed on a quarterly 
basis, they were able to track how much money they had available at a 
given time.  
 
5.3 Evolving Ownership of Global Fund Finances 
 
In the regular rounds of Global Fund grants, the CCMs applied for 
3 to 5 years of funding. However, even after a grant application was 
successful, funding was allocated according to two different stages, phase 
1 and phase 2. Because the Global Fund was set up to use performance-
based financing, the CCMs (and associated country recipients) had to 
demonstrate that a particular grant was achieving initial targets for 
beneficiaries to be approved for more funding under Phase 2 of funding 
for 5-years (The Global Fund, 2001). Under the Rolling Continuation 
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Channel (RCC), which the Global Fund introduced after its post-2008 
change in strategy, grants were approved for six years. Based on the 
demonstration of progress towards grant targets in the first three years, 
the Global Fund then committed to funding recipients for a further three 
years (Churchill, 2009).  
As told by respondents from both the Ministry of Health and PMU, 
the funding commitments and disbursements for Round 2 HIV and AIDS 
funding went as agreed with the Global Fund in the grant agreement. As 
was expected, during Round 2, the Global Fund made disbursements to 
Namibia on a quarterly basis soon after requests have been made by the 
PMU on behalf of recipients. The Global Fund also apparently made 
payments to the exact value sought by the county programmes. 
Respondents from both the DSP and the PMU, however, indicated that 
Global Fund disbursements were less reliable under the RCC grant. 
As reported by Ministry of Health and PMU respondents, 
payments on the RCC grant frequently came much later than during the 
period for which they had been requested. In February 2012, a 
respondent from the PMU explained that given that the first phase of the 
RCC grant had officially commenced in July 2010, the PR should have 
received approximately 80% of the total disbursements due, but the 
Ministry of Health had received only 39% of the expected payments: 
They used to be done in time. You know, you would put in cash 
forecast every six months, and it would usually be approved within 
three months, between 2005 and 2010. Then it just nose-dived since 
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then…We are now into the final quarter of the first two years of 
RCC, so we are into one year nine months, and we should have had 
four disbursements. I think we just received the second, one a month 
ago (Ministry of Health, DSP). 
 
Reflecting on this issue of late disbursement, in response to a 
request for payment that the Ministry of Health made in September 
2011, the Global Fund sent the PR a letter dated 29th of February 2012 
(Masanhu, 2012). The Global Fund confirmed that it decided on a 
disbursement amount of US$9.4 million for the period of October 2011-
March 2012, rather than the US$17.2 million as had been requested by 
the country, for several reasons. One of the primary reasons given in the 
letter was that the Global Fund had found that the PRs and the SRs had 
a combined cash balance of more than US$6 million U.S dollars when the 
request for disbursements was made. In another letter dated the 7th 
March 2012, the Global Fund further argued that the cash balances were 
not in standing with performance-based funding grant rules: 
With Performance Based Funding Model, grant performance, 
expenditure rates and cash balances are critical in influencing the 
disbursement decision. We note that with the RCC Round 2 
HIV/AIDS grant, high-performance results are achieved with low 
expenditure; a combination that does not support the release of the 
amounts requested by the PR (Masanhu, 2012, p. 5).  
 
Table 5.1 is a copy of the table given by the Global Fund to justify 
the conclusion that the PR and SRs kept large balances from one 
reporting period to another, and to demonstrate that the grants were still 
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performing well despite the delays in and reductions in requested 
disbursements.  
Table 5-1 Namibia Disbursement Requests and Expenditures for Global Fund RCC Grant 
July 2010 to September 2011 (Masanhu, 2012, pp. 4–5) 
Reporting Period July-Sep 
2010 
Oct 2010 – 
March 2011 
April 2011 to 
Sep 2011 
Average 
Approved budget 5,494,087 15,758,963 14,478,556 11,910,535 
PR’s Forecasted Amount 7,118,498 14,023,967 8,967,722 10,036,729 
Programmatic results 
(gross) 
90% 176% 252% 173% 
Actual Expenditure (per 
semester) 
2,022,679 10,684,840 2,109,789 4,939,103 
Excess of forecast by PR 
compared to actual 
252% 31% 325% 203% 
PR’s reported ending 
cash balances 
12,794 8,291,095 5,219,637 4,507,842 
 
The Global Fund's arguments for why disbursements were reduced or 
held back implied that because Namibian recipients had Global Fund 
money in their bank accounts, they did not need the money that they 
were requesting. Respondents from both the PMU and the DSP argued, 
however, that the Global Fund disbursements that were late or reduced 
put the Ministry of Health in a position that required it to hold seemingly 
large balances.  
In a letter dated 05 April 2012, the Ministry of Health focused on 
reiterating why it had what could be perceived as having enough money 
(Kahuure, 2012a, p. 1): 
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As explained in our December 2011 management letter response, 
the PR made a decision to retain funds meant for reimbursement of 
ARVs due to uncertainty over the timing of the next disbursement. 
Money was set aside to enable the PR to meet commitments like, 
for example, staff salaries, on time. 
 
In the letter from 05 April 2012, the Ministry of Health further argued 
that it was incorrect for the Global Fund to penalise the Ministry of 
Health for having surpassed its targets: 
Programmatic results are not tied to Global Fund funding and 
ARVs are pre-finance. This analysis does not reflect the truth and 
unfairly puts the blame on the PR/MoHSS (Kahuure, 2012a, p. 4).  
 
Further to the fact that HIV and AIDS results could not all be 
attributed to Global Fund support, respondents from PMU and DSP also 
argued that the demonstrated results were also due the fact the Ministry 
of Health continued to meet its reporting requirements to the Global 
Fund even though it was not receiving disbursements. Namibians were 
deemed as not needing the money if they submitted the reports; but were 
considered as being underperforming when they did not provide the 
reports (Kahuure, 2012a). 
Communication to the Ministry of Health from the Global Fund 
Secretariat in Geneva indicated that the first RCC disbursement was 
delayed because the contracts between the PR and the Global Fund were 
not signed as soon as the grants had been awarded (Bampoe, 2011, p. 1). 
Respondents from the DSP and PMU agreed that Namibia had been 
required to conduct a salary survey as part of the RCC grant approval. 
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They, however, argued that even if delays in grant signing justified the 
delay in the first disbursement, they did not justify delays in subsequent 
disbursements; nor did the delays in grant signing justify the reductions 
in amounts once the payments were made. 
Respondents from the Ministry of Health and PMU further argued 
that the Global Fund’s inconsistent behaviour created uncertainty that 
made it difficult for the Ministry to implement activities under the RCC 
grant. The Ministry of Health expressed these sentiments in a letter sent 
to the Global Fund Geneva on the 16th of December 2011. The letter 
explained why the Ministry of Health had requested more money than 
that which the Global Fund perceived as justified (Kahuure, 2011): 
Your analysis under ‘Rationale for the disbursement 
recommendation’ does not take into account that the spending for 
the period April to September 2011 was controlled (suppressed) to 
avoid running out of funds due to uncertainty over the time of 
receipt of the next disbursement from the Global Fund. As a result, 
the PR made a conscious decision to delay reimbursing the Central 
Medical Stores (CMS) for the ARVs procured. We explained this 
during the country team visit (November 01-04, 2011) and it was 
agreed that the PR should include the outstanding reimbursement 
in the September 2011 Progress Update and Disbursement Request 
(p. 1). 
 
In another letter to the Global Fund dated 07 February 2012 
(Kahuure, 2012a), the Ministry of Health also noted the Global had also 
had failed to inform Namibia in due time whether it would be receiving 
funding for the 3rd year of the first phase of RCC. According to the 
Ministry of Health, when the Global Fund Country Team visited Namibia 
in November 2011, they had stated that "the second commitment is just a 
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formality". Four months before the first two years of guaranteed funding 
coming to an end, the Ministry of Health had not yet received a 
commitment for the RCC HIV and AIDS grant for the period 01 July 2012 
to 30 June 2013 (Kahuure, 2012b). The Ministry of Health further noted 
that the Global Fund had unilaterally rejected budget decisions that had 
been made in consultation between the two parties (Kahuure, 2012b, p. 
2): 
We wish to highlight that the PR submitted the final revised budget 
with proposed cuts from the PR's side, which is based on agreements 
reached through the teleconference with the GF Country Team (CT) 
on December 13, 2011. After that, the CT still proceeded unilaterally 
with budget reductions, which rendered recruitment for essential 
staff and the implementation of some M&E activities virtually 
impossible (Kahuure, 2012b, p. 2). 
 
Respondents from both the DSP and the PMU also perceived the 
Global Fund headquarters as refusing to take accountability for how its 
decisions negatively impacted on the implementation of the RCC grant. 
Respondents in Namibia viewed the Global Fund as not having been 
transparent about the way it was affected by the Global Financial Crisis 
that started in 2008. They believed that Global Fund found itself in a 
situation where it did not have enough money but failed to take 
accountability and be honest with recipients. Instead, it sought to blame 
them: 
Since the financial crisis in 2008, donor funding has fallen 
drastically, and I am not sure they have got a clue what they are 
doing anymore, other than just trying to be awkward. They are 
trying at the moment to save money left, right and centre, and they 
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are not going about it, in my view, in the correct fashion. Rather 
than trusting PRs and saying to them, they are trying their 
hardest to say; you are misusing funds, so, therefore, we are not 
going to give you any more (Ministry of Health, DSP). 
 
In a letter dated the 7th of March 2012, the Global Fund argued 
that “contradictions" concerning balances versus disbursements "seem to 
exemplify a weakness in communication with the Program Management 
Unit" (Eldon-Edington, 2012, p. 2). DSP and PMU respondents argued, 
however, that the Global Fund's assertions that the PMU had failed to 
communicate with the Ministry of Health adequately were not supported 
by their actual relationship. The way that the PMU operated in Namibia 
meant that PMU staff were often the ones that wrote the grant 
management letters to the Global Fund and the PR just signed off on 
them. In fact, the Country Director for the PMU was often listed as the 
contact person for any letter from the Ministry of Health to Geneva. As it 
complained about the PMU to the Ministry of Health, Global Fund 
Geneva was mostly communicating with the PMU. 
 
5.4 Initial PEPFAR Financial Flows  
 
In Namibia, most recipients of PEPFAR funding, including the 
Ministry of Health, were chosen at the start of PEPFAR phase 1. 
According to a respondent from the PEPFAR Country Coordinator's 
Office, other agencies that received PEPFAR funding from either USAID 
or CDC in Namibia were chosen through a competitive application 
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process. The Ministry of Health, however, received funding through a 
"sole-source award". As explained by a respondent from the CDC Namibia 
office, CDC "wanted to have a direct relationship with the government" of 
Namibia, so the Ministry of Health did not need to apply for PEPFAR 
funding. According to a respondent who previously worked for the Health 
Sector Response division of DSP, this is how the relationship between 
CDC and the Ministry of Health came about:   
CDC became associated with the DSP when the DSP people moved 
into their new offices in 2002/03. It had been present as a small 
office to provide technical support to the Ministry of Health. At the 
time, any resources from the U.S Government were coming from 
USAID and the U.S Embassy in Namibia. The Ministry of Health's 
relationship with CDC became official when PEPFAR came into 
operation (Former Employee, Ministry of Health, DSP).  
 
As defined within the Cooperative Agreements (CoAgs), between 
CDC Namibia and the Ministry of Health, the Ministry applied for 
PEPFAR funding from CDC each year, through an annual grant 
continuation plan. Within the plan, the Ministry of Health was required 
to formulate an activity plan and provide a budget for how it intended to 
use the PEPFAR funds within a given year. The continuation plan than 
needed to be approved by the CDC Headquarters in Atlanta before 
PEPFAR money could be disbursed to the Ministry of Health for a given 
budget year (Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator, 2009). 
However, whereas the money for Global Fund money was held in 
Namibian bank accounts that were controlled by the Ministry of Health, 
this was not the case with PEPFAR funding. In its relationship as a sub-
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recipient to CDC, the Ministry of Health could not retain large amounts 
of PEPFAR money over an extended period. As explained by a respondent 
from CDC Namibia, the CDC headquarters made a projection on the 
expected monthly expenditures by the Ministry of Health based on total 
spending approved for the year. Once the monthly budget has been 
allocated at headquarters, PEPFAR regulations prohibited the Ministry 
of Health from spending more money than had been assigned to it for a 
given month.  
To implement activities, the Ministry of Health accessed PEPFAR 
funding through CDC's global online Payment Management System 
(PMS). An individual from the Ministry of Health was designated with 
access to the PMS. In early 2012, the Deputy Director for DSP had been 
identified as the Primary Investigator (PI) for the PEPFAR grants to the 
Ministry of Health. When the Ministry of Health requested money 
through the PMS, the disbursement request first had to be approved by 
CDC Namibia and CDC headquarters in Atlanta. A respondent from CDC 
explained that if the Ministry tried to access more than the money that 
had been allocated to it within a given month, then the PMS would raise 
an alert. The Ministry of Health then had to justify any increase in 
requested amount, as compared to the amount that was approved for a 
given month.  
Another feature of the PMS was that it required the Ministry of 
Health to spend PEPFAR funds within 72 hours once a disbursement was 
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approved. As described by a respondent from CDC Namibia, the 72-hours 
measure was put in place to prevent PEPFAR grant recipients from 
earning interest on U.S Government money. Primarily due to CDC’s close 
monitoring of the Ministry’s financial activities, DSP respondents 
perceived themselves as having more control over Global Fund money 
than over PEPFAR money: 
For Global Fund, once you get the money, you have it in the 
country. With PEPFAR it is different, the money is never in 
country. It remains in Atlanta, and even if after it has been 
approved, you request almost on a daily basis (Ministry of Health, 
DSP) 
 
Respondents from the DSP perceived themselves as only 
marginally involved in setting the budgets and activity plans for PEPFAR 
funds. In reflecting on their relationship with the Ministry of Health, 
respondents from CDC Namibia, in contrast, described their office as 
existing to support the Ministry of Health to execute the terms of the 
CoAgs:  
So there is a lot of in-kind support. There is the money that we 
grant directly to the Ministry to spend under the conditions of the 
CoAg. So as part of that, we have CoAg managers, administrators 
who make sure that all of the procurement rules are being followed 
and everything. Then we have technical advisors who work with 
counterparts in the Ministry to ensure that the work plan that is 
developed for the CoAgs and linked to the budget is executed on 
time and budget…. (CDC Namibia) 
 
Some respondents from the Ministry of Health, in particular, expressed 
frustration with the frequent PMS requests. One respondent from 
RM&DC equated the process of continually having to check in with CDC 
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for every request, to begging for money (Ministry of Health, DSP). As a 
result, Ministry of Health respondents perceived CDC Namibia as 
running the process of planning for and management of PEPFAR funds, 
rather than just providing support. DSP respondents viewed these 
processes as being driven by the U.S Government and occurring 
independent of and even regardless of Ministry of Health input:  
…All along the CDC technical advisors, they are the ones who have 
been preparing even the work plans, in terms of what should be 
happening and put figures on there, and then doing all this work 
and perhaps just getting our directors and deputy directors to 
agree. They submit proposals to Atlanta…(Ministry of Health, 
DSP) 
 
However, when asked to reflect on whether their relationship to 
PEPFAR funding limited the Ministry of Health’s ownership of the grant, 
respondents from CDC did not perceive the relationship described by DSP 
respondents as problematic. As described by one respondent from CDC 
Namibia, a lack of separation between the operations of the two agencies 
was appropriate because they had shared objectives:   
…And sometimes we cross the line and sometimes it is appropriate 
for us to get in there and help get things done really…but we do 
have shared objectives, shared ideologies about what is going on. 
That grey area between advising and sometimes gets a little bit 
blurred. But I think a little bit of blurriness is appropriate (CDC 
Namibia). 
 
Respondents from CDC Namibia articulated a relationship with the 
Ministry of Health in which CDC worked similarly to PMU in that their 
office was embedded within the operations of the Ministry. In describing 
their grant management functions, staff from both the PMU and CDC 
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recognised themselves as being critical to ensuring that the Ministry of 
Health met the rules and the reporting requirements of the Global Fund 
and PEPFAR, respectively. Staff from the PMU and CDC also sought to 
legitimise themselves as active partners in the Ministry of Health. 
Respondents from the DSP, however, only viewed themselves as active 
partners in the supervision of Global Fund money once it was in Namibia. 
 
5.5 Unchanging Ownership of PEPFAR Financial 
Flows 
 
At the point of decline in financial support from the Global Fund 
during RCC, the Ministry of Health came to the realisation that it had 
less control over the flow of money from the Global Fund headquarters 
than it had previously believed under the Round 2 grant. For PEPFAR 
funding, respondents from DSP perceived the Ministry of Health as 
having gained more knowledge of PEPFAR financial flows at the point of 
decline of the financing from the GHI, but not necessarily more control. 
According to respondents from the DSP, for the first time since the 
Ministry of Health started receiving PEPFAR money in 2004, CDC held a 
grant management workshop in early 2012, which was aimed at 
educating Ministry of Health staff on PEPFAR grant processes. 
Respondents from DSP perceived the workshops as having been 
useful:  
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I think things are going much better with the grant. We had two 
sessions of training now on grant management, and with that 
training, we have taken much of the responsibilities that we were 
supposed to have all along (Ministry of Health, DSP). 
 
Staff from CDC acknowledged that during Phase 1, DSP staff had a 
limited understanding of PEPFAR financial flows. Thus according to 
respondents from DSP, the move to give the Ministry of Health more 
knowledge of PEPFAR financial flows led to greater transparency on 
CDC budgeting activities. More financial knowledge resulted in the 
revelation that there was a substantial amount of PEPFAR funding that 
had been allocated for Namibia, but in the end was not spent. According 
to a respondent from RM&DC division of DSP, at the start of 2012, the 
Ministry of Health learned that more than 130 million Namibian dollars 
(approximately US$20 million) budgeted for the 2010/2011 PEPFAR 
financial year had gone unspent.  
In contrast to Global Fund administrators in Geneva, however, the 
PEPFAR officials in Namibia did not appear overly concerned that a 
significant amount of money allocated to the Ministry of Health ended up 
not being spent. As one from CDC Namibia reflected:  
With any large project, you are not going to spend all the money 
you are given every year, and so every year we do have some 
residual funding leftover that gets carried over to the next year. So 
that is not a phenomenon that is exclusive to the Ministry of 




Ministry of Health officials argued, however, that PEPFAR funding was 
not left over just because they did not get around to using it. As described 
by a respondent from RM&DC, there were instances during the 
2010/2011 budget year when the Ministry of Health had requested 
funding for activities that had already been agreed on with CDC, only to 
be told that the money was not available:  
When people go there (to CDC) for these things that have got on 
their work plans, they know the money is there, but when they go 
there they are told, “no the rules in America have changed, x, y z is 
not going to be happening”. But now we have 130 million dollars, 
which was supposed to be spent, that was never spent (Ministry of 
Health, DSP).  
 
In addition to providing more education on PEPFAR grants 
through workshops, respondents from CDC Namibia also indicated that 
they were seeking to give the Ministry of Health staff greater 
responsibility for managing the PEPFAR budgeting process. Despite 
these acknowledgements by both CDC and DSP staff on the need for the 
Ministry of Health to have greater control over financial flows, in early 
2012, planning for and management of PEPFAR support continued to be 
primarily governed by U.S Government processes and structures. As 
confirmed by DSP respondents, the actions of the Ministry of Health 
remained closely monitored by CDC officials. Despite the changes in 
strategic focus between phase 1 and phase 2 of PEPFAR, the case study 
of the Ministry of Health's relationship with CDC indicates that their 
operational relationship remained similar during the two periods. As 
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perceived by respondents from the Ministry of Health, even during phase 
2, PEPFAR administrators continued to govern the initiative in a way 




This chapter has shown that when the Ministry of Health first 
started to receive funding from the Global Fund and PEPFAR, it had to 
adopt financial flows and structures that were specifically aimed at 
meeting the reporting requirements of the two GHIs. However, once the 
financial flows structures were put in place, Ministry of Health 
respondents initially perceived themselves as having had a greater 
decision-making role in the management of Global Fund money, when 
compared to PEPFAR funds.  
The chapter shows, however, that when compared to the financing 
of the Round 2 grant, funding disbursements for the Rolling Continuation 
Chanel (RCC) grant often arrived later than the period for which they 
were requested, and often in the form of fewer funds than had been 
requested. The Ministry of Health realised that it had less control over 
the flow of Global Fund money than it had previously thought. It appears 
that for as long as there was money readily coming from the Global Fund 
headquarters to Namibia, the PMU acted as a useful intermediary in the 
relationship between the Ministry of Health and the Geneva Secretariat.  
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In reflecting on the communications with the Global Fund on the 
delayed and reduced disbursements, some respondents in Namibia 
believed that rather than just admit that perhaps there was not enough 
funding available for the Global Fund to give to the country, the GHI 
sought to blame Namibia for grant mismanagement. By approving the 
RCC grant, the Global Fund essentially made a promise to Namibia to 
make the funding available to the country. The Global Fund delayed and 
reduced disbursements because the Ministry of Health had made 
provision to make up for shortfalls created by its delays. This kind of 
argument is very unimaginative because it does not enable the Ministry 
of Health to aim for better health results beyond those agreed with the 
Global Fund.  
Whereas Ministry of Health respondents initially perceived 
themselves as having greater ownership of Global Fund structures and 
processes, and then losing that control; their perception of the autonomy 
that they were able to exercise for PEPFAR funding was more consistent. 
Respondents from CDC articulated a relationship with the Ministry of 
Health, in which CDC worked similar to PMU in that it was embedded 
within the operations of the Ministry of Health; and primarily existed to 
assist the Ministry of Health in its execution of the PEPFAR grant. 
Ministry of Health officials, however, viewed themselves as not initially 
having much ownership of the PEPFAR financial flows and management 
processes. CDC regulations prohibited the Ministry of Health from 
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keeping bulk amounts of PEPFAR funding for an extended period. The 
Ministry of Health, therefore, had to request PEPFAR disbursements 
soon before it needed to use the money. It then had to spend the money 
soon after the payments were made, or else risk needing to send back the 
funding that had been disbursed. 
This chapter shows that the U.S Government created an 
opportunity for the Ministry of Health to have a better understanding of 
PEPFAR financial flows during phase 2. The consequences of the 
Ministry of Health not being entirely privy to financial information were 
reflected in the revelation during PEPFAR phase 2 that a lot of money 
had not been spent because DSP staff were not aware of it. Respondents 
from DSP argued that if the processes for disbursing PEPFAR funding 
had been more transparent, then the Ministry of Health would have 
known about the money that was left over.  
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6. Human Resources Management 
6.1 Introduction 
 
It was not only for financial flows that the Global Fund and 
PEPFAR initially required the Ministry of Health to set up management 
structures and procedures that proved to be problematic when financial 
support from both initiatives was on the decline. This chapter expands 
the human resources discussion to reflect on the overall policies that 
governed the recruitment and management of health workers paid by the 
two GHIs to implement interventions through Ministry of Health 
facilities. Similar to the previous chapter on financial flows, this chapter 
is organised around the rise and decline of funding from the two: as 
represented by Round 2 vs RCC for the Global Fund, and phase 1 and 
phase 2 for PEPFAR.  
The chapter starts off by describing the procedures through which 
the health workers were recruited and managed when the Ministry of 
Health first begun to receive funding from the Global Fund and PEPFAR. 
The chapter then examines the extent to which the Ministry of Health 
owned the decision-making structures and procedures for human 
resources management. It evaluates the implications that these practices 
had for Ministry of Health operations, once it faced a decline in financial 
support from the two initiatives.  
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6.2 Initial Recruitment for the Global Fund    
 
In its regular operations, the Ministry of Health recruits using a 
predefined list of required skills and number of workers. Officially known 
as the Staff Establishment, the list defines the number of employees the 
Ministry of Health can hire, as well as the salary levels it can pay. It first 
has to be approved by the Namibian Parliament and the Public Services 
Commission (PSC) (MoHSS, 2010a, 2009a; Presidential Commission of 
Inquiry: MoHSS, 2013). The Ministry of Health’s annual budget for 
human resources is disbursed from the Namibian Government’s Treasury 
based on a pre-approved Staff Establishment. In using the allocated 
budget, Ministry of Health workers are then recruited and managed by 
the Human Resources Division in the Directorate of Policy, Planning and 
Human Resources Development (PPHRD) (MoHSS, 2008a). 
The various individuals that were hired with PEPFAR and Global 
Fund resources were not part of the Ministry of Health’s Staff 
Establishment. Thus they were not incorporated into the Ministry of 
Health’s operating plan and budget as accepted by the Namibian Cabinet 
and disbursed from the Government Treasury (MoHSS, 2008ab; 
Presidential Commission of Inquiry: MoHSS, 2013). The Staff 
Establishment that had not taken into account the various positions and 
the number of health workers that were critical to enabling the Ministry 
to carry out the interventions that it had achieved with financial support 
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from Global Fund and PEPFAR (Presidential Commission of Inquiry: 
MoHSS, 2013). 
At the start of the Ministry of Health’s relationship with the Global 
Fund and PEPFAR, the decision was made not to recruit and not to 
manage health workers funded by the two initiatives through existing 
procedures of the Directorate of Policy, Planning and Human Resources 
Development (PPHRD). According to respondents from the Ministry of 
Health, recruiting health workers by first putting them on the Staff 
Establishment was perceived by both GHIs as being too lengthy a 
process. Thus from the start of their relationship with the Ministry of 
Health, the various health workers funded by Global Fund and PEPFAR 
were not public servants. As explained by a respondent from the 
Response Management Division of DSP, they belonged to a category 
called "in addition to the Staff Establishment". 
Decisions on the working conditions of staff funded by the Global 
Fund were initially meant to be made through the Country Coordinating 
Mechanism (CCM) during the grant application process (The Global 
Fund, 2011a). Specific salary levels or positions indicated in the Country 
Coordinated Proposal (CCP) were then approved or rejected as part of the 
evaluation carried out by the Technical Review Panel (TRP) in Geneva on 
whether Namibia’s grant received funding or not (The Global Fund, 
2012b, 2011b). During Round 2, workers that were recruited to work for 
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the Ministry of Health and had their salaries paid with funding from the 
Global Fund were hired through the PMU.  
As explained by a respondent from RM&DC, recruitment and 
management of staff of the Global Fund took place through a 
collaboration between the PMU and the Ministry of Health: 
When positions with the DSP, then the DSP sits on the selection 
committee. If it is a PMU position, the Director of DSP knows 
about it, but the decision essentially lies with the PMU. The people 
who work for the PMU or are funded by the Global Fund follow 
Global Fund hiring processes (Ministry of Health, DSP).  
 
Staff employed through the PMU for interventions that were supported 
by Global Fund, however, had different employment conditions from staff 
hired through the Staff Establishment. From the onset of the Round 2 
grant, the staff employed through the PMU and the DSP to implement 
Global Fund grant activities were paid at higher salary levels, which 
were different from their Ministry of Health counterparts. According to 
respondents within DSP, although health workers funded by the Global 
Fund had higher take-home salaries, public servants also received 
employment-based benefits such as pension and health care, which GHI 
workers did not receive.  
When Namibia became faced with uncertainty around when and 
whether the Global Fund would commit to Phase 2 of the RCC grant, the 
Ministry of Health became concerned that it risked losing experienced 
staff (Kahuure, 2011). As noted within the Ministry of Health’s 
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communications with the Global Fund headquarters in chapter five, the 
delayed commitment to phase 2 of RCC funding had an adverse impact on 
the Ministry's ability to implement existing interventions and plan for 
the future (Kahuure, 2012b, 2012c).  
 
6.3 Changing Global Fund HR Practices 
 
As explained by respondents from the DSP, the different salary 
conditions between existing Ministry of Health staff and workers 
financed by the Global Fund were not perceived as a problem by the 
Global Fund when Namibia was first granted funding under Round 2. In 
particular, during the approval of the country’s Round 2 and RCC 
proposals, the Global Fund had not raised any concerns about the higher 
salary levels at which Global Fund supported staff in Namibia would be 
paid. In November 2011, however, during the implementation of the RCC 
grant, the Global Fund Secretariat in Geneva sent an email to the 
Ministry of Health, mandating budget cuts for all human resources in 
Namibia (Bampoe, 2011). The directive applied to all recipients of Global 
Fund resources in Namibia. The Ministry of Health was asked to reduce 
the salaries of over 1,000 health workers to a range of 20 to 50 percent of 
first pre-approved pay (Bampoe, 2011).  
As explained in the letter from the Global Fund, which mandated 
the salary reductions, Namibia had been asked to undertake a salary 
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survey of health workers paid with Global Fund resources in April 2009, 
before the RCC grant agreement was signed. The letter noted that due to 
"protracted negotiations" between the Ministry of Health and the Geneva 
Secretariat, the grant agreement was signed before the salary survey was 
conducted (Bampoe, 2011). The letter requesting the pay cuts further 
added that the RCC agreement had noted that "if salaries were above 
those justified" the Global Fund "could adjust the budget for salaries 
downwards" (Bampoe, 2011). 
According to respondents associated with the Global Fund at both 
the Ministry of Health and other agencies: instead of the salary survey 
being carried out in 2009 at the start of the RCC grant, the study 
eventually took place in mid-2011. Respondents from both the Ministry of 
Health and the PMU argued, however, that the salary cuts were 
inadmissible for a variety of reasons related to how the survey was 
conducted. For instance, the study was not done over a long enough 
period to adequately capture the complexity of different salary levels in 
the Namibian health system. Another respondent from the PMU argued 
that even if the survey results were not problematic due to its 
methodology, the Global Fund’s requests for reductions "bore no relation 
the findings of the study".  
These same sentiments that the salary reductions bore no relation 
to the survey results were expressed in the Ministry of Health’s response 
to the Global Fund’s directive, which requested the salary cuts: 
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Upon full review of the contents of that directive, we had to 
conclude that it [the directive] has no logical basis and is certainly 
not based on the survey neither on the Round 2 Year 5 salaries 
(Kahuure, 2012b).  
 
The Ministry of Health then goes on to provide three examples of the 
"numerous anomalies and inconsistencies, which make the directive 
entirely unworkable." In one example, the letter noted that Senior Data 
Clerks had their salaries adjusted from US$1,556 per month to 
US$1,000. The letter from the Ministry argued that this would be less 
than the US$1,308 per month that the Global Fund stated could be paid 
to the professionally lower-ranked Data Clerks (Kahuure, 2012b).   
Within the original letter requesting the salary reductions, the 
Global Fund had informed the Ministry of Health that it could choose to 
top-up the salaries that were reduced if it perceived staff as being 
essential to the programme (Bampoe, 16 November 2011). A former 
senior manager from the PMU, however, argued that in making this 
request, “the Global Fund Secretariat demonstrated a significant 
ignorance of the how its grant operated in Namibia”: 
What Global Fund told the Ministry is, this is what we can afford 
in terms of salaries; you top them up. The Ministry, of course, 
cannot top up salaries if the positions are not on the Staff 
Establishment. They cannot go to the Ministry of Finance; please 
give me money for this and this position because the Ministry of 
Finance will say: where is this position on the staff establishment? 
Where is the approval of the public service commission (Global 
Fund Namibia PMU)? 
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In the end, despite protestations from the Ministry of Health, the Global 
Fund administrators in Geneva maintained that the salary cuts needed 
to be made.  
At the end of January 2012, Ministry of Health workers who had 
salaries paid with Global Fund support was informed that they would 
have their wages cut (Eldon-Edington, 2012). Following the salary 
reductions, there was anecdotal evidence from interview respondents that 
Ministry of Health started to lose health workers that had been financed 
with Global Fund money, at both the service delivery and programme 
management levels. Informal conversations with several individuals 
within the DSP who had their salaries paid for by the Global Fund also 
revealed that they had started to look for new jobs as they feared for the 
security of their employment.  
The salary reductions mandated by the Global Fund impacted all 
organisations that were associated with the Global Fund programme in 
Namibia. The Namibian media’s reports on the effects of the salary 
reductions, however, focused the reports on the implications that the pay 
cuts had on the PMU. According to an article in the daily newspaper, the 
Windhoek Observer, published on the 10th of March 2012, the salary 
survey found that Global Fund salaries were significantly higher when 
compared to 15 other public sector and development organisations 
working in the HIV and AIDS sectors in Namibia (Jaramito, 2012). The 
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salaries of the top management staff of the PMU, in particular, were 
reported as having been found to be "exorbitantly high" (Poolman, 2012).  
According to articles in two daily Namibian newspapers, on the 
15th of February 2012, the Minister sent an email to the Global Fund 
Chairperson Geneva, Simon Bland, asking that PMU individuals be 
retained at their high salaries (Jaramito, 2012; Nghidengwa, 2012). The 
letter apparently argued that the Global Fund programme in Namibia 
would collapse if the staff were not retained at their pre-established 
employment conditions (Poolman, 2012). According to the media reports, 
the Ministry of Health noted that by making the request for PMU 
salaries to be cut, the Global Fund had “ignored” an agreement that the 
Ministry of Health reached when the Global Fund Country Team visited 
Namibia in early November 2011 (Jaramito, 2012; Nghidengwa, 2012).  
Two days after the Ministry of Health had sent the letter 
requesting staff to be retained at salary levels before the pay cut 
mandate, the Minister of Health wrote an email to the Global Fund on 
the 17th of February 2012, which retracted the request he had made on 
the 15th of February. The Minister was quoted in a daily newspaper as 
saying that he had to withdraw his demand after he got a phone call from 
Geneva and was told that the Global Fund "would not release funds to 
Namibia if the Ministry did not correct the situation" of the salary levels 
(Jaramito, 2012).  
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On the 28th of February 2012, the senior managers for 
Administration, Operations, Finance and Monitoring and Evaluation 
(M&E) in the PMU were informed that they would have their contracts 
terminated by the 31st of March 2012 (Poolman, 2012). In line with the 
funding committed for the first phase of the RCC grant, most PMU staff 
had been hired on two-year contracts, which were due to end on the 30 of 
June 2012. Staff had expected their contracts to be renewed for another 
year, once the Global Fund fully committed to funding the first three 
years of the RCC. Due to these salary tensions, the top PMU positions 
were barely functioning during the time that interview data for this 
thesis was collected. On the 15th of March 2012, it was clear that the 
Finance and M&E Managers had left their posts with the PMU. They 
avoided working to the end of March by applying their remaining annual 
leave to the rest of the month. The Operations Manager had chosen to 
ignore the termination letter and had declared through the media that 
she would be taking the Ministry of Health to the Namibian Labour 
Court for breach of contract (Poolman, 2012). 
The Global Fund administrators in Geneva attributed the late and 
reduced disbursements to the Ministry of Health not adequately 
managing the funds. In particular, the Global Fund chastised the 
Ministry for paying workers salaries that were higher than deemed 
appropriate (Bampoe, 2011; Eldon-Edington, 2012; Masanhu, 2012). 
These were, however, the same salary levels that were paid during Round 
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2 of the grant, and the Global Fund had not raised any objections. In the 
letters exchanged between the Ministry of Health and the Geneva 
Secretariat, the Global Fund argued that it made the decision to reduce 
salaries because it was concerned about the sustainability of the capacity 
that it created in Namibia (Eldon-Edington, 2012).  
 
6.4 Initial Recruitment for PEPFAR  
 
At the start of its engagement with the Ministry of Health, CDC 
Namibia contracted a third-party human resources consultancy company 
called Potentia to recruit and manage health workers paid for with 
PEPFAR money (Department of Health and Human Services, Office of 
the Inspector General, 2013). According to a U.S Government audit of 
Potentia’s relationship with PEPFAR funds, the recruitment agency first 
entered into a 5-year cooperative agreement with CDC that started on 
the 1st of April 2006. Within the agreement, Potentia was defined as 
having four core functions in the Ministry of Health’s relationship with 
CDC (Office of the Inspector General, DHHS, 2013): 
1. Advertise for and recruit medical professionals, technical 
specialists, and administrative support personnel; 
2. Manage the payroll function for PEPFAR employees; 
3. And support human resources management 
 
Through the Ministry of Health’s contract with CDC, Potentia was 
a recipient of substantial amounts of PEPFAR funding in Namibia. In 
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2011, a U.S Government audit of CDC’s relationship with Potentia for the 
budget period 1st of April 2009 through 31st March 31, 2010, found that 
out of a total $39.5 million that CDC awarded to four recipients in 
Namibia (including the Ministry of Health), PEPFAR funds totalling 
$14,486,635 went to Potentia; more than 35% of the total PEPFAR 
budget allocated to Namibia through CDC (Office of the Inspector 
General, DHHS, 2013). Within the same year of this audit, the PEPFAR 
Country Operational Plan for 2011 justified the use of Potentia as 
existing to “fill a substantial human resource capacity gap within the 
Ministry of Health and within broader government civil service 
(PEPFAR, 2011a, p. 57).”  
This justification for the use of Potentia was corroborated by a 
respondent from CDC Namibia:  
It’s in 2006 that Potentia project was identified as the best practice 
for scaling up ART services rapidly. And so the reason that 
Potentia was brought on board was that there were human 
resources gaps. Simply put, there were too many vacancies in the 
field, and the government was unable to recruit and hire people 
fast enough to allow for the rapid scale-up of the ART services 
(CDC Namibia).  
Through their relationship with Potentia, CDC officials perceived 
themselves as providing human resources consulting support to the 
Ministry of Health. They maintained that the Ministry of Health made 
all the recruitment decisions financed by PEPFAR:  
The Ministry of Health to the greatest extent possible tells us what 
their needs are…We don’t go out and say, you need this there, you 
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need that there. They do their own mapping; they tell us where the 
gaps are…We develop the position description and give it to 
Potentia (CDC Namibia) 
 
Respondents from DSP, however, spoke of a relationship in which 
recruitment decisions were driven by CDC and Potentia: 
When CDC hires people who operate for the Ministry, they hire 
them through Potentia. CDC communicates to Potentia that a 
position is sought. Potentia advertised the posts and shortlisted the 
candidates who are sent to CDC for an interview. People were 
recruited by Potentia and funded by CDC, then worked for the DSP 
side within the ministry (Ministry of Health, DSP). 
PEPFAR representatives in Namibia considered the use of Potentia in 
Namibia as having been a successful strategy for the rapid scale-up of 
HIV and AIDS interventions in Namibia. Some respondents from DSP, 
were, however, sceptical. In particular, they raised concerns that the use 
of a third-party recruitment company had negative implications for the 
Ministry of Health’s ability to retain the human resources capacity 
created with PEPFAR support:  
When HIV and AIDS funding is being released, people become very 
innovative…they can divert some of the money to HR agencies, 
claiming that they will be more properly situated, instead of using 
government HR department. The thing is that the people coming 
through Potentia are not full-time staff. They are always on 
contract, and if the contract lapses, then they are gone (Multi-
Sector Response, DSP). 
These concerns around Potentia’s implications for a sustainable human 
resources capacity in Namibia were reflected in some of the incidences 
that occurred when the Ministry of Health was faced with a decline in 
 207 
financial support from PEPFAR.  
 
6.5 Eventual Alignment of PEPFAR HR Practices?  
 
The various health worker positions that were hired with PEPFAR 
money were defined in the Cooperative Agreements (CoAgs) between the 
Ministry of Health and PEPFAR. However, since the posts were not 
pegged to the Ministry's Staff Establishment, the employment conditions 
of PEPFAR-supported health workers were different from those of 
existing Ministry staff. During Phase 1, the doctors that were paid 
through the PEPFAR programme were paid higher net salaries than 
their Ministry of Health counterparts. In early 2011, when phase 2 of 
PEPFAR had been in operations for two years, the Ministry of Health 
made the decision to increase the salaries of all medical doctors on the 
government payroll. As described by respondents from the Ministry of 
Health, soon after the Government increased the salaries of doctors, 
PEPFAR administrators informed the Namibian Government that it 
would be phasing out funding from the country. The Government was 
told that the first cuts would be from the human resources budget that it 
had expected to receive until 2013. Namibia’s total budget for personnel 
would be reduced by 10% each year. 
As explained by a respondent from the DSP, Ministry of Health 
officials did not have a problem with PEPFAR choosing to reduce its total 
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spending in Namibia. The Ministry of Health found it problematic that 
when the PEPFAR administrators decided to start their reduction of 
funding to Namibia by first reducing the human resources budget, they 
did not consult the Ministry of Health or the Namibian Government. One 
respondent from the Multi-sector response division of DSP argued that by 
making the decision to reduce the HR budget without consulting the 
Ministry of Health, PEPFAR administrators prevented an opportunity for 
the Ministry of Health to define its priorities for health workers.   
According to a respondent from the PEPFAR Country 
Coordinator’s Office, the Government’s salary increase was one of the 
reasons that decision was made to cut the human resources budget for 
Namibia: 
One of the reasons why this piece (HR reduction) started to get 
triggered is that about a year and a half ago, the government 
increased medical officer salaries by an amount that we could not 
keep up. And before that we had been keeping up, keeping pace, 
but our finances and resources aren't getting increased any longer 
so we can’t keep increasing the salaries (PEPFAR U.S Government 
employee, Namibia). 
 
The Respondent also explained that the intention to phase out U.S 
Government support from Namibia came about because there was a 
recognition among US lawmakers and US citizens that PEPFAR funding 
could not go into perpetuity. These funding stakeholders needed an 
indicator that there was an end-point to the funding. Another respondent 
from CDC further argued that as gatekeepers of the money provided by 
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U.S taxpayers, it was up to PEPFAR administrators to make the decision 
on how they would carry out the decrease in financial support to 
Namibia. The respondent from CDC Namibia also argued that by making 
the decision to reduce the human resources first without consulting the 
Ministry of Health, they were enabling the Namibian Government to 
quickly figure out how to fill the inevitable gap in human resources 
funding that would come from a total reduction of PEPFAR money 
allocated to Namibia.  
 
6.6 Ministry of Health Response to GHI Practices  
 
Concerning human resources for Global Fund and PEPFAR 
supported interventions, DSP had, for the most part, worked in isolation 
from the other divisions of the Ministry of Health. However, when the 
Ministry of Health faced decreases in funding from both initiatives, the 
onus was placed on the Human Resources Division within the Policy, 
Planning and Human Resources Development Directorate (PPHRD) of 
the Ministry to manage the absorption of health workers. A senior 
manager within with the Policy Planning Division argued that this meant 
that the HR reductions made by the Global Fund and PEPFAR 
represented an organisational challenge more than a financial one.  
To address the human resources implications of the expected 
decline in funding from the two initiatives, the Ministry of Health 
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established a Human Resources for Health Taskforce (HRH) in 2011. The 
Taskforce consisted of representatives from the Ministry of Health and 
donor agencies. It was tasked with overseeing the transition of human 
resources from being donor-funded to becoming funded by the 
Government by fiscal year 2014/15 (Ndaitwa, 2012; PEPFAR, 2011). 
Various respondents, however, pointed out that the human resources 
strategy only came about after PEPFAR informed the Government 
funding to Namibia would be reduced.  
Before the Ministry of Health faced decreases in funding for 
personnel by PEPFAR and the Global Fund, there was an opportunity for 
the country to reflect on the long-term and potentially harmful 
implications of hiring health workers through donor-specific structures 
and procedures.  In 2007, the Namibian Government, under the direction 
of Ministry of Labour, introduced a Labour Act, which prohibited the use 
of third-party contracting companies, such as Potentia, in Namibia 
(Government of the Republic of Namibia, 2007). Soon after the 2007 
Labour Act was enacted, Section 128 (which prohibited the use of third-
party recruitment) was challenged in the Namibian High Court by a 
human resources management company – similar to Potentia – called 
African Personnel Services (APS). APS argued that the ban on third-
party recruitment agencies infringed on its right to carry on a trade, as 
enshrined in Article 21 of the Namibian Constitution (Horn and 
Kangueehi, 2009). The High Court upheld the labour ban (Jauch, 2008). 
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According to articles in the national media, the introduction of the 
2007 Labour Act led to nearly 1,500 positions in the Ministry of Health 
becoming illegal because they were hired through Potentia (Maletsky, 
2009). In 2012, following an appeal by APS to the Namibian Supreme 
Court, the Government elaborated on its original prohibition by 
explaining that individuals recruited through third-party companies 
“have the same rights as any other employee” directly hired by a 
contracting company (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 2012). 
When the amendment to the 2007 Labour Law was enacted in 2012, an 
article in a daily national newspaper, The Namibian, reported that the 
new rule led to a discussion between the Ministry of Health and the 
Ministry of Labour to address the issue of Potentia (Sasman, 2009). The 
Acting Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Health at the time was 
quoted saying that Potentia was a "technicality" that needed to be sorted 
out between the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Health. 
According to the article, the Permanent Secretary would not say if the 
Ministry continued to hire and manage health workers through Potentia 
– which would be illegal according to the Government’s rules (Sasman, 
2009).  
Rather than using the discussions around the 2007 Labour Act to 
plan for the exit of the Global Fund and PEPFAR both for legal and 
operational reasons, the Ministry appears to have waited until it faced an 
actual decline in funding from the two initiatives. According to PEPFAR 
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documents, the U.S Government worked together with the Namibian 
Government to develop a human resources inventory system (PEPFAR, 
2011; PEPFAR Namibia, 2012). These posts were then matched to 
existing vacancies within the Ministry of Health and other line 
Ministries. In October 2011, the Ministry of Health committed to 
financing all medical officers that had been previously funded through 
PEPFAR by early 2012 (PEPFAR Namibia, 2012). By March 2012, the 
HRH Taskforce had only transitioned 41 medical doctors that had been 
previously funded by either Global Fund or PEPFAR (Ndaitwa, 2012). 
According to respondents, the medical doctors were the only ones 
transitioned because they were deemed most critical to HIV and AIDS 
interventions in Namibia.  
 
6.7 Summary   
 
This chapter shows that before the arrival of support from the two 
initiatives, Ministry of Health workers was primarily hired based on a 
list of pre-approved positions placed on the Staff Establishment. All the 
posts on the list are approved by the Namibian Cabinet and the 
Namibian Government's Civil Service Commission. At the start of the 
Ministry of Health’s relationship with the Global Fund and PEPFAR, 
however, workers associated with the two initiatives were not hired as 
part of the Staff Establishment that existed in the early 2000s. They were 
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identified by a category called in addition to Staff Establishment, which 
did not require approval by the Namibian Cabinet.  
The creation of three different groups of workers, all working for 
the Ministry of Health, ended up creating challenges for the Ministry 
when it was faced with a decline in funding from both the Global Fund 
and PEPFAR. Chapter six has shown that although Global Fund and 
PEPFAR support increased the Ministry of Health's health worker 
capacity, this was done on an ad-hoc basis. The capacity was not 
increased as part of a long-term human resources plan. The findings 
described in this chapter show that the human resources practices of the 
Global Fund and PEPFAR for the Ministry of Health did not encourage or 
promote country ownership. The findings also show, however, that in the 
process of seeking to decrease funding to Namibia, both initiatives placed 
the onus on the Ministry of Health to figure out how to address the 
complications created by their parallel HR structures. 
Even though there was a legitimate deficiency in the human 
resources capacity and recruitment capacity in the Ministry of Health, 
more effort could have been spent on initially increasing both the health 
worker recruitment and management capacity of the Ministry. The 
parallel human resources management procedures were tenable when the 
Ministry of Health was a recipient of substantial funding from the Global 
Fund and PEPFAR. In the face of declining funding from both the Global 
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Fund and PEPFAR, the increased human resources capacity, however, 
became threatened.   
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7. Civil Society Engagement 
7.1 Introduction  
 
In Namibia, the rise of funding from the Global Fund was 
perceived by national stakeholders as having facilitated the wider 
involvement of civil society organisations (CSOs) in deciding on and 
implementing HIV and AIDS interventions in the country. This chapter 
examines the extent to which the Ministry of Health's engagement with 
civil society organisations in Namibia was influenced by Global Fund 
grants to the country. Through mandating that proposals are submitted, 
and funding is managed through a Country Coordinating Mechanism 
(CCM), the Global Fund provided a platform for a wide-range of 
stakeholders to come together in planning for HIV and AIDS, TB and 
Malaria interventions in Namibia. As a Principal Recipient (PR) to both 
the Round 2 and Rolling Continuation Channel (RCC) for the HIV and 
AIDS grant and as the Secretariat to the PMU, the Ministry of Health's 
relationship to CSOs in Namibia had high potential to influenced by 
Global Fund grants.  
As perceived by several respondents associated with the Global 
Fund programme in Namibia, the initiative created funding 
relationships, which were not backed up by efforts to ensure that funding 
and interventions would be sustainable in the event of donor exit. As told 
by respondents in Namibia, the Namibian Network of AIDS Services 
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Organisations (NANASO) was one of the organisations most negatively 
impacted by the deteriorating relationship between the Ministry of 
Health and the Global Fund. As with financial flows and human 
resources for the Global Fund and PEPFAR in Namibia, chapter seven 
shows the Global Fund facilitated an increase in civil society capacity 
that was of a temporary nature. The CCM limited the coordination 
authority of the Ministry of Health.  
 
7.2 The Ministry of Health and multi-sector HIV and 
AIDS coordination 
 
When Global Fund support arrived in Namibia, the Government's 
policy for HIV and AIDS recognised civil society engagement as crucial to 
effective interventions (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 2008; 
MoHSS: DSP, 2008). The Government, however, did not, have a 
particular mechanism for funding civil society organisations to engage in 
the implementation of HIV and AIDS services. As described in chapter 
four, the NSF is Namibia's main policy framework for a multi-sector 
response to HIV and AIDS. Through coordination structures at the 
national, regional, sector and community levels, the NSF positions the 
Ministry of Health as the agency primarily responsible for coordinating 
the multi-sector response to HIV and AIDS.  
From its Secretariat in the Directorate of Special Programmes 
(DSP), the National AIDS Executive Committee (NAEC) is mandated to 
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provide technical leadership for HIV and AIDS interventions in Namibia 
for the NSF (MoHSS: DSP, 2010). NAEC is described in the NSF policy 
document as seeking to contribute to the national response through 
facilitating programme development and planning; coordination of 
capacity-building; partnership strengthening and management of 
strategic information, among other functions. NAEC membership is 
primarily meant to consist of people directly involved with HIV and AIDS 
programme planning and implementation in the country. These include 
the Permanent Secretaries from all 16 sector-specific Namibian 
Government ministries, key officials from development partner agencies, 
as well civil society and private sector companies and organisation 
(MoHSS: DSP, 2010, p. 87). With the DSP as the lead coordinator within 
the Ministry of Health, NAEC is identified as the key technical body for 
engaging with all the other HIV and AIDS coordination structures 
(Figure 7.1). 
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Chapters two and four showed that although the Global Fund’s 
country partnerships are mainly with a limited number of agencies, 
which serve the role of PR, its guidelines strictly require that the 
application for and management of its grants should involve multiple 
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stakeholders from a broad range of organisations. To apply for the Global 
Fund Round 2 grant, the Ministry of Health, as the Principal Recipient 
(PR), brought together several civil society organisations to be applicants 
for the Country Coordinated Proposal (CCP). Within the Round 2 
application for funding, the Ministry of Health was designated to focus on 
the biomedical components of the interventions. Civil society 
organisations were appointed to focus on the behavioural elements of the 
Global Fund-supported HIV and AIDS interventions (NaCCATuM, 2009; 
The Global Fund Office of the Inspector General, 2012). 
 In the proposal for Round 2 funding from the Global Fund, the 
Namibian applicants had identified NAEC to take on the role of the CCM. 
However, according to former Ministry of Health employee who was 
involved in the proposal for Round 2 funding, Namibia's plan to have 
NAEC take on the role of the CCM was rejected by the Global Fund. 
Namibia then established a CCM, which it called the Namibia 
Coordinating Committee for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 
(NaCCATuM).  The general operational structure of NaCCATuM was 
formed to mirror the structure of the CCM as defined by the Global Fund 
Guidelines (NaCCATuM, 2009; The Global Fund, 2013b, 2011a).  
In Namibia, the exact members of the CCM have changed of over 
the lifetime of Global Fund operations in Namibia, but they have for the 
most proportionally represent the same type of organisations. As table 7.1 
shows, the members of the Namibian CCM can be grouped into four main 
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categories: government agencies, civil society, international development 
institutions, and private entities (The Global Fund Office of the Inspector 
General, 2012).  
Table 7-1 NaCCATuM Members Round 2 Grant 
Type of Agency Total in Quantity 
Academic 1 
Government 13 
Umbrella NGO 5 
PLWHV 2 
People representing key populations 1 
Private sector 3 
Faith-based organizations 1 
Multilateral and bilateral partners 5 
 
Once Namibia established NaCCATuM, the country still 
envisioned it would operate in a way that aligned with existing multi-
sector coordination structures such as NAEC. Within the NSF, 
Specialized Committees (such as the CCM) are meant to report to the 
NAEC, which in turn is expected to report to the Namibian Cabinet 
through the NAC (Figure 7.1) (MoHSS: DSP, 2010, p. 90). In line with the 
NSF, Global Fund stakeholders in Namibia also expected that the 
Ministry of Health would continue to be the lead agency in coordinating 
the country. Several members of NaCCATuM interviewed for this 
research, however, indicated that the CCM operated separately from 
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existing coordination structures and rarely discussed issues that were not 
directly related to the Global Fund. Respondents also reported that when 
the CCM did serve as a platform for country ownership and alignment, 
this was primarily limited to its role as existing to coordinate Global 
Fund grants.  
In relation to the Ministry of Health’s potential role as the 
potential coordinator of Namibian CCM, the Global Fund also set out 
specific guidelines, which made it difficult for the Ministry to chair 
NaCCATuM (The Global Fund, 2011). Thus respondents explained that 
one of the issues that defined the operations of the CCM in Namibia was 
an ongoing concern around conflict of interest in the function of 
NaCCATuM. During the early stages of the proposal for and 
implementation of the Round 2 grant, the Ministry of Health served as 
both the Secretariat and the Chair of NaCCATuM (The Global Fund 
Office of the Inspector General, 2012). However, according to several 
members of NaCCATuM, during Round 2, the Global Fund in Geneva 
frequently raised concerns that it was inappropriate for the Ministry of 
Health to be the Chair of the CCM. The Ministry of Health's role was 
perceived as going against the Global Fund's policy on "conflict of 
interest" in the running and management of CCMs (MoHSS, 2007; The 
Global Fund, 2013b).  
The CCM is the body through which the application process for 
grants is meant to be coordinated, yet it is also the oversight body that is 
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supposed to ensure that approved grants are being implemented and 
managed according to the grant requirements defined by the Global Fund 
(The Global Fund, 2013b). In explaining the Ministry of Health's 
potential for conflict of interest over Global Fund grants, this is how one 
Government member of NaCCATuM described the Ministry’s risk of 
conflict of interest in its role as Chair of the CCM: 
 We had a situation that the PR of the fund, which was the 
Ministry of Health, was also the one which was chairing 
NaCCATuM. Now you cannot be making the laws and also policing 
the laws yourself and the implementation, so that was also where 
the conflict of interest came in (Government member, 
NaCCATuM). 
 
In October 2007, NaCCATuM held a workshop, which dealt with 
the issues of conflict of the Ministry's position as chair (MoHSS, 2007). 
According to the minutes from the Workshop, the majority of the 
members were not participating in deliberations of the scheduled 
meetings. There were questions around whether any of the decisions 
taken during NaCCATuM meetings were through consensus or were 
merely imposed individual decisions and whether the different 
constituencies were represented by their members (NACCATUM 
Workshop, 2007). Various NACCATUM members interviewed for this 
thesis indicated that representatives from the Ministry of Health and 
international funding agencies often drove the deliberations.  
The decision was reached at the workshop that, as the PR to the 
Global Fund grant, the Ministry of Health could no longer legitimately 
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serve as the Chair of the CCM. It was agreed, however, that the Ministry 
of Health could remain the director of NaCCATuM until the country 
successfully applied for another Global Fund grant (MoHSS, 2007). In 
2009, the CCM underwent a reform process, which resulted in the 
development of a constitution and governance policies. The CCM 
composition was reviewed and subcommittees re-defined. The 2009 
formal constitution and governance policies provided for the role of Chair 
to rotate every two years amongst CCM members (The Global Fund 
Office of the Inspector General, 2012). As part of the reform process, the 
NaCCATuM Secretariat was moved from DSP to the Polytechnic of 
Namibia through an outsourcing agreement. As a result of the transfer, 
the NaCCATuM Secretariat relied on the Polytechnic's financial 
management systems, which already had institutional controls. The 
NaCCATuM chairmanship was also moved from the Ministry of Health to 
the National Planning Commission, which was not involved in grant 
implementation (Global Fund Audit, 2011). In early 2012, the National 
Planning Commission (NPC) was the chair of NaCCATuM (The Global 
Fund, 2011c).  
A member of NaCCATuM interviewed for this research, however, 
pointed out that taking away the chairing power of the Ministry of Health 
was in fact pointless. The Ministry of Health was essentially still the 
agency with the highest authority over the Global Fund Grant in 
Namibia. The respondents argued that even if the Secretariat of the CCM 
 224 
and the position of Chair might sound "theoretically different" from the 
Ministry of Health, in the end, it was still the DSP that decided on all 
Global Fund grant issues. As perceived by several respondents, the CCM 
had some power over the Global Fund grant but did not ultimately have 
autonomy from the Ministry of Health or have its "own powers with 
teeth" (Government member, NaCCATuM).  
 
7.3 Missed Opportunity for Strengthening NAEC? 
 
As seen by a wide variety of respondents, Global Fund grants 
encouraged multi-sector consultation on the HIV and AIDS response in 
Namibia. Many of these same individuals, however, expressed concerns 
that this has sometimes happened at the expense of a more 
comprehensive health sector and development approach: 
We have thousands of working groups and technical advisory 
committees and task forces around HIV/AIDS. Steering committee 
for TB, but there is no instrument for looking into the broader 
health sector and then seeing whether we are not working against 
each other, that we collaborate to move forward (Multilateral 
organisation, NaCCATuM member). 
 
As perceived by some members of NaCCATuM, the creation of this new 
coordination body exacerbated a general lack of coherence that already 
existed within the Namibian health sector between different groups all 
seeking to address HIV and AID.  
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Regarding the operations of NACCATUM, there were three major 
concerns that its various members expressed on its potential and 
shortfalls in effectiveness: 
1. Many members are recipients of Global Fund resources, so they do 
not have the distance required to reflect on the issues genuinely 
2. Members are very busy and often do not regularly attend meetings, 
which creates a discontinuity in discussions 
3. NACCATUM is just a committee, which was mainly formed to 
oversee the submission of Global Fund proposals, and therefore 
does not have the power to enforce anything even if it relates to 
health system harmonisation or alignment 
 
Various NACCATUM members also reflected on the fact that even when 
it does serve as a platform for country alignment, this is very limited to 
the proposal phase. The rest of the time members view themselves as 
being focused on management issues related to the Global Fund. 
Although the existence of NaCCATuM was seen as problematic for 
confusing the coordination of Namibia’s multi-sector response to HIV and 
AIDS, a similar structure that pre-dated it was not necessarily perceived 
to be more efficient.  
A respondent from a multilateral organisation in Namibia, who was 
also an individual member of both NAEC and NaCCATuM reflected that 
if one was to go on NSF policy alone, NAEC could realistically be 
considered as being able to serve the role of the Global Fund CCM. The 
respondent argued that this would have done away with the need to 
establish NaCCATuM. The respondent from UNAIDS, however, then 
goes on to add that if NaCCATuM met as infrequently as NAEC did, then 
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the Global Fund-supported program would have collapsed. In the 
respondent’s estimation, the CCM became “the only fully functional 
coordination structure that is in place to date" in Namibia. The issue of 
NAEC meetings not happening as frequently as they were mandated by 
Government policy was brought up by several of its members: 
NAEC is supposed to meet at least four times per year, in two 
years’ time, we had one meeting, which was this year…in the 
absence of regular NAEC meetings, overall national coordination of 
activities is then non-existent (Government member, NAEC and 
NaCCATuM). 
 
Several respondents who were NAEC members also pointed out 
that when NAEC meetings did occur, high-level policy-making officials 
rarely attended. I observed this low attendance of the principal policy 
officials when I attended an NAEC meeting on the 28th of March 2012. 
According to the guidelines in the NSF policy, NAEC meetings are 
supposed to consist of a broad range of government and non-government 
stakeholders. Each Ministry is meant to be represented by a Permanent 
Secretary (PS) (who is the administrative head of each line ministry) and 
an HIV focal person (MoHSS: DSP, 2010).  
 At the NAEC meeting that I attended, only 3 out of the 15 
Permanent Secretaries were present. One of these was the Permanent 
Secretary for the Ministry of Health, which served as both the Secretariat 
of NAEC and the Chair of NAEC meetings. As pointed out by one of the 
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organiser’s of the NAEC meeting meetings only have the potential for 
impact if the high-level officials came: 
Policy changes will occur when a high-ranking official understands 
why a particular action is important. Their understanding then 
makes it easier for the focal person to execute decisions with full 
agreement from the senior staff member. The person who attends 
is otherwise left constantly trying to justify the smallest 
interventions because those at the highest level within a particular 
ministry do not understand the HIV and AIDS within the context 
of larger national issues (Ministry of Health, DSP). 
 
Several respondents also attributed the perceived ineffectiveness of 
NAEC to the fact that it was coordinated from the DSP in the Ministry of 
Health. A civil society member of both NAEC and NaCCATuM argued 
that coordinating the multi-sector response from the Ministry of Health 
perpetuated the illusion that "health should be the issue of the Ministry 
of Health alone". Along the same lines, a member of NAEC through the 
Ministry of Education attributed the lack of attendance by Permanent 
Secretaries from other Ministries to the fact that the PS of the Ministry of 
Health was the Chair of NAEC.  
Concerns regarding the role of the Ministry in coordinating 
Namibia’s HIV and AIDS response were also expressed in the country’s 
RCC proposal (NaCCATuM, 2009). The proposal noted that the Office of 
the Prime Minister had an HIV and AIDS unit, and this fact could be 
viewed as demonstrating the Namibian Government's strong political 
support for addressing HIV and AIDS. The proposal noted, however, 
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there was not enough political will in the country for HIV and AIDS to be 
treated as an issue that goes beyond health (NaCCATuM, 2009, p. 4):  
 There is no Cabinet-level accountability mechanism for ensuring 
and monitoring line ministry budget allocation and implementation 
of sectorial activities in support of the national response to HIV and 
AIDS. Except for the Minister for Health and Social Services, there 
is limited sustained and visible high-level political leadership for the 
national response to HIV and AIDS and limited engagement with 
people living with HIV to counter high levels of stigma and 
discrimination.  
 
The question around what agency should coordinate the national 
HIV and AIDS response in Namibia, however, solicited different opinions 
amongst the interview respondents. For the most part, respondents who 
represented international organisations such as the United Nations, 
PEPFAR and the Global Fund strongly argued against multi-sector 
coordination of the HIV and AIDS response being led by the Ministry of 
Health. At a donor coordination meeting aimed at addressing the 
transition of Global Fund and PEPFAR, which I attended, one participant 
from an international development agency operating in Namibia argued 
that multi-sector coordination of HIV and AIDS in Namibia might be 
better placed with another national authority, which was not the 
Ministry of Health. The individual who raised this issue argued that 
coordination by a separate agency, rather than the one mandated to 
address health, had been shown to work well in other countries. 
The Director of the DSP who was in attendance at the donor 
coordination meeting responded to this statement by saying, "Namibia is 
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not other countries. It [The Ministry of Health] has been given the 
mandate by the Namibian Government to spearhead the entire national 
response to HIV and AIDS, and that is where it will remain". In speaking 
about the role that the Ministry of Health has played in the response 
during Global Fund support, a respondent from the HIV and AIDS 
Health Sector Response division of DSP, however, admitted that the 
Ministry of Health had not done a good job of coordinating other 
stakeholders. As explained by respondents from the Resource 
Mobilisation and Donor Coordination (RM&DC) of DSP, it was the 
Ministry of Health, which sought out the various CSOs that were 
eventually applicants to the Round 2 and RCC grants, as well as those 
that eventually became members of NaCCATuM.  
 
7.4 NANASO: Questions of CSO Sustainability?  
 
NANASO was established in September 1991, following the 
independence of Namibia in 1990. A senior manager at NANASO, who 
was interviewed for this study, explained its establishment in the 
following way. Between 1986 and when the country gained independence 
in 1990, a variety of civil society organisations and various stakeholders, 
including the Namibian Government, had been working on addressing 
HIV and AIDS independently. After Namibia’s independence, some of 
these stakeholders decided that there was a need to develop a civil society 
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grouping, which would be “a common platform, common body, which can 
represent, advocate, facilitate and coordinate” on behalf of the civil 
society actors. Hence, NANASO was established. 
NANASO’s relationship with the Global Fund started in 2005 
when the organisation was first added as a sub-recipient (SR) for Round 2 
funding under the Ministry of Health as the PR (NaCCATuM, 2009). As 
described in chapter three, NANASO was then added as a second PR to 
Namibia’s successful application for Round 2 RCC funding. According to 
several respondents involved in the RCC proposal, the process was 
different from the Round 2 funding application in two main ways. First, 
Namibia treated it like a continuation of Round 2 activities. Second, the 
RCC application did not "include wide-ranging consultations" between 
HIV and AIDS stakeholders in Namibia, as was the case in the proposal 
for Round 2 funding. The RCC work plan identified civil society 
organisations as being critical to the HIV and AIDS response particularly 
for community-based health care and People Living with HIV (PLHIV) 
and identified NANASO as PR to meet this goal (NaCCATuM, 2009, p. 
12).  
As described by various respondents, however, NANASO’s 
relationship with Global Fund money under the RCC was not a smooth 
one. First of all, although the RCC grant was supposed to start in 
January 2010, NANASO did not receive its first disbursement until 
November 2010 (The Global Fund Office of the Inspector General, 2012). 
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The delays in payments to NANASO were due in part to the protracted 
grant negotiations, which also caused late disbursements to the Ministry 
of Health, as discussed in Chapter Five of this thesis. As part of its 
inclusion as a Global Fund PR, the staffing structure of NANASO was 
amended to include 11 new positions associated with administering the 
RCC grant (NaCCATuM, 2009). As explained within the RCC application, 
the justification for changing NANASO's staffing structure was to enable 
it to be better equipped to manage the Global Fund grant.  
According to the NANASO website, in 2013, the primary function 
of the organisation was to serve as an umbrella body for NGOs, CBOs 
and other agencies involved in providing HIV/AIDS services in Namibia, 
through four main activities (NANASO 2013): 
1. Network and coordinate HIV/AIDS activities 
2. Build capacity and facilitate capacity building within civil society 
3. Communicate with various members on any issues and policies 
related to HIV/AIDS  
4. Advocate on behalf of its members and be their voice on issues to 
which they want to call attention  
 
By including NANASO as a PR in the RCC proposal for HIV and 
AIDS, the Namibian applicants sought to expand the organisation’s 
activities so that it could also be involved in managing the 
implementation of HIV and AIDS interventions (NaCCATuM, 2009). 
Within the RCC proposal, NANASO was described as seeing its "grant 
management role as complementary to its network support role." The 
proposal further added that "NANASO's real strength lies in its 
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convening capacity, being able to bring disparate and often competing 
organisations together to discuss issues and to assist in putting groups in 
touch with each other through its extensive network of affiliates" 
(NaCCATuM, 2009, p. 4.9.1).  
The Audit of Namibia's RCC grant in 2011, however, reflected 
concerns that NANASO became too dependent on Global Fund resources, 
at the potential detriment of the sustainability of the organisation and its 
interventions (The Global Fund Office of the Inspector General, 2012). 
During RCC, 90% of NANASO's operational funds came from the Global 
Fund, while several other organisations had more than 50% of their 
operations financed by the grant:  
Dependency on a single funding source places significant pressure 
and risk on Global Fund resources and brings into question the 
sustainability of these organisations and the activities they 
implement (The Global Fund Office of the Inspector General, 2012, 
p. 18).  
 
Respondents from NANASO recognised that the agency's relationship 
with the Global Fund had put it in a position where it had to reduce some 
of its networking and training activities: 
When NANASO was a sub-recipient for example, we were doing all 
our programs, advocacy, networking, even from the Global Fund 
budget. What Global Fund did was that some of these items were 
cut, when we became a PR… We are supposed to increase rather 
than decrease. For example, we can only cater for maybe five 
training, compared to 20 or 30 pieces of training, which are needed. 
Some of the 13 regions are not getting appropriate civil society 
training to reflect their local conditions and needs (Global Fund 
Namibia PR, NANASO)  
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The Global Fund Audit on the Namibia RCC grant in 2011 also 
found NANASO to have mismanaged money. NANASO was found to be 
unable to account for almost US$300,000 of its RCC grant (The Global 
Fund Office of the Inspector General, 2012).  Regarding its role as local 
guarantor of the activities of other CSOs, the audit found NANASO to 
have weak governance and oversight structures. The audit report noted 
that these inefficient structures resulted in expenditures that were not 
adequately supported; expenditures made outside the approved work 
plan; and incomplete financial records. The Audit report also 
recommended that NANASO should pay back the money for which the it 
could not account (The Global Fund Office of the Inspector General, 2012, 
p. 14). 
As a result of the programme-wide salary reductions discussed in 
Chapter six, all of NANASO’s sub-recipients ended up owing money to 
the Global Fund. In the early months of 2012, there was a lot of 
uncertainty around whether CSOs in Namibia had to pay back money to 
the Global Fund or not. As explained by several respondents from the 
organisations that were impacted by salary deductions, NANASO had 
informed recipients in January 2012 that the Global Fund had mandated 
that they all make cuts to the salaries funded under the RCC grant. Once 
the CSOs had implemented the cuts, they were then informed by 
NANASO that it had made a mistake in asking them to reduce the 
salaries as from January 2012: 
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We immediately implemented the 49, 48, 50 percent pay cuts. Our 
staff just continued to work until we learned three weeks ago that 
apparently the salary cut was not meant to be affected 
immediately…Well, we understood that pay cuts were with 
immediate effect. But then it was again changed that it was not 
supposed to be implemented quickly (Global Fund CSO recipient, 
NAEC and NaCCATuM member). 
 
In reflecting on the expectation that sub-recipients would be 
required to pay back the Global Fund, a respondent from one of 
NANASO’s sub-recipients rhetorically and incredulously asked: “Were we 
supposed to have been prescient and expected there to be a 50% cut and 
therefore only pay 50% of what we have?” According to a respondent from 
NANASO who was involved in the overall administration of the grants, if 
the Global Fund did require CSOs in Namibia to pay back the money paid 
for salaries, very few of them would be able to pay back the money owed. 
If they did somehow manage to pay the money back, they would then not 
survive to carry out their functions as they did before the RCC grant. Due 
to the money that CSOs owed or potentially owed, there were concerns 
among Global Fund stakeholders in Namibia that even though the Global 
Fund’s support had facilitated an increase in access to services, it also 
potentially undermined future CSO efforts to address HIV and AIDS.  
A representative of the PEPFAR initiative in Namibia, however, 
argued that it was not necessarily the donors who were to blame for the 
situation in which the Namibian CSOs found themselves. The respondent 
argued that the substantial amount of money that was made available 
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from the Global Fund to organisations in Namibia made them 
complacent. Also reflecting on the same issue around the perverse 
incentives created by GHI funding, a respondent from the PMU, criticised 
the Global Fund for making money available, but not carrying adequate 
due diligence to ensure that the CSO recipients could sustain efforts.  
Respondents from DSP indicated that the Ministry of Health 
primarily included CSOs in the application and implementation of the 
Global Fund grants because that was what was required for the country 
to submit a successful grant. As described by the individuals within the 
DSP, there is a strict requirement that they keep detailed lists of all the 
stakeholders that have participated in the consultation process. As 
explained by a respondent from DSP, the broad stakeholder engagement 
of the various actors often functioned more like a "box-ticking" exercise. 
The decision to add NANASO as a PR was made at a NaCCATuM 
meeting held on the 1st of February 2007. The minutes from the meeting 
noted that the Global Fund had a new policy that a country submitting a 
CCP with only one PR would be disqualified (NaCCATuM, 2007). 
NANASO was therefore added as a second PR to Namibia’s proposals, 
following a requirement by the Global Fund.  
As perceived by several respondents from CSOs that addressed 
HIV and AIDS in Namibia, the potential negative impacts of a decline in 
the Global Fund money were exacerbated by the fact that their 
organisations did not have access to alternative sources of national 
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funding. Since the Government had more reliable access to finance, the 
various Global Fund CSO recipients were looking to it to fill the funding 
gaps that would be left by the phase-out of Global Fund resources. A 
respondent from the DSP perceived the challenge created by the potential 
exit of donor funding as an opportunity for the Namibian Government to 
more strategically engage with CSOs: 
HIV and AIDS are just becoming a chronic disease like any other. 
It, therefore, needs to be addressed in a manner that goes beyond 
treatment and looks at things like the fact that people on 
treatment require things like food and water…So, I am hoping that 
at least we can sell the idea that we should improve funding civil 
society, which is the backbone of the health response… they are 
the link between the health sector person and the community 
(Ministry of Health, DSP). 
 
However, when it was approached for support, the Ministry of 
Health informed CSOs that it had no intentions to fund them directly. As 
perceived by CSO respondents in Namibia, the Ministry of Health had 
fallen short of its mandate as the primary coordinator of the country's 
multi-sector response to HIV and AIDS. Even though the Namibian 
Government has committed – through the NSF – to assisting other 
stakeholders to mobilise sustainable funding resources, it did not step in 
to financially support CSOs that were threatened with a decline in Global 
Fund support. 
Respondents from the Ministry of Health argued that it would not 
fund CSO because the Namibian Government did not have an existing 
budget mechanism of financing them. These sentiments were expressed 
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by the Permanent Secretary (PS) of the Ministry of Health at the NAEC 
meeting on the 28th of March 2012. As explained by the PS, the Ministry 
would continue to ask civil society organisations to engage in both health 
sector and multi-sector planning and implementation, "but there are 
currently no plans in place for the Ministry to provide money to civil 
society". When asked to respond to the Ministry of Health's position that 
there is no budget mechanism to fund CSOs, a respondent from NANASO 
criticised the Namibian Government for failing to learn from other 
countries:   
The Government has been telling civil society that there is no 
mechanism to fund civil society... The same government is living in 
the same global village where other governments are funding civil 
society. What is so difficult for them to go and learn what others 
are doing? (Global Fund Namibia PR, NANASO)  
 
Another respondent from a CSO that was not a recipient of Global Fund 
money, however, argued that the decrease in donor support and its 
potentially undermining health system impacts were not necessarily a 
bad thing for Namibia. The respondent argued that the transition from 
donor support could be viewed as either "an opportunity for country 
ownership or a crisis of health". 
 
7.5 Summary  
 
This chapter shows that when Namibia first applied for Global 
Fund support, the country was required to establish a CCM, which it 
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called NaCCATuM. By requiring the establishment of a Namibian CCM 
and requiring it to operate in a specific way, the Global Fund appears to 
have ended up constraining the Ministry of Health's role as the lead 
coordinator of Namibia's multi-sector response to HIV and AIDS. By 
requiring the establishment of a Namibian CCM, Global Fund support 
led to the duplication of existing Namibian multi-sector coordination 
structures. In contrast to NAEC meetings, respondents believed that 
Global Fund CCM (NaCCATuM) meetings occurred when they were 
supposed to and were attended by individuals with the ability to directly 
influence the implementation of the Global Fund programmes in 
Namibia. The establishment and operations of the CCM appear to have 
allowed for a temporary indication of country ownership.  
Several respondents attributed the ineffectiveness of NAEC to the 
role of the Ministry of Health as the Secretariat and Chair of proceedings. 
They argued that by having the Ministry of Health as the lead agency in 
the multi-sector response, HIV and AIDS became exclusively viewed as a 
health issue that did not motivate buy-in from other sectors. When 
Namibia faced a decline in financial support from the Global Fund, the 
same respondents who criticised the position of multi-sector coordination 
being with the Ministry were also the ones who expected the Namibian 
Government to step in and meet the financial gap that would be left. 
This chapter has also shown that the Global Fund created a 
demand for CSO funding in Namibia, which did not sufficiently take 
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sustainability into account. The Global Fund appears to have created a 
situation in which CSOs became engaged in providing HIV and AIDS 
services because the money was available, even though they did not 
necessarily possess the financial capacity to sustain interventions beyond 
donor support. The potential decline in Global Fund support not only 
threatened the interventions it had funded, but also the activities that 
Namibian CSOs had implemented before they became grant recipients.  
The case study of NANASO was presented to illustrate the 
dilemma, which Global Fund support created for CSO organisations in 
Namibia. NANASO was supposedly added as a PR under the RCC to 
facilitate greater impact of CSO in the country's response to HIV and 
AIDS. Interview and document data indicate that in becoming a PR, 
NANASO became too dependent on the Global Fund financial support. 
When Global Fund financial assistance to Namibia was threatened, the 
existence of NANASO also became threatened. Rather than building on 
its existing strengths, NANASO’s relationship with the Global Fund 
money appears to have undermined the organisation. 
As expressed by several respondents representing CSO recipients 
of Global Fund money in Namibia, the failure for the country to make 
provisions for the decline in donor support would potentially undermine 
the progress that had been achieved in the non-biomedical components of 
HIV and AIDS interventions. As long as there was Global Fund money in 
Namibia, the Ministry of Health and other stakeholders appear to have 
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held onto a fragile partnership. The Namibian Government has never had 
a budget mechanism that allows it to fund non-government organisations 
in the health sector. Thus even though civil society organisations have 
been critical to the success of the HIV and AIDS intervention, the 
relationship as defined under the Global Fund terms did not take 







Global health initiatives (GHIs) such as the Global Fund and 
PEPFAR have been criticised for distorting country ownership by 
planning and defining the strategies by which they seek to address the 
health issues. They have faced criticisms for duplicating health systems 
management and monitoring structures and procedures in recipient 
countries (Balabanova et al., 2010; Biesma et al., 2009; Druce and 
Dickinson, 2008b; Riddell, 2007; Walker, 2009). These country level 
practices of the Global Fund and PEPFAR have been criticised for being 
contradictory to the objectives of ownership and long-term health systems 
strengthening (Atun and Kazatchkine, 2009; Cailhol et al., 2013; Collins 
and Beyrer, 2013; Marten, 2015; Oomman et al., 2008). Global Fund and 
PEPFAR practices potentially undermine the ability of recipient country 
to sustain the health systems gains that they might achieve (Craveiro 
and Dussault, 2016b; Hanefeld and Musheke, 2009; Marten, 2015; 
Oomman et al., 2008; WHO Maximizing Positive Synergies Collaborative 
Group, 2009).  
Namibia was initially primarily eligible for funding from the 
Global Fund and PEPFAR due to the country's high HIV and AIDS 
prevalence. And it was considered a prime candidate for the financing 
from both GHIs when their focus was on funding countries to rapidly 
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scale-up their HIV and AIDS interventions. When it first started 
receiving financial support from both initiatives, the Namibia 
government was already providing free access to HIV and AIDS services 
and had a long-standing policy framework for addressing HIV and AIDS. 
With primary reference to the country's Ministry of Health, the thesis 
examined Namibia's relationship with the Global Fund and PEPFAR. 
Interview data for this thesis was collected between February 2012 
and June 2012 through a research placement with the Ministry of Health. 
During this time, a wide range of respondents indicated that financial 
support from the Global Fund and PEPFAR to Namibia was on the 
decline. With the transition as a cross-cutting theme throughout, a key 
focus of the thesis was to understand the ways in which the structures 
and procedures, which governed the Ministry of Health's relationship 
with the Global Fund and PEPFAR encouraged country ownership at 
both the rise and decline of GHI funding to the country.  
The results presented in chapters five, six and seven indicate that 
when the Global Fund and PEPFAR first started increasing funding to 
Namibia, both initiatives required the Ministry of Health to set up 
structures and procedures that primarily focused on meeting the rapid-
scale up priorities of the two initiatives. As described in chapter four, the 
Namibian Government policy has designated the Directorate of Special 
Programs (DSP) the responsibility to manage external financial flows for 
HIV and AIDS to the public sector (MoHSS, 2009, 2008c). The arrival of 
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Global Fund and PEPFAR funding was, however, associated with an 
establishment of administrative structures specifically aimed at the two 
initiatives. Chapter five shows that the Global Fund required the creation 
of a Programme Management Unit (PMU) in the Ministry of Health. 
While PEPFAR funding was channelled and managed through the 
structures of CDC Namibia (Office of the Inspector General, USAID, 
2011; The Global Fund, 2004; The Global Fund Office of the Inspector 
General, 2012). This thesis uses DSP's relationship with the PMU and 
CDC Namibia as a case study of the interactions of the Global Fund and 
PEPFAR and the Namibian health system and how they promote or 
undermine country ownership and institutional autonomy. 
This thesis contributes to the global health policy debates on how 
to best use support from GHI to address HIV and AIDS at the level of one 
country. It is concerned with evaluating the ability for countries to steer 
their HIV and AIDS program at the national level in their engagement 
with GHIs. This thesis seeks to contribute to emerging literature that 
aims to examine what might happen once GHIs depart (Amaya et al., 
2014; Dodd and Lane, 2010; Merson et al., 2012; Mills et al., 2010). Given 
the findings presented in the last three preceding chapters, this chapter 
draws together the various inter-related elements that this thesis has 
examined. These are HIV and AIDS global health initiatives; Namibian 
health system; country ownership; institutional autonomy; health 
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systems strengthening; financial flows; human resources management; 
government and civil society engagement. 
The results chapters show that the influences of Global Fund and 
PEPFAR on Ministry of Health ownership at the rise and fall of funding 
to Namibia reflect their institutional arrangements at the global level. In 
Namibia, parallel administrative structures appear to have been tenable 
as long as there was a continuous stream of money from the Global Fund 
and PEPFAR to prop them up. Thus, it is not necessarily the parallel 
structures themselves that are problematic (Amaya et al., 2014; 
Balabanova et al., 2010; Cohen, 2006; Druce and Dickinson, 2008b; 
Rasschaert et al., 2011). The findings presented in chapters five, six and 
seven indicate that parallel structures became problematic when the 
money used to establish and initially operate them began to diminish.  
The approach in this thesis, however, has its limitations in 
providing a comprehensive picture on the influence of external funding in 
Namibia. The relationship between international actors and recipients is 
also known to be subject to power dynamics (Buse and Harmer, 2004; 
Easterly, 2008; Riddell, 2007). The lack of power analysis is one of the 
limitations of this thesis. This lack of power analysis and other 




8.2 Country Ownership and Autonomy in Namibia 
 
At the national and the international level, the Namibian 
Government has committed itself to being the steward of the HIV and 
AIDS response in Namibia (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 
2008, 2004b; MoHSS, 2005). As presented in chapter four, three different 
Medium Term Plans for HIV/AIDS (MTPs) and the National strategic 
framework for HIV and AIDS response in Namibia, 2010/11-2015/16 
(NSF) defined the Government's strategy for HIV and AIDS (MoHSS: 
DSP, 2010, 2008b). In addition to setting the Namibian Government's 
policy for the country's HIV and AIDS response, the MTPs and the 
National Strategic Framework for HIV and AIDS (NSF) also define the 
implementation structures and muti-sector coordination framework of the 
country's response. The MTPs and the NSF both designate the Ministry 
of Health the stewardship role of overseeing both the health sector and 
multi-sector response efforts to address HIV and AIDS (Government of 
the Republic of Namibia, 2004; MoHSS: DSP, 2010, 2008b). The 
Namibian Government was already providing a limited amount of free 
access to HIV and AIDS treatments before it began to receive financial 
support from the Global Fund and PEPFAR (MoHSS et al., 2010).  
This thesis has shown that the Ministry of Health changed its 
existing operations to accommodate Global Fund and PEPFAR funding. 
The extent of adaptation is reflected in the events that occurred when the 
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country faced a decrease in the financing from the two initiatives. At the 
same time as the Ministry of Health incurred a decrease in financial 
support to address HIV and AIDS, it also experienced a shift in 
operations. The findings in this thesis show that the level of recipient 
ownership can vary depending on whether external funders are seeking 
to increase or decrease financial resources. The initial administrative 
procedures for financial flows, human resources recruitment and civil 
society engagement, were not only aimed at meeting the health sector 
objectives as defined by the two initiatives. They were established and 
initially operated independently of existing Ministry of Health 
procedures. Issues around country ownership and their implications for 
health systems strengthening and sustainability of increased health 
systems capacity appear only to be seriously addressed by the two 
initiatives, and the Namibian Government as the two GHIs sought to 




The Global Fund initially positioned itself as allowing countries to 
define the financial management structures of the programs that it funds 
(The Global Fund, 2001a). However, as chapter two showed, recipients of 
Global Fund grants, where often initially required to manage grants and 
financial flows according to structures and processes that have been 
defined by the GHI (Atun and Kazatchkine, 2009; Biesma et al., 2012; 
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Marten, 2015; WHO Maximizing Positive Synergies Collaborative Group, 
2009; Windisch et al., 2011). When Namibia was first approved for the 
Round 2 grant, it was required to establish specific grant management 
positions for the Global Fund grant, before the country received its first 
disbursement. The Global Fund requested the Ministry of Health to 
create the positions that eventually formed the PMU, even though the 
Namibian proposal had identified the DSP as the unit that would carry 
out grant management functions. In making the demand on the Ministry 
of Health to establish the PMU, the Global Fund deviated from its 
principles of encouraging country ownership. The Namibian PMU 
operated as a semi-autonomous entity within the Ministry of Health 
(Atun et al., 2009).  
As the PR to the Global Fund grant in Namibia, it was the 
Ministry of Health's responsibility to request disbursements from the 
Global Fund and then allocate them appropriately to the sub-recipients in 
the country. In conjunction with the PMU, the Ministry of Health 
approved, received and disbursed all Global Fund money to sub-
recipients. Based on their relationship with the PMU and the process for 
requesting disbursements during Round 2 of the HIV and AIDS grant, 
Ministry of Health respondents perceived themselves as having 
ownership over the management and disbursement of funds.  
The organisational autonomy of the Ministry of Health was, 
however, somewhat influenced by the presence the PMU, which acted as 
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an administrative intermediary to the Global Fund. Respondents 
described a situation during Round 2 of the Global Fund grant in which 
when the Ministry of Health of requested disbursements on its grant, 
they were quickly approved for the amounts required. In contrast, during 
the Round 2 RCC grant, the Ministry of Health experienced extensive 
delays on disbursements from the Global Fund in Geneva. When the 
Global Fund disbursed funds, the Ministry also received fewer amounts 
than it had requested (Bampoe, 2011; Eldon-Edington, 2012; Kahuure, 
2012c).  
The Global Fund administrators in Geneva attributed the late and 
reduced disbursements to the Ministry of Health not adequately 
managing the funds. In particular, the Global Fund chastised the 
Ministry for paying workers salaries that were higher than deemed 
appropriate (Bampoe, 2011; Eldon-Edington, 2012; Masanhu, 2012). The 
role that the PMU played as an intermediary between the Global Fund 
Geneva office and the Ministry of Health became constrained when there 
was a decrease in grant funding that was coming to Namibia. Chapter Six 
shows that as a result of the Global Fund requiring Namibia to reduce 
salaries during year 2 of the RCC grant, the Ministry of Health had to 
prematurely terminate the contracts of senior management staff in the 
PMU. At the same time that the Ministry of Health had to terminate the 
contracts of senior PMU staff, it was also dealing with the challenges of 
getting the required disbursements from the Global Fund. In the absence 
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of a properly functioning PMU, the responsibility then lay with existing 
Ministry of Health staff to manage the relationship with the Global Fund. 
The issues related to late and reduced disbursement in Namibia 
appears related to decreased international funding and the Global Fund's 
failure to acknowledge early on that there was a problem. At the global 
level, the Global Fund did not have as much money as it appears to have 
initially anticipated (Kapilashrami and Hanefeld, 2014; Kirigia et al., 
2011; Leach-Kemon et al., 2011; Lewis and Verhoeven, 2010). Even after 
there were indicators that it would not necessarily be able to meet its 
existing funding obligations, the Global Fund continued to make calls for 
funding (Health Gap, 2011; The Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, TB and 
Malaria, 2008).  
In comparison to the Global Fund, PEPFAR was not established 
with any intentions to promote country ownership in the flow and 
management of the initiative's finances. Through the establishment of 
Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator (OGAC), and through the annual 
Country Operational Plan (COP) process, PEPFAR was established to 
ensure that U.S Government agencies were setting HIV and AIDS 
priorities in a coordinated manner. The argument was made that this 
inevitably allows for a reduction in duplicated efforts and a decrease in 
the potential wastage of U.S taxpayer money (Fan et al., 2013; Navario, 
2009). As perceived by Ministry of Health respondents, PEPFAR 
administrators did not necessarily apply this larger collaborative 
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approach in the way that they engaged with the Ministry in the flow of 
finances.  
Chapter Five indicates that in their initial relationship to 
PEPFAR, respondents from DSP perceived themselves as having limited 
ownership over money granted to Ministry of Health. According to DSP 
respondents, the requests for disbursements on the PEPFAR grant were 
processed and closely monitored by CDC staff. Respondents from CDC 
Namibia sought to characterise the agency as a non-implementer that 
only supported the Ministry of Health. Respondents from the Ministry of 
Health, however, perceived themselves as supporting the activities of 
CDC Namibia, rather than the other way around. Right from the process 
of applying for PEPFAR funds, to requesting disbursements on grants, 
making decisions on grant implementation, and monitoring the 
responses, Ministry of Health respondents perceived themselves as 
engaging by U.S Government rules as overseen by CDC Namibia.  
Ministry of Health respondents expressed a relationship that 
implied that the Ministry was viewed as a useful conduit for the U.S 
Government to achieve its PEPFAR objectives with little regard for the 
Namibian Government's existing operational structures for HIV and 
AIDS management. Respondents from CDC Namibia did not refute this 
perception of limited Ministry of Health autonomy. In fact, 
representatives of PEPFAR readily admitted that they were entitled to 
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make decisions on behalf of the Ministry of Health given their roles as 
local gatekeepers of PEPFAR funding. 
In relation to money from the Global Fund, the relationship 
between the Ministry of Health and the PMU was uniquely Namibian. 
The relationship between CDC and the Ministry of Health was a direct 
reflection of PEPFAR operations at the global level (Fan et al., 2013; 
United States Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of 
Governors Office of Inspector General, 2010b). Inherently, PEPFAR was 
a bilateral initiative. It existed to fulfil the foreign relations goals of the 
U.S government (Merson et al., 2012; Office of the U.S. Global AIDS 
Coordinator (OGAC), 2004; Riddell, 2007). As explained by CDC 
respondents, it was the U.S Government's money, so they had to manage 
it according to U.S Government requirements. 
 As described in Chapter One, PEPFAR Phase 1 (2004-2008) did not 
have country ownership and health systems strengthening as one if its 
clear overriding objectives. The strategy documents for the second 
PEPFAR phase 2 (2009-2013) on the other hand sold the initiative as 
having a "focus on transitioning from an emergency response to 
promoting sustainable country programs." Unlike the first phase of 
PEPFAR, which specifically sought to expand the access to these services 
mainly, PEPFAR phase two spoke directly to issues of health system 
strengthening (110th USA Congress, 2008). Representatives of the 
PEPFAR program in Namibia were eager to create a distinction between 
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the two phases of funding. They constructed PEPFAR phase one as being 
about scale-up, while PEPFAR phase two was about sustainability and 
country ownership. Similar to the differences between Round 2 and RCC, 
the two different PEPFAR phases presented an analytical focus for the 
thesis on the rise and fall of GHI funding in the country.  
Given it new emphasis, one would expect PEPFAR 2 to have 
operationally shifted from its US-centric approach towards greater 
country ownership (Fan et al., 2013; Navario, 2009; United States 
Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of 
Inspector General, 2010b). As the example of Namibia detailed in this 
thesis shows, there was no fundamental change in the structures and 
relationships that governed the operations of PEPFAR funds at both the 
global and national level. Similar to PEPFAR 1, the application process, 
financial management, and operations for human resources for PEPFAR 
2 remained primarily driven by the US Government and its 
representatives. 
During PEPFAR phase 2, the decision to reduce funds to Namibia 
was made with limited input from the Ministry of Health and the 
Namibian Government (110th USA Congress, 2008; Holmes et al., 2012). 
Staff in the Ministry of Health, specifically in DSP, also had to take on 
greater financial management responsibilities once the PEPFAR 
administrators in the USA made the decision to decrease the amount of 
financial support provided to Namibia. Once staff in the DSP were given 
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greater responsibilities for managing PEPFAR money, they found out 
that there had been a significant amount of unspent grant money during 
phase 1. Due to the initially CDC-driven and opaque financial flow and 
management structures of PEPFAR funding, the Ministry of Health had 
not been aware that the money was available. 
For financial flows, respondents from the Ministry of Health 
expressed concerns that even though Namibia was granted funding from 
both the Global Fund and PEPFAR, the money never belonged to it. 
Through setting up the relation with the PMU (for Global Fund) and 
CDC Namibia (for PEPFAR) as a way to manage their money and closely 
monitor the operations of their grants, the two GHIs undermined the 
Ministry of Health's autonomy. Some respondents from the Ministry of 
Health went as far as to say that they were constantly made to feel that 
the GHIs did not trust the Ministry with their money. There was the 
impression among respondents from the Ministry of Health that even if 
CDC Namibia and the Global Fund PMU were very efficient at managing 
and monitoring their individual grants, this resulted in a temporary form 
of effectiveness in the Ministry. Respondents argued that for a 
sustainable Ministry of Health capacity, GHI funding could have been 
used to more efficiently address the existing grant management 




Inadequate human resources capacity was a limitation to 
Namibia's capacity to rapidly scale-up HIV and AIDS interventions when 
financial support from the Global Fund and PEPFAR first arrived in the 
country. However, as in other contexts, human resources deficits in 
Namibia were addressed with Global Fund and PEPFAR financial 
support, but not as part of a long-term strategy for the country (Biesma et 
al., 2009c; Cailhol et al., 2013; Drager et al., 2006; Schneider et al., 2006; 
Vujicic et al., 2012). The recruitment procedures and the salary levels 
associated with funding from the Global Fund and PEPFAR were issues 
that respondents from the Ministry of Health kept on bringing up.  The 
salience of these matters was apparent because the adverse implications 
of a lack of alignment between Global Fund and PEPFAR health worker 
management and salary levels revealed themselves during the collection 
of interview data for the thesis.  
Chapter Six shows that health professionals paid for with PEPFAR 
funding to work for the Ministry of Health were initially hired and 
managed through a recruitment agency called Potentia. The salary levels 
paid to PEPFAR staff were also different from the wages of their existing 
Ministry of Health counterparts. In findings reflective of both Global 
Fund and PEPFAR operations in Namibia, a 2011 U.S. Government audit 
of PEPFAR funds in the country found two critical elements missing 
concerning human resources (Office of the Inspector General, USAID, 
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2011). The first was a lack of transition plan for shifting the cost of 
workers' salaries to Namibian entities. The second was the lack of 
baseline data, indicators, and targets for human resources for health 
activities. The Audit predicted that the identified health systems building 
weaknesses would potentially hinder Namibia's ability to sustain its HIV 
efforts and gains in the event of total withdrawal of PEPFAR funding. 
The U.S Government Audit specifically criticised PEPFAR funding for 
being "narrowly targeted at addressing HIV/AIDS without knowing 
whether those HRH (human resources for health) salaries fit within the 
current government structure or civil society (Office of the Inspector 
General, USAID, 2011, p. 5)”. 
Although the Global Fund and PEPFAR contributed to improved 
HIV and AIDS outcomes in Namibia, the various health worker positions 
and operational structures were not integrated into larger Ministry of 
Health operations (Presidential Commission of Inquiry: MoHSS, 2013, p. 
79). In seeking to make the health worker transition, PEPFAR officials in 
Namibia, placed the onus on the Ministry of Health to manage the issue 
of Potentia. Any attempts by the Ministry of Health to quickly transition 
staff from being funded by PEPFAR to having them financed by the 
Namibian Government were, however, complicated by the initial use of 
Potentia. Rather than seeing it as problematic, PEPFAR officials in 
Namibia characterised Potentia as a having been a successful "proof of 
concept" for addressing human resources limitations at the scale-up HIV 
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and AIDS interventions. This perception of the success of Potentia is also 
reflected in PEPFAR documents at the global level.   
In 2006, the U.S Government's Department of Health (DoH) 
produced a report for its PEPFAR implementing partners agencies, which 
presented CDC Namibia’s relationship with Potentia as a best-practice 
for rapidly scaling up ART service delivery (USAID and TeamSTAR, 
2006). According to the report from DoH, the use of third-party agencies 
such as Potentia meant that PEPFAR efforts to put people on treatment 
would not be encumbered by the weak human resources recruitment and 
management capacities of grant recipients (USAID and TeamSTAR, 
2006). This kind of argument represents a very myopic view of donor 
support for HIV and AIDS interventions. By using Potentia as a best-
practice example, the DoH was essentially sending the message that the 
focus of PEPFAR funding should be aimed at scaling up interventions as 
quickly as possible; rather than viewing grant recipients such as the 
Ministry of Health as key partners who might have difficulties that need 
to be addressed in the long-term.  
Namibia's application for an RCC grant as a continuation of the 
Round 2 HIV and AIDS grant from the Global Fund requested a human 
resources budget that would increase every year for the first three years 
of the grant. The country's proposal then proposed a reduction of the 
Global Fund's contribution for some health workforce positions by 10% 
per year between years 3 and 6 of the RCC grant. The proposal stated 
 257 
that the Namibian Government would cover the reduction in the human 
resources budget during the second half of the RCC grant (NaCCATuM, 
2009). Despite claims in the RCC grant application for the Namibian 
Government to be able to sustain health worker funding that had first 
been provided by Global Fund, the Ministry of Health appears to have 
been caught by surprise when both GHIs sought to decrease their human 
resources budget.  
Sustainable human resources for health strengthening is a 
complex process, depending mostly on country-specific health worker 
production and retention factors. GHIs could assist in these strategies, 
provided that they are flexible enough to incorporate country-specific 
needs regarding funding (Cailhol et al., 2013). Cailhol et al. (2013) 
examined the processes and content of human resources for health policy 
shifts in 5 countries associated with the Global Fund and PEPFAR: 
Angola, Burundi, Lesotho, Mozambique and South Africa. In all 
countries, successful roll-out of HIV and AIDS clinical services was 
observed, despite human resources for health shortages. These 
improvements were a result of the mostly short-term emergency response 
by GHI-funded Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and to a lesser 
extent by governments. Over time, the five countries slowly implemented 
mid to long-term human resources strategies, sometimes in collaboration 
with GHIs (Cailhol et al., 2013). 
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Chapter Six indicates there was no clear strategy in place on how 
the Namibian health system would sustain some of the health workers 
that the Global Fund and PEPFAR had funded, once the Ministry of 
Health was no longer a recipient of GHI funding. The Ministry of Health 
started by absorbing doctors and pharmacists in the government staff 
structure because these were the positions that already existed on the 
Government's Staff Establishment. The Namibian Public Service 
Commission first had to approve some of the health worker positions that 
had been developed specifically to facilitate the implementation of GHI-
supported Ministry of Health interventions. There was uncertainty 
expressed by respondents representing the two GHIs and respondents 
from the Ministry of Health on how long it would take for some critical 
health worker positions – such as those relating to monitoring and 
evaluation – to be approved by the Public Service Commission.  
Ministry of Health officials also confirmed that there was no 
guarantee that staff positions would be approved by the Public Service 
Commission just because the Global Fund and PEPFAR had funded 
them. As a result, several respondents from the DSP expressed concerns 
that Ministry of Health might not absorb various staff positions, which 
had been critical to implementing GHI interventions (but did not have 
corresponding positions within the Ministry). Respondents from Ministry 
of Health, however, also expressed frustration that when the Global Fund 
and PEPFAR headquarters decided to reduce their HR budgets to 
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Namibia, they did not consult the Namibian Government. During the 
RCC grant, the Global Fund mandated a reduction in the levels of 
salaries that were allowable for all workers associated with the Global 
Fund grant in Namibia. These wage levels were not problematic during 
the Round 2 grant. While during PEPFAR phase 2, the decision was 
made by PEPFAR administrators to reduce the human resources budget 




Chapter seven examines the Ministry of Health's relationship with 
civil society organisations as associated with Global Fund support to 
Namibia. The results presented in chapter seven indicate that funding 
from the Global Fund that started during the Round 2 grant created an 
opportunity for civil society organisations to become more engaged in 
planning for and implementing HIV and AIDS interventions in Namibia. 
When the financial support from the Global Fund in the country was on 
the decline, as reflected by circumstances during the RCC grant, there 
appeared to be a lot of political uncertainty on how the country would 
sustain the efforts of civil society organisations that were funded by the 
GHI. 
Before the arrival of Global Fund support in the country, the 
Namibian Government had pre-established national policy 
implementation structures through which it sought to coordinate the 
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multi-sector response to HIV and AIDS. In particular, the National 
Strategic Framework for HIV and AIDS (NSF) emphasises the Namibian 
Government's commitment to strengthening both the operational and 
financial capacity of CSOs addressing HIV and AIDS in the country. The 
data indicates, however, that in the presence of Global Fund support, the 
country had difficulty in meeting the NSF goals of a coherent and 
efficient multi-sector coordinating strategy. In the face of declining 
funding from the Global Fund, the Namibian Government also did not 
stay true to its commitment to assist other stakeholders in accessing 
sustainable financial resources.  
As with most countries that have received its support, the Global 
Fund required Namibia to establish a Country Coordinating Mechanism 
(CCM) to apply for and oversee its grants. Although the CCM been 
branded in the literature as allowing for country ownership, it served 
more to play the functions related to the Global Fund requirements in 
Namibia. In comparison to the Namibia's pre-existing multi-sector HIV 
and AIDS coordination structure, NAEC, respondents viewed the CCM as 
being more functional and thus more effective. They criticised NAEC, 
which is meant to be coordinated by the DSP for not meeting as 
frequently as national policy requires. As told by respondents in Namibia, 
even though NAEC members (many of whom were also CCM members) 
were supposed to meet four times a year, the meetings often did not occur 
more than twice a year.  
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Respondents in Namibia believed that there was a need for leaner 
HIV and AIDS coordination structures with clear guidelines on how 
external funders such as GHIs would engage in the planning processes in 
Namibia. Respondents were in particular critical of the fact the same 
organisations that were part of the Global Fund CCM were already 
members of NAEC. Thus it was viewed contradictory to the principles of 
country ownership and alignment when the CCM and NAEC 
fundamentally had the same objectives concerning HIV and AIDS, yet 
different meetings were held for the two groups. The CCM mainly 
discussed Global Fund issues. It appears, however, that those same 
people who were able to make to CCM meetings could have easily made it 
to NAEC meetings to discuss Global Fund issues in the context of existing 
national priorities.  
By requiring Namibia to establish a CCM, the Global Fund 
appears to have wasted an opportunity for the country to strengthen its 
existing multi-sector coordination structures for HIV and AIDS. For most 
of the Round 2 grant, the Ministry of Health chaired the CCM, and also 
served as its Secretariat. However, citing issues of conflict of interest 
throughout the Round 2 grant, the stewardship role of the Ministry of 
Health on the CCM was taken away by the time the country received the 
RCC grant. If the goal of the CCM is to ensure effective multi-sector 
coordination and country ownership as initially articulated by the Global 
Fund, then perhaps the Ministry of Health should not have been side-
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lined. Thus the Global Fund emphasis in Namibia should have been on 
ensuring that its coordination activities were aligned with the Namibian 
Government's goals for HIV and AIDS multi-sector engagement.  
The case study of the Ministry of Health indicates that Global 
Fund's application and implementation process overemphasise the 
involvement of a variety of stakeholders that is more concerned with 
quantity over quality. Policymakers within the Ministry of Health 
recognised that civil the society organisations that had been funded by 
the Global Fund were critical to supporting the Ministry's medically 
focused response to HIV and AIDS. These groups carried out the 
behavioural components of the HIV and AIDS interventions and served 
as information providers and advocators for people to access the 
Government run treatment services.  
The delays in Global Fund disbursements and decrease in financial 
support to Namibia, however, had an adverse impact on the operations of 
civil society organisations in the country. NANASO, which was added as 
a second PR to the RCC grant to oversee civil society activities, in 
conjunction with the Ministry of Health, was one of the organisations 
negatively impacted. Several respondents in Namibia indicated that the 
decrease in funding threatened the non-medical interventions for HIV 
and AIDS that had been driven by civil society. On the other hand, civil 
society organisations in Namibia seemed to have unfair expectations of 
the Ministry of Health.  
 263 
In various ways, the CCM members agreed with taking away the 
multi-sector coordination role of the Ministry of Health because the 
Global Fund had signalled that this reflected a problem of conflict of 
interest because the Ministry of Health was also an implementer of HIV 
and AIDS interventions. When funding from the Global Fund had become 
constrained, these same civil society organisations expressed frustrations 
that Ministry of Health was not doing more to help them fill the gaps in 
financial resources that would occur in the event of a total cessation of 
funding from the Global Fund.  
When financial support from the Global Fund was on the decline 
during the RCC, the expectation was for the Ministry of Health to make 
up for the money that the Global Fund would no longer make available to 
civil society organisations in Namibia. Since it relied on the Government 
budget, civil society stakeholders criticised it for not doing more to help 
them access alternative and potentially more sustainable sources of 
funding. As described by respondents from civil society groups that were 
recipients of financial support from the Global Fund, the GHI funding 
created a market and demand for HIV services. It, however, also created 
a dilemma in which there is a demand for services, for which provision 
was not potentially sustainable.  
Chapter Seven shows that concerning multi-sector coordination 
and engagement, the Global Fund's objectives were both aligned and 
misaligned with the aims set out by the Namibian Government. On the 
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one hand, similar to the Namibian Government, the Global Fund was 
attempting to ensure that the country had the sense of ownership in 
defining how its funds would be used. The Global Fund claims to want to 
ensure that decisions around funding and the application for its grant 
reflected the existing capacities and interests of those that would be 
receiving the funding. It did this by encouraging that a wide range of 
stakeholders should be part of the conversation. Yet, by insisting that 
everyone have an equal voice, the Global Fund was responsible for side-
lining the role of the Ministry of Health. By seeking to limit the Ministry 
of Health’s leadership role in the multi-sector coordination of its grant in 
Namibia, the Global Fund’s policy of conflict of interest did not align with 
how things already operated in Namibia. 
Chapter Seven illustrates that although the Global Fund has 
branded the CCM as allowing for country ownership, in Namibia, it 
mainly served the requirements of the GHI. The data presented in this 
chapter indicates that even when governments manage to engage with 
multi-sector efforts in the presence of donor support, this collaboration 
can be temporary. Health sector stakeholders will then return to their 
pre-funding status quo, in which different agencies work independently 
(Banteyerga et al., 2006; Dodd and Lane, 2010; Hill et al., 2012). As a PR 
to the Global Fund grants and the Secretariat of the PMU, the Ministry 
of Health engaged with CSOs in the implementation of interventions 
through what appears to be an artificial relationship driven by the 
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availability of Global Fund money. Lots of signatures during consultation 
processes, unique to the Global Fund, are therefore not reflective of a 
larger commitment from the Namibian Government to continually engage 
with and support CSOs. This lack of long-term commitment is reflected in 
the Ministry of Health's response when it became apparent that a loss in 
Global Fund support might jeopardise the activities of CSO recipients.  
 
8.3 Health System Implications of HIV and AIDS 
GHIs in Namibia 
 
The Namibian Government has defined its HIV and AIDS response 
regarding policy and institutional structures (Government of the Republic 
of Namibia, 2008; MoHSS: DSP, 2010). It, however, does not appear to 
enforce its objectives in the presence of GHIs. The results chapters 
indicate that it took the transition of Global Fund and PEPFAR funding 
in Namibia for the Ministry of Health to start considering how it would 
integrate the parallel capacity that was developed by GHIs into existing 
Ministry of Health structures. GHIs largely operate in a vertical manner, 
bypassing country systems; they compete for the limited human 
resources; they influence country policies; and they are not always 
harmonised with other donors (Mwisongo and Nabyonga-Orem, 2016). 
GHI approaches have not changed substantially over the years, but there 
has been an evolution concerning global attempts to manage the 
interactions of funders with country health systems. Thus the challenge 
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is for recipient countries to hold them accountable to the goals of 
international policies such as the Paris Agenda. 
Weaknesses in health systems contribute to a failure to improve 
health outcomes, even with increased official development assistance. At 
the national level, it is essential to increase capacity to manage and 
deliver services, situate interventions firmly within national strategies, 
ensure effective implementation, and coordinate external support with 
local resources (Balabanova et al. 2010). Due to the availability of 
treatment, HIV and AIDS has now become a chronic health issue in many 
countries, rather than the death sentence it used to be before the advent 
of initiatives such as the Global Fund and PEPFAR. The chronic nature 
of HIV and AIDS require sustainable implementation of health services 
and availability of the appropriate workforce (Bennett et al., 2015; Kelly 
and Birdsall, 2010; Marten, 2015; Mills et al., 2010).  
Since HIV and AIDS are a long-term problem, solutions to address 
them need to also have a long-term potential for impact (Hecht et al., 
2010; Johri et al., 2012). It is hard to translate increases in funding to 
better HIV and AIDS outcomes in the long-term if other essential health 
services remain underfunded. GHI funding, if it also contributes to 
broader health system improvements, may potentially leverage better 
HIV and AIDS outcomes (Druce and Dickinson, 2008a; Palen et al., 2012; 
Vujicic et al., 2012; Windisch et al., 2011). If immediate results are the 
aim of external financial resources, without adequate attention to 
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strengthening the health system in whole, this can create challenges for 
the continuity of access to those services. Rather than just investing in 
HIV and AIDS-specific systems, it is in the best interest of international 
actors to invest in strengthening overall health systems.  
Namibia was able to achieve significant gains in decreasing HIV 
prevalence during the period covered by this thesis (MoHSS et al., 2010; 
MoHSS and Health Systems 20/20, 2008). As one individual from the 
Ministry of Health put it, support from the Global Fund and PEPFAR 
"helped us to reverse the tide as far as HIV was concerned". Thus with 
the assistance from the Global Fund and PEPFAR, the Namibian health 
system was able to translate increased domestic funding for HIV and 
AIDS into improved health outcomes. Many of the interviewees, however, 
perceived the health systems contributions of the two GHIs as having 
occurred at the expense of country ownership and long-term health 
systems strengthening. By initially seeking to meet their objectives, 
donors such as the Global Fund and PEPFAR then potentially end up 
undermining their health goals, as well as those of the countries that 
receive their assistance.  
Alignment and harmonisation of partnerships and GHIs are 
difficult in countries with the inadequate capacity to coordinate the 
funders (Mwisongo and Nabyonga-Orem, 2016). At the policy level for the 
Ministry of Health, the Division of Policy Planning (PPHRD) was the 
division tasked with developing and implementing the national policy for 
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public sector health operations (MoHSS, 2009, 2008c). There was, 
however, clearly a disconnect between the Policy Planning Division and 
DSP. Respondents from the Policy Planning Directorate, in fact, appeared 
to have little knowledge on how the Ministry engaged with the Global 
Fund and PEPFAR. This lack of collaboration between the two divisions 
demonstrates duplication and lack of alignment within the Ministry. A 
respondent from the Donor Coordination Division in PPHRD argued that 
if the Ministry of Health clearly defined how it sought to engage with 
external funders, then it would be easier for initiatives such as the Global 
Fund and PEPFAR to align with Ministry priorities and operations.  
In Ghana, strong government leadership has facilitated the 
integration of Global Fund-supported activities within national programs 
(Atun et al., 2011). Various respondents characterised the Namibian 
Government as being complacent regarding ownership of GHI 
interventions because of the abundance of funds that were made 
available to the country. The interventions supported by the two GHIs 
were necessary and useful because their funding arrived when Namibia 
was at the known height of its HIV and AIDS epidemic (El Obeid, 2001; 
MoHSS, 2008a). Several respondents in Namibia argued that the 
Ministry of Health needed to better prepare for both the arrival and 
departure of external funding to the health system. Respondents in 
Namibia, therefore, recognised that the Ministry should have had a 
transition plan that defined how the country would integrate the increase 
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in health systems capacity developed with funding from the Global and 
PEPFAR.   
There was some recognition by policymakers within the Ministry of 
Health that perhaps the onus is on the government to be more clear about 
how it would seek to sustain the capacity of external funders such as 
GHIs, rather than expecting the funders to be the ones intent on 
facilitating this goal. By lacking clear policies for integrating and aligning 
support from external the Global Fund and PEPFAR, the Ministry of 
Health potentially left itself subject to their priorities. 
 
8.4 Thesis Limitations and Areas for Further 
Research 
 
The political dimensions of aid are central to understanding both 
the giving of aid and its impact at the recipient end (Riddell, 2007). In the 
interactions between GHIs and country health systems, the power 
dynamics appear more nuanced because their relationship exists under 
what Offe (2009) terms as a “voluntary façade.” This “depoliticises 
governance and fails to take into account the significant conflicts of 
interests and values that take place outside the negotiation room” (Offe, 
2009). Offe (2009) argues that current conceptions of governance take a 
naïve approach, which suggests a “pure and innocent ‘power to,' which 
deemphasizes the power ‘over’ other actors” (Offe, 2009, p. 551).  
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According to Buse and Harmer (2004), initiatives such as the 
Global Fund are endowed with unquestioned legitimacy because they are 
seen to be providing a welfare-enhancing intervention. Relationships 
between countries and GHIs are then automatically assumed to be 
reflecting the wishes and resources of those for whom the partnership is 
set up to help (Buse and Harmer, 2004, p. 53). In international 
development to health, the establishment and operations of 
administrative structures have influenced who wields power to make 
decisions on how donor funding is governed (Carbone, 2008; Dodd and 
Lane, 2010; Whitfield and Fraser, 2009a). Relational power dynamics 
regulate the types and structures that are implemented in the first place, 
and may also influence the ways in which those structures function once 
they are in place (Easterly, 2008; Riddell, 2007).  
Future research relevant to the findings presented in this thesis 
could focus on the underlying power dynamics that govern the 
administration of external funding from initiatives such as the Global 
Fund and PEPFAR. Capacity building practitioners can be better at 
confronting and responding to power asymmetries present within the 
playing field in which they engage (de Valk, 2009; McMahon, 2010). 
Ubels et al. (2010) argue that it is of particular importance for 
practitioners associated with development aid to be aware of the location 
of what types of power are in play, and how they are applied. In the 
Ministry of Health’s relationship with CDC, in particular, there was 
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clearly an asymmetry in decision-making power. Future research 
relevant to this thesis might examine questions such as: To what extent 
were CDC staff cognizant of the power that they possessed? How careful 
were they with wielding it?  
Concerning the issue of power, another area for further research is 
a questioning of the extent to which respondents from recipients such as 
the Ministry of Health perceive underlying power dynamics when 
engaging with GHIs. There was an indication from respondents that 
Ministry of Health officials sometimes felt limited in their authority to 
make decisions and drive interventions associated with funding from 
GHIs. McMahon (2010) argues that this is a worthwhile issue to explore 
because aid recipients can sometimes subvert the power that donors seek 
to exercise over them (p.82).  
Another limitation of this thesis is its exclusive focus on the 
Ministry of Health at the national level. Functionality on the national 
scale, however, does not always translate into functionality at the local 
level, which is where services are accessed (Biesma et al., 2009; Hanefeld, 
2010). For instance, the Namibian Government’s health policy documents 
emphasise a Primary Health Care that allows for health provision at the 
community level in direct contact with individuals, families, and 
communities (MoHSS, 1998; MoHSS: DSP, 2010). Aid relations with 
democratically elected governments involve at least three sets of actors – 
aid agencies, governments, and the citizenry—and this results in a three-
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way relationship where each set of players has a direct connection with 
the other two (Whitfield and Fraser, 2009a). This research did not 
evaluate the opinions of citizens.  
The involvement of GHIs in delivering health services depends on 
effective collaborative working at scales from the local to the 
international, and a single GHI is effectively constructed of multiple 
collaborations. Collaboration between local implementing agencies and 
departments of health involves distinct power dynamics and tensions. 
Managing the tension between the power to provide resources held by 
GHIs and the national health agency’s access the populations in need of 
these resources is critical to ensuring partnerships that function 
efficiently (Jobson et al., 2017). 
Concerns over whether resources are reaching those most in need, 
and the desire to make citizens more accountable to their governments is 
one of the reasons often given for making aid more efficient (Diamond, 
2009; Whitfield and Fraser, 2009a). In reflecting upon the decrease of 
Global Fund and PEPFAR financial support to Namibia, several 
respondents attributed the transition to Namibia’s economic ranking to a 
higher middle-income country during the presence of the two initiatives. 
Some respondents argued that the state’s ranking as a middle-income 
country implies that Namibia should be able to pay for all the required 
HIV and AIDS interventions with local financial resources. Many donors 
made similar arguments when they withdrew their financial support to 
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Namibia in the late 1990s (El Obeid, 2001; European Economic Fund, 
2008). Several respondents, however, argued against the economic 
ranking justification by reflecting that it ignores the social and economic 
inequalities that exist in the country. Generalised economic indicators, 
such as average income per capita are, not a reflection of a country’s 
ability to meet the health needs of its citizens (Sen, 2001). The country 
does not necessarily do a good job of translating financial resources into 
human welfare.  
 
8.5 Summary  
 
This thesis is a case study of how GHIs impact on the national 
health systems of the countries that receive their financial support. The 
Namibian case study as presented, adds to knowledge on how the 
operations of GHIs can influence the national health system context. The 
Namibia context is also important because there is limited academic 
research on the country’s health sector, particularly about GHIs. Studies 
of the Global Fund and PEPFAR have tended to take a cross-sectional 
approach to understanding their impacts, in a manner that emphasises 
their original scale up goals. This thesis expands on the health system 
understanding of Global Fund and PEPFAR impacts at country level by 
taking into account both the rise and decline in GHI funding to Namibia. 
 274 
The Namibian Government has constructed HIV and AIDS as 
requiring a long-term approach. At the increase of Global Fund and 
PEPFAR funding to Namibia, the rapid objectives of the two initiatives 
governed their operations with the Ministry of Health. For the most part, 
when the two GHIs began to operate in Namibia, their focus appears to 
have been on scaling up access to HIV and AIDS as quickly as possible. 
The initial operations of the Global Fund and PEPFAR therefore 
eventually had negative implications for the sustainability of the 
institutional capacity that Namibia developed with GHI support.    
The findings presented in the thesis support conclusions that the 
priorities of GHIs may govern their interactions recipient countries at the 
expense of health system ownership. Namibia first received financial 
support from the Global Fund and PEPFAR due to an emergency demand 
for HIV and AIDS services that was defined at the global level. The 
founding policies of the Global Fund and PEPFAR indicate a naive 
expectation that a substantial amount of GHI funding would quickly 
solve the world's HIV and AIDS troubles in the most heavily burdened 
places such as Namibia. Following the first few years of operations, the 
Global Fund and PEPFAR sought to pivot away from their initial focus on 
emergency mode and rapid scale-up of interventions, to a greater focus on 
sustaining their successes. The emergency is, however, not over for 
countries such as Namibia even though the GHIs have changed their 
minds about the nature of the problem. 
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As far as ownership was concerned, there was a perception among 
the Namibians interviewed for the thesis that the Global Fund and 
PEPFAR could have been better aligned their operations with existing 
national systems and objectives from the onset. Funding from two GHIs 
could have then been used to better address the existing health system 
deficits in the country. This thesis has shown that the drive for results 
ended up undermining the institutional autonomy of the Ministry of 
Health and thus led to a missed opportunity to integrate increased 






This thesis is concerned with evaluating the Namibian Ministry of 
Health’s ability to steer the HIV and AIDS program at the national policy 
level in its engagement with the Global Fund and PEPFAR. It examines 
how the relationship of the two GHIs with the Ministry of Health 
changed over time as the emphasis on their engagement with Namibia 
shifted from a focus on the rapid scale-up of financial resources to address 
HIV and AIDS services. Their attention moved to a greater focus on 
country ownership and health system sustainability, which was also 
associated with a decrease in the financial support made available to 
countries like Namibia.  
The thesis has a thematic sub-focus on the Ministry of Health’s 
functions of financial flows and management, human resources 
management, and civil society engagement. It examines the operational 
structures and processes that were adapted in relation the two initiatives 
at the rise of their funding to Namibia. The thesis then evaluates the 
implications that these structures and processes had for the Ministry of 
Health at the point at which Namibia faced a decline in financial support 
from the two GHIs. This study, therefore, captures the transition of 
Global Fund and PEPFAR funding to Namibia. 
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9.2 Summary of Thesis Findings  
 
Chapter One frames the thesis around the concept of country 
ownership and autonomy as reflected in the origins and objectives of the 
Global Fund and PEPFAR, as well as international efforts to make global 
health aid more effective as represented by global policy attempts to 
encourage country ownership through the Paris Agenda. Chapter One 
also introduces the relevance of using Namibia as a case study for 
understanding the country-specific interactions of the Global Fund and 
PEPFAR on country ownership. Namibia is relevant because it was 
initially positioned as the ideal recipient of Global Fund and PEPFAR 
financial support when the objectives of the two GHIs were focused on 
rapidly scaling-up HIV and AIDS interventions at the global level. The 
country was then directly impacted when the goals of the two initiatives 
then changed to encourage more ownership and sustainable health 
systems support. 
Chapter Two reviewed the literature on the country-specific effects 
of Global Fund and PEPFAR funding. The chapter focuses the ownership 
and autonomy discussion on the three sub-themes of financial flows; 
human resources management; and civil society engagement. It evaluates 
the extent to which existing literature has perceived the two initiatives as 
having facilitated or discouraged country ownership. Chapter Two also 
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reflects on the health system implications of Global Fund and PEPFAR 
practices, as associated with their impacts on country ownership. 
Chapter Three focuses on the research design underlying the data 
presented in this thesis. It justifies the use of the case study design and 
its various components that were taken into account to provide this 
research with both internal and external validity. Given my birth 
nationality as a Namibian, the chapter concludes with an argument for 
embracing the subjectivity of the researcher in the collection and analysis 
of data for qualitative case studies. 
Chapter Four presents Namibia’s national health and HIV and 
AIDS policy background to provide the context of the results presented in 
chapters five, six and seven. The chapter introduces the Namibian 
Government’s policy and institutional role in addressing HIV and AIDS 
in the country. It also provides a descriptive background of Namibia’s 
engagement with the Global Fund and PEPFAR in relation to the funding 
received and the agencies in the country associated with the two GHIs. 
Chapter Five is the first of the three results chapters that 
primarily uses interview data to examine the concept of ownership and 
autonomy at the rise and fall of GHI funding of Namibia. It focuses on 
financial flows in the Ministry of Health’s engagement with the Global 
Fund and PEPFAR. Chapter Five shows that the arrival of Global Fund 
and PEPFAR funding was associated with the establishment of financial 
flow processes and structures to cater to the accountability requirements 
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of the two GHIs. The Global Fund required the creation of a Programme 
Management Unit (PMU) in the Ministry of Health, while PEPFAR 
funding was channelled and managed through the structures of the 
Centres for Diseases Control (CDC) offices in Namibia. 
Chapter Six examines the structures and procedures that were 
used to recruit human resources in the Ministry of Health’s engagement 
with the Global Fund and PEPFAR. As done in Chapter Five, Chapter 
Six compares and contrasts implications for country ownership and 
autonomy of Global Fund and PEPFAR practices at the rise and fall of 
GHI funding to Namibia. Chapter Six shows that the recruitment 
practices associated with Global Fund and PEPFAR funding to the 
Ministry of Health resulted in the existence of three different categories 
of workers, all working for the Ministry of Health on HIV and AIDS 
interventions. This separation of human resources recruitment ended up 
then creating challenges for the Ministry’s ability to sustain the increased 
human resources capacity when it was faced with a decline in funding 
from both the Global Fund and PEPFAR.  
Chapter Seven examines the Ministry of Health’s engagement with 
HIV and AIDS civil society organisations in Namibia, as mediated by the 
Global Fund. On paper, the national coordination structures for 
Namibia's multi-sector response to HIV and AIDS are relatively well-
defined through the NSF. The data presented in Chapter seven shows, 
however, that in the presence of Global Fund support, the Ministry of 
 280 
Health had difficulty in meeting the NSF goals of a coherent and efficient 
multi-sector coordinating strategy.  
Chapter Eight brought together the issues of country ownership 
and organisational autonomy presented in the results sections and then 
links them to review of literature presented in chapter Two. Chapter 
Eight argues that the practices of the Global Fund and PEPFAR at the 
rise of their funding to Namibia discouraged country ownership and 
autonomy, and indicate adverse implications for sustainable capacity and 
health systems strengthening for the Ministry of Health.   
This thesis primarily seeks to contribute to research that examines 
the country level interactions of GHIs such as the Global Fund and 
PEPFAR. It is a critical assessment of how recipient governments can 
retain ownership and autonomy of their health systems in the presence of 
substantial funding from GHIs. The thesis has shown that the initial 
interactions between the Namibian governments were driven by the 
short-term goals of the two HIV and AIDS GHIs.  The tensions of this 
initially myopic approach of providing external assistance for health were 
apparent in some of the health system challenges that the Ministry of 
Health faced due to a decline in funding by the two initiatives.  
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9.3 Concluding Thoughts  
 
When the Global Fund and PEPFAR were established, there was a 
lot of global political enthusiasm for rapidly scaling-up HIV and AIDS 
treatment, prevention and care interventions in countries that needed the 
support. The enthusiasm was also accompanied by the availability of 
financial resources. The Namibia case study shows, however, that the 
GHIs were not able to sustain the magnitude of funding that they had 
initially provided to the country. The data presented in this thesis shows 
that when the Ministry of Health started its relationship with the Global 
Fund and PEPFAR, structures and processes for financial flows, human 
resources and civil society engagement (for the Global Fund) appear to 
have driven by the demands of the two initiatives.  
The Ministry of Health’s existing structures and processes were 
initially perceived as being weak by the GHIs, and thus a potential 
hindrance the originally stated objectives of the two initiatives to rapidly 
scale-up HIV and AIDS interventions. Rather than seeking to strengthen 
the perceived health system weaknesses by enhancing them, Global Fund 
and PEPFAR funding to Namibia was used to circumvent the Ministry of 
Health’s existing structures. In Namibia, parallel administrative 
structures appear to have been tenable and unproblematic as long as 
there was a continuous stream of money from the Global Fund and 
PEPFAR to prop them up. 
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This thesis has shown that structures and operations for financial 
flows, human resources and civil society engagement that were funded 
through the Global Fund and PEPFAR initiatives facilitated the initial 
rapid scale-up of HIV and AIDS for the Ministry of Health. The original 
nature of operations of the structures funded through the two initiatives, 
however, undermined the Ministry of Health's autonomy to make 
decisions on behalf of the Namibian public health sector. The Namibian 
Government was also characterised by various respondents as being 
complacent concerning ownership and ignoring its implications for 
intervention sustainability because of the abundance of funds that were 
made available to the country through the Global Fund and PEPFAR. 
The increased health system capacity achieved in Namibia with 
financial support through the two GHIs, therefore, appeared to be 
unsustainable when their funding to the country was on the decrease. 
When both GHIs sought to decrease financial support to Namibia, the 
Ministry of Health was expected to take on responsibility for 
management functions that had initially been closely aligned with the 
requirements of the two initiatives. Perhaps a greater promotion of 
national ownership in Namibia's engagement with the Global Fund and 
PEPFAR funding would have reflected a funding transition that indicated 
more potential for the country to sustain the increased health system 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































HIV and AIDS Intervention Plan: 2008 to 2010 
Directorate Special Programmes: Ministry of Health 
Objectives Activities Output Partners 
Provision of 
HAART 










Expand the number of 
facilities providing 
HAART through 
outreach services and 
IMAI from 58 services 
















 Provide post exposure 
prophylaxis to all 
exposed clients 












 Train 240 family 
members to serve as 
treatment supporters 






    
Laboratory 
services 





Pay for all HIV-related 
bio clinical monitoring 
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Actively support and 
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between ANC, 











 Offer HIV DNA-PCR 
test to 25% of HIV-
exposed babies within 8 
weeks of birth 












 Offer routine family 
planning and 
counseling  services to 















   






produce video clips on 
treatment, care and 
support                              
Video clips 




 Radio/TV talk shows Radio/TV 




 Develop information 
package for the deaf 
and the visually 







 Conduct male 



















 Publish and distribute 











 Commemorate the 
National Health Week 
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Train health workers 
on comprehensive HIV 
case management  
Clinical 
Staff 







 Provide bursaries for 













 Staff to attend short 







 Send Staff to  
international 









 Conduct a team 
building workshop for 



















   
To assess and 
improve the 
quality of HIV 
care services 
provided in  all 
ART health 
facilities. 
Extend the coverage of 
the  HIVQUAL project 
to all ART sites  
HIVQUAL 





 Print and distribute 
updated training 
manuals for HIVQUAL 







 Train Healthcare 









   
To strengthen 
TB/HIV 
services at all 
levels 
Increase intensive TB 
Case finding among 
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of  TB-IPT to HIV 








 Participate in infection 
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 Sensiitise RACOC + 
RMT members on 
TB/HIV co-infection 
during debriefing 




 Participate in 
consultation meetings 
between NTCP and TB 












 Participate in the 
biannual national HIV 
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an M&E plan for HIV 
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an M&E plan for 
HIV/TB collaborative 


















 Strengthen the 
reporting system for 
adverse events 



















Information for Participants 
 
 
My name is Liita Naukushu and I am a PhD student in International Public Health 
Policy at the University of Edinburgh. My research focuses on Namibia to 
examine how Global Health Initiatives (GHIs) engage with the national health 
priorities of developing countries. It places a particular emphasis on how the 
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis (Global Fund), the U.S 
President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the Ministry of 
Health and Social Services (MoHSS) have related to each other in current 
rounds of funding.  
 
The primary sources of data for my research are one-on-one interviews and 
policy documents. These data will be used to understand the operational and 
strategic frameworks that govern GHI partnerships with MoHSS in the Namibian 
health system. I would please like you to contribute to my research through an 
interview. Your input is important because of your previous or current association 
with Global Fund and/or PEPFAR activities in Namibia.  
 
The interview should take no more than 1 hour. It will be recorded with a digital 
recorder, in order to enable me to best recall and represent your contribution. 
Any information you give me will be made anonymous. I will respect your 
decision if you do not want the conversation recorded, do not want to respond to 
a question, or if you wish to withdraw your participation from the research at any 
stage. The results of the research may be published in academic journals and 
presented at conferences. 
 
If you have read and understood the information provided, and still wish to take 
part in my research, I will ask you to sign a 













Dr. Anuj Kapilashrami (Supervisor) 
Lecturer, Global Public Health Unit 
University of Edinburgh  
Email: anuj.kapilashrami@ed.ac.uk 
Tel: +44(0) 131 650 3939 
Dr. Jeff Collin (Supervisor) 
Director, Global Public Health Unit 
University of Edinburgh  
E-mail: jeff.collin@ed.ac.uk 
Tel: +44 (0) 131 651 3961 
Ms. Ella Shihepo (Namibian Contact) 
Director, Directorate of Special Programs 
Ministry of Health and Social Services  
E-mail: shihepoe@nacop.net  













I have read and understood the information provided, and I fully to consent to 
participate in the above titled PhD research.  
 
I understand that I am not obligated to contribute to this research and I can 
withdraw my participation at any stage before, during or after the interview.   
 
By signing this form, I consent to the following: 
 
1. I will participate in a one-to-one interview with the researcher 
2. Any information I provide can be recorded in audio and/or written form for 
later use by the researcher 
3. The information I provide can be disseminated in any form relevant to the 
research as long as my name is not quoted and anonymous quotes 
cannot be directly linked to me 
 
By signing this form, I acknowledge that I understand everything in the 
information sheet and consent form. 
 
Name of the participant: __________________________ 
 
Signature of Participant: __________________________ 
 
Signature of researcher: ___________________________ 
 
Date of interview: _____________ 
Researcher: Liita-Iyaloo Naukushu 
E-mail: L.Naukushu@sms.ed.ac.uk ; lnaukushu@gmail.com  
Tel: (will include Namibian mobile number) 
Primary Supervisor: Dr. Jeff Collin 
E-mail: jeff.coll@ed.ac.uk 
Tel: +44 (0) 131 651 3961 
Secondary Supervisor: Dr. Anuj Kapilashrami 
Email: anuj.kapilashrami@ed.ac.uk 



















































Overview of the Partnership 
 
1. Can you please introduce yourself? 
a. Your position, how long you have been with the organisation, what 
is your general job description  
2. Who are main donors to the Ministry of Health? 
a. What activities do they fund within your department?  
3. What is your individual/department’s engagement with Global 
Fund/PEPFAR money in the Namibian health sector? 
4. As you understand them, what are the objectives of the Global 










a. Can you please describe your individual/department involvement 
in the planning process that led to the establishment of the formal 
documents for these mechanisms in the current rounds of funding? 
7. How have existing Ministry of Health governance structures been 
adjusted to accomodate Global Fund/PEPFAR governance requirements? 
8. In your experience, what have been some of the Ministry’s challenges and 
strengths in meeting the demands Global Fund/PEPFAR? [Please give 
examples] 
 
Health Sector Alignment 
 311 
 
9. What national strategies, policies, or frameworks do you view as 
governing priority-setting in the Namibian health sector?   
10. To what extent do you think activities in the Namibian health sector over 
the past ten years have been driven by GHIs such as PEPFAR/Global 
Fund, rather than the Ministry of Health? [Please give examples.] 
11. How would you define alignment of donor-funded activities with existing 
country health systems? 
a. To what extent do you think there could have been better 
alignment between the priorities of Global Fund/PEPFAR and 
those of the Ministry? Which areas of the health sector would you 
have emphasized and in what ways? 
12. I understand that you are part of the PEPFAR Steering Committee/GF 





Recruitment and Technical Advisors 
 
13. Technical Advisors (TAs) appear to be a prominent feature of activities 
funded by Global Fund/PEPFAR.  
a. Based on your own experiences, what have you found to be the 
strengths and weaknesses in the use of TAs for Global 
Fund/PEPFAR activities? 
14. I understand that CDC recruits and manages all project staff using the 
recruitment/HR agency, Potentia.  
a. What was the Ministry’s involvement in this decision? 
b. To what extent does the Ministry work with Potentia on HR 
recruitment issues? 
15. What implications do you think the use of TA’s and these different 
staffing processes have for long-term human resources development in 
the Namibian health sector? 
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16. As you understand them, what are the main functions of the Ministry of 
Health in the Namibian health sector? 
17. To what extent does the Ministry of Health represent the priorities and 
needs of the Namibian people?  
a. What do you view as the Ministry’s biggest strengths and 
weaknesses? 
18. To what extent has the presence of Global Fund/PEPFAR created 
opportunities and/or challenges to the Ministry, as well as the Namibian 
Health Sector? 
19. I understand that that PEPFAR has already communicated its intention 
to decrease funds and there is uncertainty around Global Fund money 
a. What do you understand as the reasons for this transition? 
b. What Ministry and health sector activities do you think will be 
most impacted by this phase out and uncertainty? In what ways? 
20. In future, what do you think health sector stakeholders (including your 
agency) should do differently or duplicate, if Namibia is presented with 







Interview Guide (Global Fund and PEPFAR) 
 
Overview of the Partnership 
 
21. Can you please introduce yourself? 
a. Your position, how long you have been with the organisation, what 
is your general job description 
22. What activities is your organization currently funding in the Ministry of 
Health and/or other agencies in the Namibian health sector? 
23. As you understand them, what are the objectives of your organisation in 
funding activities within the Namibian health sector, and the Ministry of 
Health (if stated in previous question)?  
 







a. Can you please describe your individual/department involvement 
in the planning process that led to the establishment of the formal 
documents for these mechanisms in the current rounds of funding? 
26. In your experience, what have been some of the Ministry’s challenges and 
strengths in meeting agreed upon expectations? [Please give examples] 
 
Health Sector Alignment 
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27. What national strategies, policies, or frameworks do you view as 
governing priority-setting in the Namibian health sector?   
28. To what extent do you think activities in the Namibian health sector over 
the past ten years have been driven by GHIs such as PEPFAR/Global 
Fund, rather than the Ministry of Health? [Please give examples.] 
29. How would you define alignment of donor-funded activities with existing 
country health systems? 
a. To what extent do you think there could have been better 
alignment between the priorities of Global Fund/PEPFAR and 
those of the Ministry? Which areas of the health sector would you 
have emphasized and in what ways? 
30. I understand that you are part of the PEPFAR Steering Committee/GF 





Recruitment and Technical Advisors 
 
31. Can you please discuss the role that technical advisors have played in 
current rounds of your funds to the Ministry of Health?  
32. Based on your own experiences, what have you found to be the strengths 
and weaknesses in the use of TAs in your partnership activities in 
Namibia? 
33. I understand that CDC recruits and manages all project staff using the 
recruitment/HR agency, Potentia.  
a. What was the Ministry’s involvement in this decision? 
b. To what extent does the Ministry work with Potentia on HR 
recruitment issues? 
34. What implications do you think the use of TA’s and these different 
staffing processes have for long-term human resources development in 
the Namibian health sector? 
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35. As you understand them, what are the main functions of the Ministry of 
Health in the Namibian health sector?  
36. In your opinion, to what extent does the Ministry of Health represent the 
priorities and needs of the Namibian people?  
a. What do you view as the Ministry’s biggest strengths and 
weaknesses? 
37. To what extent has the presence of Global Fund/PEPFAR created 
opportunities and/or challenges to the Ministry, as well as the Namibian 
Health Sector? 
38. I understand that your agency is phasing out/reducing funds to the 
Namibian health sector. 
a. What are the reasons for this transition? 
b. What Ministry and health sector activities do you think will be 
most impacted by this transition? In what ways? 
39. In future, what do you think health sector stakeholders (including your 
agency) should do differently or duplicate, if Namibia is presented with 










40. Can you please introduce yourself? 
a. Your position, how long you have been with the organisation, what 
is your general job description 
41. What are the main functions of your organization, in relation to the 
Namibian health sector? 
a. In what ways are your health sector activities different from those 
carried out by the Ministry of Health? 
42. What is your individual/organisation engagement with Global 
Fund/PEPFAR money in the Namibian health sector? 
43. As you understand them, what are the overall objectives of Global 
Fund/PEPFAR activities in Namibia? 
 
 
Health Sector Alignment 
 
44. What national strategies, policies, or frameworks do you view as 
governing priorities in the Namibian health sector? 
45. To what extent do you believe that activities in the Namibian health 
sector over the past ten years have been driven by Global Fund/PEPFAR, 
rather than the Ministry of Health? Please give examples. 
46. How would you define alignment of donor-funded activities with existing 
country health systems? 
a. To what extent do you think there could have been better 
alignment between the priorities of Global Fund/PEPFAR and 
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those of the Ministry? Which areas of the health sector would you 
have emphasized and in what ways? 
47. I understand that you are part of the PEPFAR Steering Committee/GF 
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48. What are the current main priorities in the Namibian health sector? 
49. As you understand them, what are the main functions of the Ministry of 
Health in the Namibian health sector?  
a. To what extent does the Ministry of Health represent the priorities 
and needs of the Namibian people?  
50. To what extent has the presence of Global Fund/PEPFAR created 
opportunities and/or challenges to your organisation, the Ministry of 
Health, as well as the rest of the Namibian health sector? 
51. I understand that that PEPFAR has already communicated their 
intention to reduce funds in Namibia over the next few years and there is 
uncertainty around Global Fund money. 
a. What do you understand as the reasons for this transition? 
b. What areas of the Namibian health sector do you think will be 
most impacted by this phase out and uncertainty? In what ways? 
52. In future, what do you think health sector stakeholders (including your 
agency) should do differently or duplicate, if Namibia is presented with 
similarly high levels of disease-specific funding as provided through 
PEPFAR/ Global Fund?  
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